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RUSSIAN REVIEW



*An American Journal
Devoted to Russia
Past and Present*

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Contributors to This Issue

HAROLD J. BERMAN is a student of Soviet law and legal practice; he graduated from Dartmouth College in 1938, received an M.A. in History at Yale, and is now a second-year student at the Yale Law School.

EDWARD PINKOWSKI is a young journalist of Polish parentage; having enlisted in the Navy in 1942, he spent the next three and a half years doing public relations work for the Navy while writing articles on naval activities for various magazines.

A. M. NIKOLAEFF, formerly Russian Military Attaché in Washington, D. C. (under the Imperial and the Provisional Governments) is the author of historical articles and book reviews in various American periodicals.

WASSILY W. LEONTIEF, SR. was Professor of Economics at the University of Petrograd-Leningrad until 1926 and subsequently lectured on Russian History and Economics at the University of Berlin; a resident of this country since 1939, he has been working on Russian Economics for various government agencies in Washington and has contributed articles to American magazines.

LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY, lecturer in Slavic at Harvard University, is the author of *The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia*, 1937; *Intervention at Archangel*, 1944; and Associate Editor of *The American Slavic and East-European Review*.

GEORGE C. GUINS, formerly Privat-Docent at the University of Petrograd and Professor of Law at Harbin College of Law, Manchuria, is the author of several books (in Russian) in the field of Social Psychology and Law and of articles in American quarterlies; at present is a Lecturer in Russian at the University of California.

GLEB STRUVE, Lecturer in Russian Literature, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, is the author of *Twenty-five Years of Soviet Literature*, 1944, and of articles and reviews in British and American magazines; for the current academic year (1946-1947) he is Visiting Lecturer at the University of California.

HELEN ISWOLSKY, daughter of the Russian Ambassador to France during the First World War, is author, lecturer, and collaborator with Nicholas Berdyaev and Jacques Maritain; among her recent books is *Soul of Russia*, 1943.

EDWARD PODOLSKY is an M.D. specializing in neuro-psychiatry and author of several books in the field of medicine, the latest of which is *Doctors, Drugs and Steel*.

MARION M. COLEMAN, a graduate of New York State College, Albany, New York, is co-editor, since 1943, of the *Bulletin* of the American Association of Teachers of Slavonic and East European Languages and co-author of *The Polish Insurrection of 1863 in the Light of New York Editorial Opinion*, 1934, *Mickiewicz in English*, 1940, and of numerous articles on the Slavs.

DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILD, Visiting Lecturer in Russian Civilization at Dartmouth College, is author of *Russia in the Intellectual Life of Eighteenth Century France*, 1936, and of articles and reviews in literary and historical publications.

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The Restoration of Law in Soviet Russia

By HAROLD J. BERMAN

WHEN the Soviets seized power in 1917, their first aim was to annihilate everything that belonged to the past. Especially in the realm of law, the attempt was made to smash not only the particular legal system of pre-revolutionary Russia, but also the conceptions and categories behind that system. And the institution of law itself was assailed.

This assault upon law was made with the weapon of Marxist historical relativism and economic determinism. In the Marxist philosophy of universal history,¹ the State did not exist in the first stages of human evolution. The primitive tribal order was communistic in nature, without class struggle; only with the emergence of a pastoral economy, and the development of the institution of slavery, was the State created as a means of enforcing the will of the slave-owners. And so, with the transition to feudalism and then to capitalism, the State developed to meet the needs of new ruling classes. The first task of the Proletarian Revolution was to smash the State machinery of the bourgeoisie and to replace it with the new State machinery, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.² But with the transition to Socialism and then to Communism, all class enmities would disappear and the State would "wither away."³

But in their enthusiasm, early Soviet jurists went beyond Marx and Engels and preached the withering away not only of the State but of law as well. The doctrine of "the withering away of law in general, that is, the gradual disappearance of the juridical element from human relations," was the official jurisprudence.⁴ "The wither-

¹See F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, N. Y., 1891.

²See V. Lenin, *State and Revolution*, 1917.

³For the classic expression of the doctrine of the withering away of the State, see Engels, *Anti-Duehring*, English edition, London, 1934, p. 308.

⁴Pashukanis, *General Theory of Law and Marxism*, 3rd ed., Moscow, 1927 (in Russian), p. 104. Pashukanis, the leader of this school of thought, was Director of the Institute of Soviet Organization and Law of the Academy of Science, and editor of the legal periodical *Soviet State and Law*.

ing away of the categories of bourgeois law—exactly the categories, and not this or that particular rule—can under no circumstances mean their replacement by some new categories of proletarian law," it was declared.⁵ And again: "We refuse to see in law an idea useful for the working class. . . . Religion and law are ideologies of the exploiting classes, and the latter gradually took the place of the former. . . . At the present time we have to combat the juridical ideology even more than the religious."⁶

This jurisprudence found expression in every branch of Soviet law. Of particular interest from the theoretical standpoint were its repercussions in the fields of criminal law and family law.

Criminal law, according to early Soviet legal writers,⁷ originated when the motive of vengeance of the primitive blood-feud was replaced by the motive of retribution and compensation. This happened when the exchange of commodities began to be a more regular feature of daily life. The rise of the market place fixed the principle of equivalents in men's minds, and criminal law is in reality the judicial expression of that principle. As the product of a society which centered its economic life around the exchange of commodities, criminal law, it was thought, is essentially bourgeois law and will wither away under Socialism. Moreover, in anticipation of this event, the juridical categories of crime, punishment, and guilt, were replaced with sociological categories. Thus for the words "crime" and "punishment" in Soviet legislation were substituted "socially dangerous acts" and "measures of social defense."⁸ Fault was declared to be a bourgeois criterion: "measures of social defense" should be administered in accordance with the best interests of the Workers'-and-Peasants' State, which should in turn be determined by the "revolutionary legal conscience" of the judges. The eighteenth century doctrine of "no crime, no punishment, without a law" (i.e., without a previously existing statute defining the crime and the punishment to be meted out) was attacked, and in its stead the

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁶A. G. Goikhbarg, *Economic Law*, 3rd ed., Moscow, 1924 (in Russian), vol. 2, pp. 8, 19.

⁷Cf. John Hazard, "Reforming Soviet Criminal Law," *Journal of Criminal Law*, 1938, vol. 29, p. 157; Schlesinger, *Soviet Legal Theory*, 1945, pp. 152 ff.

⁸Cf. Criminal Code, R.S.F.S.R., art. 1: "The penal legislation of the R.S.F.S.R. has as its aim the protection of the Socialist State of Workers and Peasants, and the legal order established therein, from socially dangerous acts (crimes) by means of application to persons who have committed them of the measures of social defense indicated in the present Code."

principle of analogy was introduced: if an act or omission was socially dangerous and there was no specific statute prohibiting it, the judge could apply a statute prohibiting an analogous act or omission. During the period of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat (and especially during the strategic retreat of the N.E.P.), criminal laws and a criminal code—"bourgeois in form, but proletarian in substance"—were necessary. But even these were restricted more and more to the enunciation of general doctrines, and it was believed that ultimately there would be no criminal law whatsoever, but everything would be left to administration, re-education of offenders, and the general well-being of a classless society in which crime would, for all practical purposes, disappear altogether.

Similarly in the field of family law, it was anticipated that with the achievement of Socialism there would be no need whatsoever for the State to mix into marital affairs. The "formal" monogamy of bourgeois society, founded on the economic supremacy of men and concealing their "secret polygamy" (prostitution, etc.), would be replaced by "real" monogamy, for the men as well.⁹ With the industrialization of society, women would be economically emancipated and would refuse any longer to tolerate the infidelity of their husbands. And the family, like law, would wither away, and all children would be brought up by the State. Looking forward to this transformation of the family into a free association, bound only by the free will of the members, the Soviet lawmakers of 1917 secularized marriage and granted complete freedom of divorce.¹⁰ And in the Family Code of 1926 both marriage and divorce were relegated to the sphere of private agreement, with the control of the courts and of the State reduced to a minimum.

To evaluate properly the extreme anti-legalism of the first years of the Revolution, it should be remembered that Soviet jurisprudence got its start in an essentially lawless situation. The success of the Revolution depended on what was officially called the "Red Terror"; and further, despite the efforts of the leaders to check it, anarchism of the Bakunin variety was an important element of the revolutionary ferment. Perhaps many of the new principles in criminal law can be attributed to the Terror, and many of the

⁹Cf. Engels, *op. cit., supra*, note 1, p. 61 ff.

¹⁰Decrees of December 18 and 19, 1917, Collection of Laws, R.S.F.S.R., 1917, no. 11, art. 160; *ibid.*, no. 10, art. 152. Under the pre-revolutionary Imperial Code, marriage and divorce were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, and were governed by the laws of the different religious confessions.

theories of family law to anarchism. Undoubtedly, the necessities of the Revolution were partly responsible for the wide use of the doctrine of analogy in criminal law, the subordination of culpability to political interests, and the replacement of the supremacy of law by revolutionary legal consciousness. Undoubtedly, also, the collapse of morality and of moral values was partly responsible for the rebellion against a religious conception of marriage and divorce.

But the Soviet jurists who were called upon to interpret these revolutionary legal institutions in the light of Marxism saw in them not simply a response to a perilous emergency situation, but rather the beginning of the complete disappearance of law from the Soviet social order.

In the middle of the last decade, it was proclaimed that Socialism—the first phase of Communism—was achieved; at the same time, the 1936 Constitution was promulgated, and Stalin, in reporting on it, declared that "we need stability of laws now more than ever." These words introduced a profound upheaval in Soviet jurisprudence. Pashukanis, Stuchka, Krylenko, Goikhbarg, Rubinstein, and other erstwhile distinguished jurists were bitterly attacked for their negative and "nihilistic" attitude toward law. The repercussions of this attack were felt, and are still being felt, in every branch of the Soviet legal system.

The new Soviet jurisprudence emphasizes the positive rôle of law in the building up of Socialism. It was expressed most forcefully by Vyshinsky, who replaced Krylenko in 1937 as People's Commissar of Justice. Vyshinsky called for a reconstruction of civil law¹¹ as well as a new spirit in criminal law. He attacked the Pashukanis school for reducing law to politics, saying that "such a way of thinking reflects discredit on Soviet law and legality by asserting that the Soviets do not defend the rights of citizens but tend to carry out their politics."¹² He likewise attacked Stuchka and his followers, who, by reducing law to economics, "fell into economic materialism,"¹³ "liquidated law as a particular and specific social category, drowned it in economics and deprived it of its active and creative rôle. Such a legal approach deprives the independent investigation

¹¹Previously Civil Law was being replaced by what was called Economic Public Law, which minimized the rights of the individual.

¹²A. Vyshinsky, *Basic Tasks of the Science of Soviet Socialist Law*, Moscow, 1938 (in Russian), p. 31.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 30.

of law as a special science of all meaning.”¹⁴ And Vyshinsky decried “the enemies of the people who slanderously asserted that Soviet law is not Socialist law, that in general there is not and cannot be Socialist law, that Soviet law is doomed to fade out and ‘wither away.’”¹⁵

Passages are now found in the writings of Marx and Lenin to prove that their attack on law was an attack on bourgeois law and not a denial of Socialist law, and that the necessity for juridical categories has always been understood by true Marxists. The situation which was faced in the first two decades of the Revolution is distinguished from the situation of today, in which, it is claimed, Socialism is achieved and the direct transition to Communism under way.

A “rehabilitation of law”¹⁶ has been carried out on a large scale. New law schools in the universities have been established, and special law schools created. Professors of law who were trained under the pre-revolutionary régime have been defended against their former detractors. The Latin language has been restored to a place of importance. “Judicial culture” and the need for “judicial authority” is emphasized.

In criminal law, the “commodity exchange” theories of Pashukanis have been renounced. The tribal blood-feud is now understood as a primitive form of “the self-defense of society against all violations of the conditions of its existence.”¹⁷ Not equivalency of injury for injury, but rather the protection of the group from further danger, is thought to be the basis for early forms of retribution and composition. Criminal law has thus existed in all societies, and is not simply a “bourgeois” institution. And it will continue to exist under Socialism as long as the interests of the workers have to be protected whether from within or without. Furthermore, the failure to see positive value in the juridical approach to crime, punishment, guilt, etc., and the lack of interest in the rights of the defendant and in correct legal procedure, are evidence of a desire to undermine Soviet law and Socialist justice.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁵A. Vyshinsky, *The Soviet Court and the Socialist Administration of Justice*, Moscow, 1938 (in Russian), p. 4.

¹⁶Cf. Max Laserson, *Russia and the Western World*, 1945, Chapter IV: “The Rehabilitation of Law.”

¹⁷This is Marx’s definition of criminal sanctions in general. Cf. N. V. Krylenko, “More on the Criticism of the Recent Past,” *Soviet Justice*, no. 16, 1937 (in Russian), p. 6. In this article Krylenko repudiates Pashukanis.

In restoring the word "crime," Soviet jurists now emphasize the element of personal responsibility for conduct. A crime consists not merely in a socially dangerous act: there must also be culpability (intentional or negligent) on the part of the actor. And further, there should be a statutory prohibition of the act and a statutory definition of the penalty. Thus a crime is now defined¹⁸ as "a socially dangerous, culpable, punishable act or omission." The doctrine of analogy has been severely limited: while not returning to a formal legalism, the Soviet courts now require a showing, if analogy is to be applied, of a similarity both in kind and importance between the act committed and the act prohibited, and further, the act committed must be one which is *generally* prohibited by law but simply not specifically included in the Special Part of the Criminal Code.¹⁹

The phrase "measure of social defense" is now attacked as unworthy, and doctrines of "punishment" are brought back. It is no longer only the protection of society, or the will of the State, or the re-education of the delinquent, that is stressed, but also the condemnation of the crime and of the criminal. "The mark of punishment that distinguishes it from other measures of political compulsion is that it inevitably causes the criminal a definite suffering which is painful to him."²⁰ By making the criminal suffer, the State, acting through the judge, expresses society's condemnation of his act. The deterrent and educational aspects of punishment are not eliminated; but they are seen now as aspects of punishment, whereas previously punishment was seen as an aspect of them.

The changes in family law in the last decade have been even more striking. The Law of June 27, 1936, prohibiting abortions, providing benefits for mothers of large families, extending the network of public crèches and nurseries, and placing certain procedural and financial restrictions on divorce, reflected a new attitude: in a society in which law was now held to have positive and creative value, the family was to be given all possible legal support. At the same time, this new attitude had to make its way against the provisions of the 1926 Family Code, which was still in force. By recent amendments to the Code,²¹ however, this discrepancy is resolved. Marriage,

¹⁸All-Union Institute of Juridical Science, *Criminal Law, General Part*, Moscow, 1943 (in Russian), p. 101.

¹⁹The Soviet codes contain a general part, in which basic principles are enunciated, and a special part, in which particular crimes and punishments are defined.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 218.

²¹Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., July 8, 1944,

which previously could result from the mere cohabiting of the parties with the intent to be considered married, must now be registered in order to have validity. Divorce is restored to the jurisdiction of the courts, and a complicated and expensive procedure is established for the express purpose of discouraging it. The legal equality of the spouses, formerly a principle which tended to take the woman out of the home, is now extended and redirected to strengthen the position of the wife and mother.²² For the purpose of distinguishing more clearly between marital and extra-marital ties, children born out of wedlock are now supported by State allowances to the mother rather than by payments exacted from the father as before. Money allowances are paid to all mothers on the birth of the third and each subsequent child, while the privileges for expectant mothers and the network of institutions for the care of mothers and children are greatly extended. The prohibition of abortions and the criminal sanction against "insulting and humiliating the dignity of mothers" are reaffirmed. And as a symbol of the value which is placed upon the bearing of children, the Motherhood Medal, the Order of the Glory of Motherhood, and the honorary title of Mother Heroine are instituted for mothers of five children and more.

"The task of Soviet Socialist family law," it can now be said,²³ "consists in giving form to the new Socialist family and strengthening it in every way."

The restoration of law in Soviet Russia is part of a change which has come over the whole of Soviet life during the past decade. A new respect for Russian history has developed. The need for religious faith has been recognized. Marxism has been re-valued in the light of both the past and the future. The Revolution has emerged from its violent international phase into a period of national conservatism and stability.

Unfriendly critics from the left have viewed this movement as a

published in English in *Information Bulletin*, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Wash., D. C., July 25, 1944, vol. iv, no. 84. This and supplementary edicts were incorporated in the Family Code, R.S.F.S.R., by the Edict of April 16, 1945, *Journal of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.*, May 11, 1945 (in Russian), no. 26 (353), 4.

²²Recent judicial interpretation of the community property law gives each spouse greater control over the joint property. Reikhel, "General Property Relationships of the Spouses in Soviet Law," *Soviet State and Law*, 1940, vol. 8-9 (in Russian), p. 113-114. Also the family allowances for the birth of children are the private property of the mother.

²³All-Union Institute of Juridical Science, *Civil Law*, 1938 (in Russian), vol. 2, p. 417.

betrayal of Socialism,²⁴ and from the right it has been seen as a "Great Retreat."²⁵ Yet fundamental principles have survived from 1917 on. Particularly in the fields of law that have herein been discussed, there has been no wholesale abandonment of the positive gains of the Revolution, but rather a re-integration of new and old. Sociological concepts of criminal law have not been rejected; rather the attempt has been made to reconcile them with traditional juridical categories. The principles of monogamy, the lifelong character of marriage, the equality of the spouses, the protection of children born out of wedlock, and State support of mother and child—are preserved from early days, but whereas previously they were directed toward the eventual withering away of the family as a juridical entity, and were to be achieved by the free choice of individuals, they are now reoriented toward the strengthening of the family and placed under the aegis of law.

The new Soviet jurisprudence thus represents an equilibrium between the Revolution and Russia, between change and continuity. As such, it has importance for the understanding not only of Soviet Russia but of law as well.

²⁴Cf. A. Koestler, *The Yogi and the Commissar*, 1945.

²⁵Cf. N. S. Timasheff, *The Great Retreat*, 1946.

Soviet Trainees in U.S.A. in World War II

By EDWARD PINKOWSKI

If you haven't heard about the Navy's training of Russian fliers in this country, you can attribute it to the patriotic citizens of Elizabeth City, North Carolina, who kept the secret to themselves. Nearly 12,000 people in this sleepy Southern town knew about the Russian fliers because they saw them in their stores, movie houses, homes, and in Navy planes over their city, but not once did they mention it in their press or radio.

Only recently did the Navy disclose that it trained approximately 140 Russian airmen at Elizabeth City in 1944 as part of a lend-lease agreement with the Soviet Union. In March 1944, the Soviet Purchasing Commission had arranged with the Lend-Lease Administration to deliver 48 Navy patrol bombers to Russia, but the contract was held up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No reason was given for this action, but President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who many believed arranged with Stalin at Teheran to give Russia some of our military equipment, overrode the Joint Chiefs of Staff's refusal, and the contract went through.

Admiral Ernest J. King, then Chief of Naval Operations, turned over the work of accepting the planes from the factory, checking out Russian crews, and actually delivering the planes to Soviet representatives to the Atlantic Fleet Air Force. The work sifted down to a headquarters squadron under Lieutenant Richard C. Harper, a blonde, high-cheeked lad from Wilmette, Illinois.

The training program, known as Project Zebra, fell on the husky shoulders of a 31-year-old Bostonian of Russian descent, Lieutenant Commander—then Lieutenant—Stanley Chernack, U.S.N.R., who had four years experience as a Navy flyer. Most of his flight time, however, was in connection with research and development of the searchlight for night flying, parachute bombs, and training of fliers in firing aircraft rockets. Because of his ability to speak Russian, he had been taken off rocket training to play the rôle of linguist, teacher, diplomat, and purchasing agent for 25 hand-picked Russian flying crews.

When on April 4, 1944, he arrived at the Patrol Plane Base at Elizabeth City to take over his new assignment, he found five Russian crews already there. Each Russian crew normally consisted of a pilot, a co-pilot, a navigator, two flight engineers, all of whom were commissioned officers, and an enlisted radioman. The officers were grouped in the Bachelor Officers' Quarters and the enlisted men in barracks.

The way everything happened at the same time gave Chernack little time to prepare himself. Fortunately, the French had just taken out their remaining lend-lease planes, and the operational facilities already established at the Patrol Plane Base provided a going concern for the Russian enterprise.

On April 17, two weeks after the first group arrived, 15 more crews, accompanied by Colonel V. Vassilyev, who assumed command of all Russian crews, pulled into Elizabeth City. They were wearing heavy winter uniforms and looked like tundra soldiers invading the south. That couldn't last. They were called to a certain building and measured for summer uniforms, including a black tie, a gray shirt, and gray trousers.

None of the Russian officers and men spoke English and that made their training very difficult. The need for interpreters was obvious. Lieutenant Commander Chernack, who spoke only Russian and German until he was four, still knew enough about the Russian language to get along, but the long hand of the Navy reached out and found about 15 interpreters for the project. Appearing in the classes were also five interpreters from the Russian Embassy in Washington.

In the beginning, the Russians were wary of some of the Navy interpreters. One officer, towering, handsome Lieutenant Gregory G. Gagarin, stood out in the group. It seems his family name played an important rôle in Russian official circles in Tsarist days, and the young Gagarin, who spoke Russian, French, German, and English, was watched with suspicion. His mother was a Russian countess, and his father, until the Russian Revolution in 1917, was a prominent Cavalry officer. At any rate, before the Russian fliers left Elizabeth City, they learned more about radio and radar from this interpreter than they could have from Russian books and instructors. They came to like him, too.

Two officers, one a Russian and the other an American, got along without the use of an interpreter, yet neither spoke the other's language. The American was Ensign King E. Hodges, a likable, effi-

cient engineering officer who came up through the ranks, and the Russian was Colonel Kokorev, one of Russia's outstanding aeronautical engineers. By pointing and grimacing both understood each other when they described the Pratt Whitney engines that went into the patrol bombers.

The Soviet airmen were divided into classes according to the structure of the plane that they were going to handle. Then each group received instruction in his specialty. In some cases the American interpreter had to lecture to a Russian interpreter, paragraph by paragraph, who then passed the information on to the students. The Russians were thorough, hard-working and eager to learn. They didn't move from one point to another without understanding every part of American equipment. They admired American production methods.

One of the difficulties was the fact that the Russian fliers had no seaplane experience. They had flown only single engine land planes. The Russian Navy had no air force. That's why these Reds all had Army ranks.

Each crew received approximately 80 hours of flight training as well as ground school instruction in the structure of the PBN-1 aircraft fuel and hydraulic systems, armament, radar, engines and accessories, rescue equipment, loading, weight and balance of aerial navigation.

The Russian fliers found the Navy procedure different from their own. In Russia the fliers come and go as they please and have no air traffic rules. They don't circle the field as we do. They just barge in. They also don't request permission to take off as we do. But they learned the Navy procedure, with the help of interpreters in the control tower who gave them the proper instruction in their own language.

The Russians expected a great deal from the planes. Major Peskarov, for example, who brought the first detachment of Russian crews, took off in a patrol bomber with a training crew and interpreter aboard. The plane, carrying two cement torpedoes as dummies for armament practice, had the maximum load of 40,000 pounds. Instead of dropping the cement dummies to lighten the load of the plane for landing, Major Peskarov, a fearless flier who had been shot down three times in the battle of Leningrad, insisted on making a landing with the full load. He landed safely in Albemarle Sound, and it turned out to be a record for a PBN-1 plane.

That feat didn't surprise the officer in charge of the project as

much as the time one of the Russian fliers, a deep-chested fellow with a bald head, approached him on the seaplane ramp and asked him the distance to Nag's Head, a popular beach resort in North Carolina.

"About forty-five miles," Chernack replied in Russian.

The man stood quietly a moment figuring the miles in kilometers. A smile spread across his tawny face.

"I can swim that," he said simply.

Taken aback, Chernack didn't know what to say, and finally turned to a bystander skeptically. "Is he kidding?"

"No," the fellow replied, "he holds the record for long-distance swimming in Russia."

These stories of the Russians grew as the training went on and finally leaked into the homes of Elizabeth City. Lieutenant Commander Chernack was then besieged with telephone calls every night from people in the local community inviting the Russians to their homes for dinner. A fine friendship between two great peoples was born not only in the project but also in the community. The Russians were invited to attend their movies and buy in their stores. They were taken into town on shopping trips in groups of ten with an interpreter. The people treated them with great respect as the Russian armed forces were then making their great stand at Stalingrad.

Major Peskarov was in command of the first group of four planes to leave Elizabeth City on May 25, 1944. Because the planes were routed over the North Atlantic along a network of R.A.F. bases, the Royal Air Force sent a detachment to brief the Russian crews and provide safety crews, usually two men, to assist them in communications in the air and during stopovers at R.A.F. bases. Later on a R.A.F. navigator was added to these crews.

The 25th plane to be delivered was the only one of the original 48 that was lost en route. Unfortunately, Colonel Vassilyev, who had been recalled to Russia, was on that plane. But that did not stop the Russians from bidding for more planes. By the time the 48 planes were flown to Russia, another lend-lease contract for 90 more planes, some of which were PBY-6A's, was in the works.

The first thirty of these planes were delivered by Navy crews to Kodiak, Alaska, where they were taken over by the same Russian crews which had ferried the planes on the North Atlantic route. The Russians flew the planes to Vladivostok or Amadyr, Siberia, and used them for convoy patrols.

When winter began to nip their ears, Lieutenant Commander

Chernack, R.A.F. representatives, and the Russians sat down to work out a new route. The North Atlantic was too stormy for winter ferry service. The one selected routed the planes down to South America, then across the Atlantic. The flights over this route were controlled by Naval Air Transportation Service as far as Port Lyautey, Africa, where the Royal Air Force took over. The R.A.F. guided the planes to Habbaniyah, Persia, and from there the Russians went on alone to Baku, Russia.

It was not until October 31, 1944, two months before the project folded up, that the Navy began to equip the patrol bombers with Norden bombsights and a new type of radio and radar gear. At least fifty of the planes were equipped with these secret devices.

Most of the Russian fliers who took the first planes over returned to learn how to operate the new gear. There were only a few new faces, and the training did not take as long as before. With their maddening desire for knowledge and curiosity in American-made engines, the Russians cooperated splendidly in the training program.

Lieutenant Commander Chernack, who played the top card in this odd rôle, had three different Russian commanders to deal with during this training. First was Peskarov, second was Vassilyev, and third was a graduate of the Russian Military Academy, shrewd, capable Lieutenant Colonel V. A. Terstsiev, who was quicker to see the American method of training and procedure than Vassilyev. Lean, tall Vassilyev generally insisted on the Russian way of doing things.

Terstsiev, however, accomplished more results. The Russians liked him and respected him for his knowledge of flight and engineering problems, and his American friends rated him high for his ability to see things the American way. The discipline of the Soviet airmen was the same but not as noticeable under him as under Vassilyev.

The story of Navy training of Russian personnel was repeated to a large extent in 1945, when 15,000 Russian sailors hit the beaches of Cold Harbor, Alaska, to take over 138 small surface craft under a lend-lease agreement. This small number of planes and ships was all the Navy lend-leased to Russia during the war. The ships included LCI's, former Coast Guard frigates, mine sweepers, submarine chasers, and other small craft.

Cold Bay wasn't as exposed to American hospitality as Elizabeth City, but the Navy fed and quartered the Russian Navy trainees as well as anyone ever was. They got along well. Here again Uncle

Sam's bluejackets were impressed with the Russian boys' maddening desire for knowledge and sports.

This chapter in Russian lend-lease history began late in February 1945, when the commandant of the 17th Naval District, Alaska, was ordered to set up a base at Cold Bay for training the Red fleet sailors to take over certain of our ships. In May of that year, Captain William S. Maxwell, a well-known mustang who was welter-weight and middleweight boxing champion and interpreter of the Siberian Expeditionary Forces at Vladivostok in 1919, among other assignments, was rushed to Alaska to train the Soviet crews. Although he knew the Russian language as well as the day he was born in Moscow 46 years ago, he dealt mainly with the Russian officer in charge of the Red crews, Rear Admiral Boris Popov.

The procedure for training them was simple. They were trained ashore for four weeks, then taken aboard the ships that were earmarked for them. The Red sailors joined the Navy crews in a training cruise on the vessel and learned what they had to do. It didn't vary much from their own ships except in a few details. Once trained, the Soviet crews sailed to Siberia alone.

This training went on until September 1945. By that time most of the ships were poised to strike at Japan through the Kuriles simultaneously with an Allied operation from the south toward Kyushu or Honshu. But the end of the war lowered the curtain on an important scene in the drama of Allied cooperation.

The February Revolution and the Russian Army

By A. M. NIKOLAEFF

A GENERAL belief exists that the old Russian army, especially that exclusive portion of it, the Imperial Guard, played an important rôle in the outbreak of the Revolution in March, 1917. (February, according to the Russian calendar). Without doubt, this belief is based on the fact that in the early press reports describing the street demonstrations of the workers and the mutiny of the troops in Petrograd, and in the historical accounts which were subsequently published and widely circulated (such as Leon Trotsky's *History of the Revolution*), the names of the crack Guard regiments figured prominently. In these accounts one reads that a mutiny broke out in the Volynski and Pavlovski regiments, units of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions of the Guard which had won great distinction in the Napoleonic wars; that the whole Preobrazhenski regiment, one of the two oldest regiments of the 1st Infantry Division of the Guard formed by Peter the Great, "was marching [in mutiny] down the street . . . without a single officer"; and that Voroshilov, one of Lenin's and Trotsky's close associates at the time, "led the Izmailovski Guard Regiment [another unit of the 1st Infantry Division] in street battles."

Such statements create the impression that the three infantry divisions of the Guard, and some additional troops of the line assembled at the capital, all mutinied almost overnight when street riots occurred there.

As a matter of fact, at the time of the outbreak of the Revolution, all the regiments of the Imperial Guard, together with their officers, as well as all the infantry regiments of the line, were at the front. During those days the exact position of the regiments of the Guard, of which the majority had been quartered in Petrograd in time of peace, was at the southwestern section of the front facing the Austrian and German armies, some 800 miles away from Petrograd. How, then, was it possible for the regiments that supposedly started the Revolution to be at the same time in two so widely separated places, the capital and the southwestern front?

The purpose of this article is to answer this puzzling question and to make clear which troops actually participated in the mutiny.

In accordance with the laws for the national defense of the Russian Empire, upon declaration of war, every infantry regiment as it mobilized was to form a replacement unit, the object of which was to replace the losses suffered by the army at the front. At the beginning of the war, the replacement units were called battalions, but as the war went on they were deployed into regiments. Each of those units was given the name of the regiment of the regular army to which it had to send reinforcements. Thus the replacement units sending men, for instance, to the Pavlovski and Preobrazhenski regiments bore the names of replacement battalions (later replacement regiments) of these two regiments of the Guard. According to mobilization regulations, only ten professional officers and a few score trained soldiers were to be assigned to each replacement battalion to serve as its cadre.

The strength of the Russian Army in the field in World War I, as estimated in January 1917, i.e., two months before the Revolution, was 6,900,000 men.¹ The number of replacement troops had to be proportionally large. They formed a whole "army of the rear" behind the army in the field. By the 1st of January 1917, their number had reached the imposing figure of more than 2,170,000.² Assembled in large groups, they occupied certain populous centers and various areas in a zone extending behind the front and were trained there. One of these training centers was in and around Petrograd. It consisted of those replacement units which were to send reinforcements to the regiments of the Guard.

On the eve of the Revolution the replacement units were made up of a contingent that had received no previous training. By far the greater part of them consisted of men belonging to the second class of the militia (up to 43 years old). A law empowering the military authorities to call out those men for active service in the field had been passed in the third year of the war, up to which time, under the ruling of the conscription law, they had been free from service. The orders calling them out were issued from September, 1916, until the end of that year. Therefore, having been enlisted only recently, from the military point of view they represented raw material gathered from all over the country, welded together neither by discipline nor by the spirit of comradeship. Furthermore, men evacuated from the

¹N. Golovin, *The Russian Army in the World War*, 1931, p. 109.

²Ibid., p. 116.

front because they had been found unfit were also included in that concentration of replacement troops.

However, it was neither the recency of their enlistment, nor their lack of previous training which prevented the making of good soldiers from these raw contingents. The main difficulties were due to two other circumstances, namely, the inadequate number of experienced instructors, i.e., officers and non-commissioned officers, and the fact that Petrograd, while it was a large concentration area of replacement units in the rear, was at the same time an industrial center of prime importance.

Due to the great shortage of army officers in the field, the number of officers assigned for training the recruits and militiamen in the depots was not only inadequate, but pathetically small. Instead of the established proportion of ten officers to a replacement battalion, that is, to every thousand men (a proportion of officers, by the way, much smaller than that of the army in the field), there were at the capital approximately two officers to every company, in spite of the fact that the number of men in a company of replacement troops had grown to fifteen hundred. In addition, officers who were physically fit were the exception. It is clear, therefore, that with one officer to every seven or eight hundred men, only nominal control over the replacement troops could be maintained. It was also impossible to train them properly.

In Imperial Russia, with its agricultural population equal to 85 per cent of the whole population, by far the greater part of the army, including its depot contingents, consisted of peasants. These, taken as a whole, constituted the most conservative class of the population. Quite the opposite was true with regard to the industrial workers, whose number, estimated at about one and three-quarters per cent, including women and those under age, formed only a small fraction of the total population of the Empire. The industrial workers were strongly affected by revolutionary propaganda, and many of them belonged to revolutionary parties. The mood of the workers before the Revolution and their attitude toward the government and the war may be judged by the number of strikes. In the course of 1916 there were as many as 1,410 economic and political strikes, involving 1,080,000 persons, and Petrograd was "leading in the political strike movement."³

A total of approximately a quarter of a million workers engaged in making munitions and filling war orders was employed in the many

³M. T. Florinsky, *The End of the Russian Empire*, pp. 165 ff.

factories in and around Petrograd. This fact created extremely favorable conditions for the carrying on of revolutionary agitation among the replacement units, and no effort was spared to win the newly enlisted peasants to the side of the workers. That revolutionary agitation was carried on among them was known as early as September, 1915.⁴

On March 8, 1917 (February 23, Russian calendar) a number of workers went on strike and rioting occurred because of a supposed shortage of bread in the capital. On the fourth day the rioting elements were joined by mutinous soldiers of the 4th Company (1,500 strong) of the Pavlovski replacement regiment.⁵ The following day nearly all the remaining replacement troops joined the uprising. The swiftness with which the mutiny spread among the replacement units may serve as the best proof of how thoroughly the ground for a mutiny had been prepared. On March 12, the fifth day of the rioting, the capital was in the hands of an armed mob which recognized no authority except its own. The mob set fire to government buildings, seized the arsenal, and threw open the prison gates, setting criminal offenders free. Policemen, as well as many officers, were disarmed, beaten, and occasionally killed.

The revolutionary outbreak in the capital was a surprise not only to the army at the front, but to everybody in Russia. Professor P. N. Miliukov, member of the Duma and Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government, writes: "A real revolution broke out . . . basing itself on forces differing from such as had been confidently expected by the Duma. . . . It [the Duma] was taken unawares, as everybody was . . . by the soldiers' outbreak on March 12."⁶

The government might have gained control over this situation if it had had regular troops under the command of a strong man at its disposal in Petrograd. But no regular troops were at hand,⁷ nor was

⁴S. E. Kryzhanovsky, *Vospominaniya*, 1938, p. 160.

⁵*Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhima*, Leningrad, 1924, pp. 195 ff. From the testimony of General Khabarov, Commander-in-Chief of the Petrograd garrison, it is clear that bread was available in the army supply stores in Petrograd. The distribution of this bread would have put an end to the disturbances at the very beginning, but no such distribution was made.

⁶P. N. Miliukov, *Bolshevism; an International Danger*, New York, 1920, p. 69.

⁷In addition to some four thousand policemen, a very inadequate number, there was at hand for the suppression of the riots, outside of replacement units, a mounted force of only two or three thousand men belonging to Cossack militia and to a reserve cavalry regiment hastily brought to the capital from Novgorod (about 100 miles away).

the general who was responsible for the maintenance of order in the capital a man of energy and determination.

The Emperor abdicated March 15, and the Provisional Government was formed the same day. The Revolution was an accomplished fact. At this point an important detail should be brought to light showing that the Petrograd replacement troops were not as eager to overthrow the existing régime as they were to stay away from the front. No doubt inspired by the revolutionary leaders, they demanded that under no conditions should they be sent to the front to fight the enemy, and claimed that their presence in the capital was necessary for the defense of the Revolution. This unsoldierly demand was promptly approved by the Provisional Government.

What was the morale and general state of efficiency of the Russian army at the front during the months immediately preceding the Revolution? In the accounts of the Revolution published in English little, if any, light has been thrown on this important question.

To answer this question it seems best to quote the opinions of those who were in a position to know the state of the Army at the front. Among these there were some who were in sympathy with the sudden change of the political régime and others who were not.

First, let us see what was the opinion of those army leaders who, in the early days of 1917, led the Russian forces in an offensive against the armies of the Central Powers, planned in common with the Allies. The views expressed by two military commanders, General A. A. Brusilov and General A. I. Denikin, are of special significance. Before the Revolution, both held high posts at the front, the former that of Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern group of armies, the latter that of Commander of the 8th Army Corps. Neither was demoted in consequence of the Revolution; on the contrary, Brusilov was appointed to the post of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Denikin to that of Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern group of armies. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, Brusilov recognized the Soviet régime, remained in Russia, and gave his support to the Red military leaders, whereas Denikin, became leader of the White forces. Neither sympathized with the Imperial régime or had a personal grudge against the March Revolution. Yet, after the Bolshevik coup d'état, their opinions represented views poles apart.

Speaking of revolutionary propaganda and the morale in the Army, Brusilov wrote: "[During the winter of 1916-1917] as before, the drafts sent me were poorly trained and their minds were poisoned

by propaganda, but at the front by dint of hard work, all that was soon put aright. . . . I was convinced that with careful preparation on the same lines as that of the preceding year, and with the increased materiel that I now had, we could not but attain a striking success in 1917. . . . In any case, the discipline was still excellent at that moment [winter of 1916-1917], and had we taken the offensive there was no doubt that the troops would have done their duty as they did in 1916."⁸

Let us turn to Denikin: "Propaganda from without [that is, carried on by German agents] and from within had an influence chiefly on the troops on duty in the rear and on replacement battalions quartered at the larger centers, especially at Petrograd. But it produced comparatively little effect on army units at the front. Consequently, whenever drafts that had been led astray by propaganda came to the front they would quickly change their mind in the hard but healthy atmosphere of fighting. However . . . before the revolution, there were two or three instances of disobedience by whole units which were severely suppressed."⁹ We further read: "Judging from my own experience, not merely from statistical data, I have ample ground to state that by the end of 1916 our army, though it had not reached the high standards of technical preparedness of the Allied armies, had been provided with combat equipment, fully sufficient for starting planned and extensive operations on its entire front." In another place of his account we read that at the end of January 1917, that is, one month before the Revolution, the old Russian army, opposed on its front by "49 per cent of all the enemy forces engaged on the European and Asiatic fronts . . . had preserved sufficient strength for going on with the war and winning a victory."

Thus, we see from these quotations that the two generals were sure of the fighting fitness of the Russian army on the eve of the Revolution. Their opinion is fully supported by the fact that at the time of the revolutionary outbreak in Petrograd there was no mutiny at the front.

As a matter of fact, the news of the Revolution came to the army as a complete surprise. "The troops," writes Denikin, "were stupefied. . . . There was neither joy nor grief." When the division, drawn up in formation, heard the news that the Emperor had abdicated, "here and there rifles would swing unintentionally and tears

⁸A. A. Brusilov, *A Soldier's Note-Book*, London, 1930, pp. 282, 287.

⁹A. I. Denikin, *Ocherki russkoi smuty*, Paris, 1922, pp. 28, 31-32, 37.

would run down the cheeks of the veterans."¹⁰ Such was the impression produced on the 8th Army Corps by the news. And there is no evidence that the attitude of other army units at the front was different from that of Denikin's army corps.

In opposition to the opinion of the two leaders of the Imperial army, a Soviet publication issued in 1925 by the *Centrarkhiv* (Central Archives) under the title *Razlozhenie armii v 1917 godu* (Disintegration of the Army in 1917) states that a "disintegration of the army began even before the February [March, according to our calendar] Revolution," and that documents printed therein show this to be true. However, the documents, with the exception of a brief chapter at the beginning, refer to the period which followed the Revolution, and may not, therefore, be considered as reflecting the situation at the front before the Revolution. As regards the portion of the book devoted to the pre-revolutionary period, the most unfavorable document regarding the morale of the old Russian army appears in an excerpt from the "Minutes of a conference of the Commanders-in-Chief of the fronts" in December 1916. At that conference General Brusilov stated that there were cases of mutiny in the 7th Siberian Army Corps which had been stationed in the Riga area. He, as well as General Ruzsky, Commander-in-Chief of another group of armies, called Riga a center of revolutionary propaganda. Several soldiers of that army corps had to be shot after they had killed their company commander. Following General Brusilov, General Evert, Commander-in-Chief of the Western front, reported that seven soldiers had to be court-martialed and shot because of a mutiny which followed some disturbances caused by an alleged scarcity of food.

In another Soviet publication¹¹ we read that shortly before the Revolution, a part of the 223rd Regiment of the 56th Infantry Division, under the influence of propaganda by seventeen agitators, refused to relieve another regiment of that division holding a position in the front line.

From these publications we see that cases of mutiny occurred in the units which had been withdrawn from the trenches and were resting in the areas close by where it was easy for agitators to work among them. But the quotations from the accounts of Brusilov and Denikin show that both, as they wrote their accounts, said practically the same thing in regard to mutinies before the Revolution as

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 60.

¹¹*Krasnyi Arkhiv*, 1937, vol. 81, pp. 19 ff.

the Soviet publications did. Yet the two leaders of the Army were convinced that the fighting capacity of the army at the front, as a whole, was not affected by these few serious breaches of discipline.

Now let us examine what was written on this subject by persons who did not hold high military posts but who were in a position to comprehend the situation.

In his reminiscences of war and revolution in Russia, Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, who was doing his military service in an engineer battalion, as a volunteer, at the outbreak of World War I, and at its close advanced to the rank of captain, writing of the condition and morale of the Russian army in the latter part of 1916, says: "I may say categorically, notwithstanding we were six months away from the revolution, that never had the army been in a better state. Now at last we had plenty of technical equipment and ammunition. The discipline in the regiments I visited was good . . . the officers were optimistic. . . . Certainly there was no depression, no defeatism, no signs of coming revolution." Wishing to know better the mood of the men at the front, he listened to their conversations during the long nights they stayed together. He writes: "Their thoughts were away from the front and centered in their village. . . . They seemed indifferent as to whom they were fighting. They were at war and that was all there was to it. But they were cheerful, and I did not see any of those surreptitious looks that I saw so often later during the revolution. The army at the time was essentially healthy."¹²

Finally, in order to have an answer to the question of the mood of the pre-revolution army from still another viewpoint, let us see what was said in this regard by a writer who was not a military man but had an opportunity of observing the army in the fateful year. In an article entitled "In Defense of the Russian Constituent Assembly" (*Archives of the Russian Revolution*, vol. XIII) by Boris Sokolov we read: "There is an opinion, far from having foundation in fact, that Russia and the Russian revolution were ruined by the front, namely, that there occurred a disintegration of the military units at the front which caused many unfortunate events that followed. To me, who spent nearly all the year of 1917 at the front, it seems that such opinion is wrong and that it calls for rebuttal. The disintegration which set in gradually and spread more or less rapidly in various parts of the front was only the echo of the events that had taken place in the interior of the country."

¹²A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *The Grinding Mill*, New York, 1935, pp. 188-189.

As we read the evidence of participants in World War I, offered in many diaries, reminiscences, and accounts, of which only the more important have been quoted in the present article, it becomes clear beyond any doubt that, contrary to what is generally believed, the Old Russian Army, in full obedience to its leaders, joined the Revolution not in mutiny but after its leaders had recognized and accepted the political change.

Soviet Planning: The Problem of Economic Balance

By W. W. LEONTIEF, SR.

I

ON March 21, 1946, the Fourth Five-Year Plan was published. It was entitled *The Law of the Five-Year Plan for the Recovery and Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. for 1946-1950*. This was the first plan under such a title; previous Five-Year Plans have passed the Supreme Soviet only as resolutions. We shall see from the following data that it is too presumptuous to call them "laws."

The First Five-Year Plan was in operation from October 1, 1928, to December 31, 1932; the Second was executed during 1933-1937; the Third, for 1938-1942, was in operation three and one-half years, until June 1941 when it was interrupted by the war. The production figures during the war were not published, and even for 1940 only a few figures were given in official speeches and publications.

The First Five-Year Plan was the most comprehensive, despite the difficulties attending a first attempt. A summary of the research and tabulations for each year was published in three volumes. At the time the Plan was announced, the discussions were partly public, and the economists and research workers in the Planning Board were not so strictly bound by party directives as they were later. They even gave two variations of the plan—a "starting" one and an "optimal."

There are published reports on the programs of the Second Five-Year Plan in two volumes and one volume on the Third Five-Year Plan. The programs of the succeeding Five-Year Plans are less detailed and explicit. The Second and Third Five-Year Plan reports did not present figures of production for each single year of the five years, as was done in the First Plan report, but only for the fifth, or final year.

The new Fourth Five-Year Plan is not yet published as a book, and one can judge it only through the published "law" and the proceedings in the Supreme Soviet. The "law" contains a list of 53 most important items in industrial production, in amounts planned

for 1950. It is regrettable that we do not find in the plan a parallel list of the factual output of the year 1945, the year before the plan starts, or for the last pre-war year, 1940, which could be used as a starting point.

N. Voznesensky, the head of the Planning Board, compares the aims in different items of the new plan for 1950 with pre-war production, but the supposed increase is presented only in percentages, or roughly indicated, as "twice as much," or "three times as much."

It is important to note that the "law" fails to mention the fact that the new plan of production deals with postwar Russian territory, including areas separated from Russia in the period between the wars, such as the Baltic States and Bessarabia. Thus a clear estimate of the aims of the new plan becomes very difficult.

II

Let us now examine the first three Five-Year Plans, comparing their planned figures with the actual results. From the list mentioned above we choose 19 of the more important and representative items, whose production can be compared more easily through the four Five-Year Plans. The output in the new plan is properly given in kind rather than in money value. The figures of the earlier plans were often given and estimated, even by foreign investigators, in rubles. This is misleading, as the ruble is not a constant value.

Official sources of information about the early plans are incomplete. It is a complicated task to estimate the possibilities of the actual fulfillment of the new plan.

We will compare only the final years of the plans: 1932, 1937, 1940/42, 1950, which were the real goals of the respective Five-Year Plans.

The first row of the table (pp. 28-29), gives the output in 1928, the year before the First Five-Year Plan was started. Each of the three Five-Year Plans is shown with two columns of the planned figures and the corresponding results, and two columns of percentages—first the planned increases, second, the fulfillments.

As the Third Plan was not completed the fulfillment cannot be given. The percentage of the planned increase under the new Fourth Five-Year Plan can be estimated only for a few items.

For a better understanding of the figures of this table, one may compare them with industrial production of the same items in the leading industrial countries as given in the official Soviet source, *Planovoe Khozyaistvo* (p. 30).

THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS

	First, 1932				AND T
	1928	Plan	% of Planned Increase	Fulfill- ment	Plan
Pig iron (million tons)	3.4	10.0	294	6.2	62.0
Steel (million tons)	4.3	10.4	242	5.9	56.7
Rolled metal (million tons)	3.5	6.1	171	4.3	68.8
Coal (million tons)	35.8	75.0	210	64.3	85.9
Petroleum (million tons)	12.3	21.7	176	22.3	102.8
Electric power (bill. k.w.h.)	5.1	22.0	431	13.4	59.5
Locomotives	480	—	—	828	—
Freight cars (thousands)	—	—	—	22.3	—
Passenger cars (thousands)	—	—	—	1.1	—
Automobiles (thousands)	—	—	—	44.1	—
Tractors (thousands)	1.5	55.0	333	51.6	93.8
Paper (thousand tons)	299.3	—	—	471.2	—
Cement (thousand tons)	1903	—	—	3481	—
Lumber (mill. c.m.)	13.6	42.5	313	24.4 ¹	57.4
Cotton fab. (mill. m.)	2742	4700	171	2719.7	57.9
Woolen fab. (mill. m.)	96.6	270	286	91.3	33.8
Leather footwear (mill. prs.)	23	80.0	350	82.0	102.5
Sugar (thousand tons)	1340	2600	194	828.2	36.9
Soap (thousand tons)	195.5	—	—	357.2	—
AVERAGE			258.0		68.2

¹The most important sources for the table are:

Pyatiletnii plan narodno-khozyaistvennogo stroitelstva S.S.S.R. (The Five-Year Plan for the National Economic Construction in the U.S.S.R.), Gosplan, Moscow, 1929; *Itogi vypolneniya pervogo pyatiletnyago plana razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva S.S.S.R.* (Summary of the Fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, 1934; *Vtoroi pyatiletnii plan razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva S.S.S.R.* (The Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R.), Gosplan, Moscow, 1934; *Itogi vypolneniya vtorogo pyatiletnyago plana* (The Fulfillment of the Second Five-Year

PLANS

AND THEIR FULFILLMENT¹

% of Fulfill- ment	Second, 1937				Third, 1942				Fourth, 1950			
	Plan	% of Planned Increase	Fulfill- ment	% of Fulfill- ment	Plan	% of Planned Increase	Fulfill- ment	Plan 1940	Plan 1940	% of Planned Increase (1940)		
62.0	16.0	260	14.5	90.6	22.0	152	15.0	19.5	130			
56.7	17.0	289	17.7	104.0	27.5	156	18.3	25.4	133			
68.8	13.0	303	13.0	100.0	21.0	162	12.2	17.8	146			
85.9	152.5	237	127.0	83.3	230.0	181	166.0	250.0	150			
102.8	46.8	210	30.5	64.5	54.0	177	31.0	35.4	114			
59.5	38.0	284	36.4	93.2	75.0	206	50.0	82	164			
	2800	338	1581	57.1	2090	132	—	2200	—			
118.4	531	59.0	50.0	90.0	153	—	146.0	—	—			
3.5	309	0.9	25.7	3.4	373	—	2.6	—	—			
200.0	837	200.0	100.0	400.0	200	147	493.6	—	—			
166.7	323	78.8	48.2	140.0	178	—	112.0	—	—			
1000.0	212	831.6	83.2	1300.0	156	—	1340	—	—			
7500.0	216	5454.0	73.3	10000.0	183	—	10000.0	—	—			
57.4	43.0	176	28.8	67.2	45.0	156	—	39.0	—	—		
57.9	5100.0	188	3447.0	67.6	4900.0	142	3800	4686.0	123			
33.8	220.0	241	110.8	50.4	175.0	167	123.0	159.4	—			
102.5	180.0	220	164.2	91.2	235	143	—	240.0	—			
36.9	2500.0	302	2421.0	96.0	3500.0	145	—	2400.0	—			
	1000.0	280	495.0	49.5	925.0	187	—	870.0	—	—		
68.2		312		73.2		175.3						

Plan), Moscow, 1939; *Tretii pyatiletii plan razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva S.S.S.R. (1938-1942)* (Third Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, 1939; *Narodno-khozyaistvennyi plan na 1935, 1936, 1937 gody* (National Economic Plan for 1935, 1936, 1937) Three issues, Gosplan, Moscow, 1935, 1936, 1937; *Sotsialisticheskoe stroitelstvo Soyuza S.S.R., 1935, 1936, 1933-38* (Socialist Construction of the U.S.S.R.), Three issues, Gosplan, Moscow. Some figures were mentioned in articles contained in Soviet periodicals such as *Planovoe Khozyaistvo*, *Bolshevik*, and others. Percentages have been calculated in most instances by the author of this article.

PRODUCTION PER CAPITA IN 1937
(U.S.S.R.—1937; other countries—latest figures published)

	<i>U.S.S.R.</i>	<i>U.S.A.</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>England</i>	<i>France</i>
Electric power (kilowatt h.)	215	1,160	735	608	490
Pig iron (kilograms)	86	292	234	183	189
Steel (kilograms)	105	397	291	279	188
Coal (kilograms)	757	3,429	3,313	5,165	1,065
Cement (kilograms)	32	156	173	154	86
Cotton fabric (square metres)	16	58	—	60	31
Woolen fabrics	0.6	2.8	—	7.4	—
Leather footwear (pairs)	1.0	2.6	1.1	2.2	—
Sugar (kilograms)	14	12	29	8	21
Soap (kilograms)	3	12	7	11	10

During the First Five-Year Plan among the nineteen selected products, achievement of more than a hundred per cent was reached only in two cases: petroleum (102.8%) and leather footwear (102.5%). For six products the results were less than two-thirds of the aim; the result was only 33.8 per cent for woolen fabrics and 36.9 per cent for sugar. The average of fulfillment in production of items, was 68.2 per cent of the planned amount.

The results of the Second Five-Year Plan were not much better. The planned production was fulfilled for three items: steel (104%), rolled metal (100%), and automobiles (100%). In nine cases the production reached only two-thirds or less of the plan. Nevertheless, the average of achievement—namely, 73.2 per cent of the program—was better than the results of the First Five-Year Plan.²

The Third Five-Year Plan contained a less ambitious program compared with the two previous plans. Pig iron, steel, and rolled metal, the three fundamental products of metallurgy, had to be increased by about 150–160 per cent as against around 250 per cent in the First and about 275 in the Second Five-Year Plan. The actual output in 1940, the third year of the plan, was only insignificantly

²It is of interest to note the fulfillment of the Second Five-Year Plan in money value. The total production of large-scale industry was planned to be in 1937, 86.4 billion rubles; the fulfillment was announced to have reached 90.2 billion rubles. The difference between the 104.4 per cent in rubles and 73.2 per cent for the chosen items in kind demonstrates the inaccuracy of the monetary figures.

higher than in 1937. A little better was the case of coal and electric power, but not of petroleum. These observations are in accord with an official statement about the industrial output during these last years before the war (the first half of the Third Five-Year Plan). The report of N. Voznesensky at the Eighteenth Party Congress, February 18, 1940, stated that although the industrial production increased, "the rate of increase of industrial output was somewhat underfulfilled. . . . Instead of 14 per cent, the actual average annual rate of increase in the three years (1938-1940) was 13 per cent." This was acknowledged as due to the iron and steel industry. These figures deal purely with money value, and we have seen its inexactitude. One may presume, that the fulfillment of this plan, if war had not intervened, would not have been satisfactory.

A general survey of the program and the results of previous Five-Year Plans shows that in all of the items of the table the goals were extremely exaggerated. The expected average in industrial production was 258 per cent in the First Plan, 312 in the Second, and 175.3 in the Third.

The Second Plan was the most difficult undertaking. It covered perhaps more laborious years in Russia's industrialization than the First. The First was partly dedicated to the rebuilding of the pre-revolutionary plants and branches destroyed during the Revolution. Nevertheless, the fulfillment of the Second Plan—73.2 per cent—was even higher, than that of the First—68.2 per cent.

A comparison of planned increase with actual results exposes the exaggerations and ineffectiveness of the Five-Year Plans:

Percent	First	Second	Third
Planned increase	258.0	312.0	175.3
Fulfillment	68.2	73.2	—

III

Let us turn now to the aims and perspectives of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. German invasion disrupted industrial production during 1941-1945. Consequently, the program for 1950 does not exceed, for most of the items, the program for 1942, the last year of the Third Five-Year Plan. For some branches of industry the figures are calculated even lower. Metal output is an outstanding example of this; the goal for pig iron is reduced from 22 million tons for 1942 to 19.5 million tons; that for steel from 27.5 to 25.4; and that for rolled metal from 21 to 17.8.

In fuel production the table (p. 29), shows the following figures: the goal for the coal output for 1942 was 230 million tons (another source, 243); for 1950, 250; petroleum for 1942, 54 million tons, for 1950, only 35.4; electric power is expected to rise from 75 billion to 82 billion kilowatt hours.

The program for commodities is much more modest. But the few items of this kind in the table bring to light the imperfection of Soviet planning. For cotton fabrics, the most used kind of clothing in Russia, the plan figures for the final years of the four Five-Year Plans were as follows (in billions of square meters):

1932	1937	1942	1950
4.7	5.1	4.9	4.7 (4.686)

The goal for the present plan, ending 1950, is no higher than that for 1932, and is lower compared with the two intervening Five-Year Plans. These figures are more significant when one considers the extremely low general quality of clothing in Soviet Russia and the increase of population from about 155 million (1929) to presumably about 200 million at the present time.

For woolen fabrics, essential for a higher standard of living, the fiasco in planning was even greater (figures in thousand square meters):

1932	1937	1942	1950
270	220	177	159.4

The figures show a progressive decrease even in the program of production.

The program for 1950 for the output of sugar, consumed by the Russians mostly for their traditional tea drinking, is lower than even the actual production in 1937: (thousand tons):

1932 Plan	1937 Fulfillment	1942 Plan	1950 Plan
2,600	2,421	3,500	2,400

This is partly due to the destruction of Ukrainian beet fields; nevertheless, this reduced plan presents a dark picture of the food situation in Soviet Russia.

The enormous fluctuations in the planned increase of industrial production, as well as the differences in the percentages of fulfillment, were very costly for the national economy of the U.S.S.R. as a whole.

An equilibrium in Soviet economy was not and is not realized, nor is Soviet planning carried on according to any specific planning theory. The Soviet State economy, as well as the free enterprise of the capitalistic countries, requires a coordination of supply and demand in each separate branch of industry and an equilibrium of production and consumption between all the branches of the national economy—agriculture, industry, transportation and so forth.

At the beginning of Soviet planning the principle of equilibrium was denounced by party leadership and has been neglected in the practice of planning until now, leaving a most dangerous gap in the Soviet economy.

The capitalistic system tends to reach economic stability through a free play of economic forces, through the competition of private initiative and private interests. In the régime of State economy this task is taken over by the state. Central state economic planning, under these conditions, is the only method and way for economic coordination and stability. The planning has to be based upon systematic research, presenting in figures the whole economic movement and turnover of goods in the form of the so-called "balance of the national economy."³ Soviet economic literature refers to such a balance existing at present only as a vague theoretical concept.

The national economy of any country regularly absorbs certain quantities of different goods and products. In the course of time goods are produced, consumed, and reproduced. (The reproduction of the means of production is the basic concept of the Marxian theory of production.) At the end of a period a certain quantity of products remains in reserve. The balance has to reflect the whole movement of production, utilization, and consumption during the period under consideration.⁴

A balance of national economy may be found through research and calculation in the figures of a past economic period, or, as a balance for the future—a planned balance—it may present a coordinated program for the coming economic period.

Soviet planning does not treat the national economy as an organic unit tending to achieve an economic equilibrium—coordinating production, distribution, and consumption of all raw materials, semi-finished goods, and manufactured products. The Five-Year Plans

³The prototype of this was François Quesnay's famous *Tableau Economique* (1758).

⁴The author does not wish to complicate further the problem by balancing also the man-power.

are, in fact, programs for the production and development of separate branches of industry, without interrelation.

In 1926 the Central Statistical Board published one large volume entitled *The Balance of National Economy of the U.S.S.R., 1923-24*. Being a first attempt, this study was rather imperfect and, exaggerating, Stalin called the research "not a balance, but a game with figures." In 1929 Stalin assigned to the economists and planners the task of working out a realistic balance. An article in the leading Soviet magazine *Planovoe Khozyaistvo* (No. 6, 1940), asserted that the task has not been accomplished.

Soviet industrial boards established special balances for important groups of products, the so-called "material balances," for metal, fuel, and textiles. These partial balances do not settle the problem of the balance of the whole national economy. An article in *Planovoe Khozyaistvo* (No. 6, 1940), stated, that "at present the programs of production in economic plans are not based on material balances. There is rather a tendency to use the latter only for distribution of products, foreseen in the planned figures."

Production, distribution, and consumption are not in the correct proportion; they are unbalanced. Products of some branches of industry are plentiful, remain in reserve, and are wasted. Products of other branches, however, are scarce, and both industries and consumers lack certain necessary goods.

But under the régime of State economy and planning, unlike that of the capitalistic system, the lack of economic equilibrium does not result in a crisis of production and in unemployment, but remains hidden. Nevertheless, the economic losses accompanying this state of affairs constitute an important defect in the system, and are very costly.⁵ It is a curious fact that efforts to achieve an economic equilibrium were, at the beginning of Soviet planning, condemned by party leadership as "capitalistic fiction."

Research work on the theory of planning is more or less intentionally neglected in Soviet Russia. Teaching of the theory of political economy was suspended for several years. One may recall, in this connection, an editorial, much discussed in the American press,

⁴Ch. Bettelheim, the author of the most detailed description of Russian planning outside of Russia—*La Planification Sovietique* (2d ed., Paris, 1945), does not recognize the importance of this problem and merely paraphrases in his book the writings of Soviet economists.

Cf. the present writer's study "Die Erfüllung des russischen Fuenfjahrplanes," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Vol. 39, p. 507, published twelve years ago.

which appeared in Moscow's monthly *Under the Banner of Marxism*.

In the planning of currency and of finance the same lack of consistency and integration is evident. In the years 1929-31 Soviet financiers were working on an "all-comprehensive" financial plan (*edinyi finansovyi plan*). Later, however, this plan was discarded.⁶

It is also remarkable that the Five-Year Plans do not mention foreign trade. The obscurity surrounding this subject is partly due to the uncertainty of Russia's receiving a foreign loan; still, some indication of expected credit and resulting imports and exports could be given. Failure to consider these problems again demonstrates the inability of the Soviet Planning Board to integrate Soviet economy into world economy.

Nevertheless, the problem of systematic planning and economic balancing becomes so urgent that it breaks through sporadically in Soviet economic literature and conferences. The head of the Planning Board, N. Voznesensky, wrote in 1940: "Lately comrade Stalin again and again pointed out the necessity of improving in every way the planning of national economy. Among Stalin's recent pronouncements on planning, the stress he laid on the proportions between and coordination of the different parts of the plan is worthy of notice. The basis for this pronouncement was the order Stalin had given ten years ago calling for the establishment of a balance of the national economy. A plan for increased socialist construction based on a balance of national economy has to utilize all economic reserves and liberate the planning from a legalistic—bureaucratic maximalism. It is impossible to work out an intelligent (*gramotnyi*—literate) economic plan without first drawing up the balance of the national economy."⁷

And yet the U.S.S.R. works in this way.

The main handicap to effective economic research and planning in the U.S.S.R. is the practice of the Kremlin to keep secret all the economic difficulties and failures.

Russia's wealth of natural resources and the state of mind of her people constitute the most favorable premises for a successful management of the State economy. The significant failures of the Five-Year Plans and the resultant suffering of the people are not dependent upon objective conditions.

⁶Cf. my study "Vom Staatsbudget zum einheitlichen Finanzplan. Sowjetrussische Finanzprobleme," *Weltw. Archiv*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1931).

⁷"Stalin's Three Five-Year Plans," *Bolshevik*, Moscow, 1940, No. 1.

But there is only one man in Soviet Russia who can, without any risk, proclaim a "J'accuse."

At the Seventeenth Party Congress, in 1934, Stalin spoke as follows: ". . . from now on nine-tenths of the responsibility for the failures and defects in our work rests not on 'objective' conditions, but on ourselves, and on ourselves alone. . . . If we still suffer from a number of defects and not a few failures in our work, we are to blame for this only ourselves, our organization, our poor organizational leadership."

Since this speech was made, however, the conditions causing these pronouncements and the methods of Soviet planning have not shown any signs of improvement.

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Nicholas Gumilev

By LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY*

TWENTY-FIVE years ago, on August 27, 1921, Nicholas Gumilev, one of the great masters of modern Russian poetry, was shot as a participant in a conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet government. He was 35 years old. Since then his fame, already fairly well established before his death, grew and spread. Although his works have not been reprinted in the Soviet Union, his place in pre-revolutionary Russian letters is duly acknowledged by all Soviet literary critics, some of whom liken him to the "imperialist" Kipling. But Gumilev was more than a bard of adventure and of "imperialist expansion." Although he was one of the first to bring into Russian poetry exotic themes (particularly in his poems dealing with Africa, which he had visited on three successive occasions), his value as a poet lies primarily in his "classical," "Parnassian" worship of the word in its true and not symbolic meaning, and in bringing clarity and vigor to Russian poetry, so long befogged and effeminated by the Symbolists before him.

To Gumilev, poetry is "one of the means of expressing oneself and is performed by the medium of the word, the only tool which satisfies its needs. . . . Poetry and religion are two sides of the same medal. The one like the other demands from man spiritual labor—not in pursuit of a practical aim, as ethics and esthetics do—but for the sake of a higher one, unknown even to himself. Ethics adjusts man to life in society; esthetics tends to increase his capacity for enjoyment. To religion and poetry belongs the guidance of man in his transformation into a superior type." This thought Gumilev expressed in one of his most remarkable poems entitled "The Word," in which he bemoaned the encroachment of science, of the number, upon the life of modern man:

But we did forget that shining brightly
Among earthly ills there is the word,
That Saint John in opening his Gospel
Said to us: The Word is truly God.

*The reader's attention is invited to Dr. Strakhovsky's extensive essay "Nicholas Gumilev, the Poet-Warrior" in *The Slavonic and East European Review* (American Series), October 1944. [Ed.]

Gumilev was not only a great poet but also the master of a school of poetry, Acmeism, and as such he was a teacher of the technique of poetry. "One should write," he said, "not when it is possible, but when it is imperative. The word 'possible' should be stricken out of all domains of poetical study." To this he added the recommendation of Delacroix: "One must study relentlessly the technique of one's art so as not to think about it in the moments of creation." With his unerring judgment he has guided many a younger poet to maturity and to perfection, as witness the works of Nicholas Tikhonov in the Soviet Union and of George Ivanov and George Adamovich among the Russian emigré poets.

When World War I broke out, Gumilev volunteered for service although he was not subject to the draft. He spent long arduous months at the front, participating in many engagements. Nevertheless, he glorified war, and, unlike the patriotic verse of poets still comfortably living in the rear, his poetry sounded a true note of genuine patriotism:

THE ATTACK

What might have been a paradise
Has now become a den of fire.
Four days on end we've been attacking,
All foodless in the snow and mire.

There is no need of earthly food
In this strange hour of light and dread,
Because the mighty living word
Is better food to us than bread.

And all the blood-empurpled weeks
Are dazzling and their burden light.
The shrapnels rush above my head
With fragments swift as birds in flight.

When I call out, my voice is wild.
Brass striking brass is in my cry.
Upholder of a lofty thought,
I cannot, no, I cannot die.

As 'twere the sound of thundering hammers
Or waters of the raging sea,
The golden heart of valiant Russia
Beats in my bosom evenly.

And oh, it is so sweet to deck
Victory, like a maid, with pearls,
When moving down the smoking track
As the defeated foe recoils.¹

This poem, written on the fields of Galicia, could have been written at Stalingrad.

Gumilev's poetical talent expressed itself also in the field of literary criticism. For years he wrote not only reviews of books of new poets, but also critical essays on the poets and poetry of his time under the general title "Letters about Russian Poetry." When these were collected and published after his death, in 1923, Valery Bryusov, the eminent poet who had become a member of the Communist Party, said about the book in a review article: "It is an interesting and valuable book . . . it is a book of a poet who loved and understood art. . . . Literary historians and historians of our own social development will continue to have to refer to this book by N. Gumilev."

Finally, Gumilev was also a writer of prose "excellent in its formal perfection," as stated by L. Lelevich in the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*. His only collection of short stories was published posthumously in 1922, although he had prepared the text before his death.

Such is the brief story of Gumilev, the poet. Unlike Byron or Pushkin, he did not wake up one morning to find himself famous. He had to struggle and fight in pursuit of that elusive deity, Fame. He was a perfectionist by nature, hence worked arduously in constantly improving and bettering his work. Frail of body, he possessed an indomitable spirit. His whole life is an example of human courage, an example of victory of the spirit over the flesh. In his last hours, when he was already aware of his fate, he wrote to his wife: "Do not worry about me. I am well. I am writing poetry and playing chess. . . ." And he faced the firing squad, as he had faced life, unflinchingly.

¹Translated by Gerard Shelley in *Modern Poems from Russia*, London, 1942.

The Trolley Car That Lost Its Way*

By NICHOLAS S. GUMILEV

Translated by Leonid I. Strakhovsky

Down a strange street I aimlessly wandered,
When the caw of ravens I heard from afar,
And the peals of a lute, to which thunder responded—
There flew before me a trolley car.

How I jumped on it as past it thundered,
Gaining a foothold, is dim in my mind.
Tearing the air in the daylight asunder,
Streaking with fire the path left behind;

Whirling like storm clouds, darker and darker,
In the chasm of time it lost its way. . . .
Please stop the trolley car, conductor,
Please stop the car right away!

But too late! Round a bend we have travelled,
Through a palm grove we've furrowed a lane,
And we roared over bridges of marble—
'Cross the Neva, the Nile and the Seine.

Then flashing past the frame of the window
An old beggar-man—the same, I know,
Threw after us a look that dwindled.
He died in Beirut a year ago.

*This almost nightmarish and prophetic poem was published in the collection *The Pillar of Fire* (1921) not long before the poet's death.

The reference to "the horseman iron-gloved" in the thirteenth stanza is to the famous equestrian statue of Peter the Great erected in St. Petersburg by Catherine the Great, and the one to St. Isaac's Cathedral in the next stanza, to the majestic shrine built in the same city under Nicholas I.

Where am I now? With alarming langor,
My heart beats in answer: There you see
A depot where midst the noise and clangor,
To the Land of Souls you can buy a seat.

Here is a sign-board . . . blood-filled letters
Proclaim it's a grocer's, but I know—
Instead of cabbages, turnips, and lettuce,
Here they sell dead-heads all in a row.

Red of shirt, with a face like an udder,
The headsman cut off my head, too.
And it lay there, right next to the others,
In a slippery box as in glue.

And in a lane—a fence with a marker,
A house with three windows, pale and grey. . . .
Please stop the trolley car, conductor,
Please stop the car right away!

Máshenka, here you did live, my song-bird;
Here you did weave a carpet, my bride.
Where then are now your voice and your body?
How can it be that you also have died?

Oh! how you moaned in your bed-chamber,
When in a powdered wig I went
To be presented to the Great Empress,
Never to see you or hear your lament.

Now it is clear that freedom's a semblance,
Only a light which streams from beyond.
People and shadows stand at the entrance
Into a Zoo of planets in bond.

Then comes a wind, so sweet and beloved,
And beyond the bridge there flies at me
The hand of the Horseman iron-gloved,
And the raised hoofs of his steed.

Guarding the true faith stands like a castle
St. Isaac's Cathedral for all to see;
There I'll attend a "Te Deum" for Másha,
And a "Requiem" mass for me.

And still the heart is sullen forever,
Hard it's to breathe, painful to live. . . .
Máshenka, I did not think that ever
One could so love and so grieve.

Russia's Prize in Manchuria*

By GEORGE C. GUINS

I

V. M. MOLOTOV's letter, attached to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945, proclaimed that:

The Soviet Government always has considered the three Eastern provinces to be a part of China. It confirms once more its recognition of Chinese sovereignty over the three Eastern provinces and promises to respect their territorial and administrative inviolability.

From this statement it appears that the civil management, the courts of justice, the police, and the safe-guarding of the railway in Manchuria are to be under the jurisdiction of the Chinese.

This act of diplomacy on the part of the Soviet government may at first appear to be a gesture of magnanimity. Many informed persons have suspected that Soviet Russia intended to annex Manchuria or at least place the entire region under Soviet control.

In reality, however, the Soviet government has simply recognized China's legal rights, which were once violated by the Russians and later by the Japanese. The Chinese concession to the Russian Imperial government allowing Russia to build the Chinese Eastern Railway had not given Russia the right to use its troops to guard the railroad. Nor did this concession permit the establishment in the so-called "special zone" of Russian civil administration, of courts of justice, and postal service. All these rights were usurped by Russia following the Boxer uprising. Russia also took advantage of China by interpreting too broadly several provisions of the treaty, which intended only to give Russia strips of territory for the building of a railway.

The Sino-Soviet Treaty concerning the joint use of the Port Arthur fortress likewise simply reestablished the Chinese rights to it, which had already been mentioned in the Sino-Russian (Russian-Chinese) Treaty of March 27, 1898. According to the latter treaty, the Chinese even then could use the Port Arthur harbor for their ships. Imperial Russia, however, practically seized Port Arthur for herself and exploited the harbor entirely in her own interests.¹

*This is a chapter from the author's projected book, *Russia in the World of Tomorrow*. [Ed.]

¹C. W. Young, *The International Relations of Manchuria*, Univ. of Chicago Press,

The Soviet refusal of territorial gains in Manchuria also cannot be regarded as a genuine concession to Chinese interests. Neither Russia nor Japan ever had any formal territorial rights in Manchuria. Therefore, it is impossible to talk about any "reestablished" or "inherited" territorial rights of the Soviets in Manchuria. Besides, Soviet Russia—through Stalin—many times has solemnly declared that she "will not yield even an inch of her land," but at the same time does not claim even a palm's breadth of foreign territory as her own.²

As long as Russia holds to her fundamental principles in her international policy, she can claim title in Manchuria only to the Chinese Eastern Railway. This railway was built by Russia and, under Japanese pressure, was sold for a very low price to the puppet state of Manchukuo. It is true that the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Lev Karakhan, in his declaration published in 1920, renounced on the part of the Soviet government all concessions obtained by Imperial Russia from China. But, during the Sino-Soviet conference at Peking in 1924, Soviet Russia explained that she had given China the right of joint management of the railway and of participation in the profits, although she considered the railroad itself to be Russian property. Later, during the 1924 to 1935 period of joint Russo-Chinese management of the railway, Soviet spokesmen explained that Russia gave up all special privileges which were a violation of Chinese sovereignty, but not the Russian property rights in the railway, built by Russians and at Russian expense.

At present, the Soviet government recognizes China as a fifty per cent co-owner of the Chinese Eastern Railway. This recognition does not violate former Soviet promises; it is even more favorable to Chinese interests than the arrangement made in 1924.

However, by the treaty of August 14, 1945, the Soviet government obtained more than it possessed in 1935, at the time of the Chinese Eastern Railway's sale. It has obtained even more than the Imperial government possessed in Manchuria until 1905, when it was forced to yield to Japan the southern part of the railway and also the port cities of Port Arthur and Dalny-Dairen.

After forty years of Japanese possession and management, the South Manchurian Railway experienced great changes. It was en-

1929, pp. 17-24; *Japanese Jurisdiction in the South Manchurian Railway*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1931, pp. 33-42; *The International State of Kwantung Territory*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, pp. 18-37.

²J. Stalin, *Leninism*, N. Y., International Publishers, 1942, p. 443.

tirely rebuilt and transformed into a most profitable enterprise. Dalny-Dairen also was transformed into a great prosperous city, with beautiful parks and, a feature of utmost importance, with a first-class harbor.

The Chinese-Changchun Railway, as the former South Manchurian and Chinese Eastern railways together are called at present, represent a most valuable property, and it would be naive to believe that the Soviet interests will limit themselves only to the control over transportation and the port of Dairen. During the last fifty years Manchuria, not without cause, has acquired the reputation of being the world's danger zone, the "Tinder Box of Asia." Certainly Soviet policy regarding it is a vital part of Russia's overall plans in the Far East.

II

Manchuria is one of the most important areas of the Republic of China, a promised land for millions of landless farmers of Shantung and Hopeh (Chihli) provinces, and an industrial stronghold comparable to the Saar and Ruhr regions of Germany.

Manchuria occupies an area of more than 500,000 square miles or 92,800,000 hectares, of which 32,000,000, or roughly one-third, undoubtedly is arable land. According to 1939 figures, 56 per cent of this arable land is still awaiting exploitation.

Manchuria's territory is so vast that it could take in France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium. Japan proper (the home islands of Japan) could be located on less than half the territory of north Manchuria.

In comparison with other parts of China, Manchuria possesses essential advantages in her natural resources and geographical situation, her outlets to the Pacific, and the opportunity of serving as a link between South and North, East and West. At the same time Manchuria's strategic location is the cause of constant trouble.

Manchuria is the granary of eastern Asia. Its production of soya beans alone, from 1934 to 1938, was nearly four million tons. In 1940, it was 3.2 million tons. This drop in soya bean production was accompanied by a slight drop in the total production of wheat, but at the same time there was an increase in the production of rice, millet, maize (corn), and *kaoliang*—sorghum.

Manchuria, occasionally, is referred to as the "sea of trees." Its timber resources, practically, are limitless, and although the latest

estimate places them at 3,750 million cubic meters, this figure represents only a portion of the total wealth of timber.³

A large area of Manchuria is grazing land, where sheep raising is the predominant occupation. Estimates made just before the Pacific war placed the number of these animals at 1,800,000 in round figures. On the ranges, cattle and horses also are raised, although in smaller numbers.

However, Manchuria not only is an agricultural country but also an important industrial region. It is rich in coal, of which it has an estimated 20 million tons; in iron, the best of which is found in Tunghwa province near Korea, and in the Anshan region deposits near Mukden (about 400 million metric tons). The country's mineral wealth includes some 3,545 metric tons of gold, according to the estimates of the geologist, Eduard Ahnert. Gold deposits are located in Heilunkiang province bordering on the Amur river and along the middle and upper stream of the Amur tributary, Sungari. There is an estimated 13,600 million tons of magnesium, a deposit without parallel in the world for quantity and quality; also, 120 million tons of aluminum; very rich deposits of fireclay, limestone, likewise silver, copper, lead, zinc, and other minerals.⁴

In 1940 Manchuria's population numbered about 37 millions, and its annual increase was estimated at about 1,900,000. Statisticians figured that twenty years later, by 1960, Manchuria would have a population of some 75 to 80 millions.⁵

Actually, Manchuria, with her favorable trade balance, was a regulator for the entire foreign trade of the Republic of China, which for a number of decades has suffered from an adverse balance of trade. In China's foreign trade, Manchurian bean products have replaced such an important item as tea, which for a long time was exported in such quantities that it became one of the mainstays of China's foreign trade. Without Manchuria, China is doomed for an indefinite period to suffer an unfavorable trade balance, with im-

³"Progressive Manchukuo," *The Manchuria Daily News*, 1940.

⁴The Heavy Industry of Manchukuo." *East Asia, Economic Intelligence Series*, Tokyo, January 1940. All figures concerning the national resources are quoted according to the last official data of the former Japanese administration in Manchuria. It is impossible to check these figures because the other published data are obsolete and the exploration of Manchuria has been continuing incessantly, and accordingly figures had changed.

⁵E. E. Yashnov, "Colonization Prospects in Manchuria," *Manchuria Monitor* 1928, nos. 5-6; *Contemporary Manchuria*, Monthly Supplement, February 1940.

ports greatly exceeding the quantity of goods she can deliver for export.

China proper, likewise, is depending upon Manchuria for its raw materials, chiefly soya beans and their derivatives, bean cakes and bean oil, also for the Chinese sorghum, kaoliang, peanuts, and for sizable quantities of coal, lumber, salt. At the same time, Manchuria is an important buyer of both China's raw products—such as raw cotton—and consumers' goods: cotton, yarn, cotton piece goods, wheat flour, cigarettes, silk piece goods, paper, tea, clothing, and various accessories.

Manchuria's resources are of decisive importance for the projected industrialization of China. Should Manchuria fulfill her promises of development, her importance to the national economy of China is bound to grow ever greater. Without exaggeration, one can say that he who controls Manchuria controls China's economic and political potential.⁶

III

Russia's interests in Manchuria are not less extensive than those of China. Manchuria is connected with the Maritime province and Transbaikal region by railways and by navigable rivers, the Ussuri, Sungari, Nonni, and Argun. The new railways were built by the Japanese administration close to Soviet territory and to the Soviet-controlled Mongolian People's Republic. Manchuria, therefore, became an excellent market for the Russians, a market able to supply the Soviet Far East with wheat, meat, wool, and ready to import Soviet-manufactured goods.

Yet, at the same time, Manchuria is a territory which easily enough might be transformed into a base for an offensive against the Soviet Union. It also would be possible to make use of the Mongolian population living in the Barga region and in western parts of Manchuria as an instrument for countering the Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia.⁷ From the Soviet viewpoint, a rapid colonization

⁶Cf. Sun K'o, *China Looks Forward*, N. Y., 1944: "The Northeast, known to the world at large as Manchuria, will surely become an inexhaustible reservoir of national wealth and prosperity. It may well develop into a new center for the renaissance of Chinese culture and civilization." "In space it [the Northeast] occupies approximately one seventh of the country's total area. In population it is one twelfth of the nation's aggregate. But in foreign trade, it was already in 1931, a full quarter of China's total. If only export trade is considered, as much as a third of our entire contribution to the world market came from four provinces." (p. 226).

⁷In the four Hsingan provinces of Manchukuo about one third of the population is Mongolian.

of northern Manchuria would threaten the security of the sparsely populated Maritime province in the Russian Far East.

It would be only natural for Soviet Russia to want to replace Japan in the economic life of Manchuria and to direct Manchuria's further industrial development. In 1943, the Tokyo radio announced that Japanese investments in the puppet empire of Manchukuo had then reached 17,000,000,000 yen. This figure seems to be exaggerated, yet it is a fact that during the last decade Manchuria's industries developed enormously and that southern Manchuria became an arsenal of great importance. Naturally, Soviet Russia must be interested either in destroying this arsenal or bringing it under her control, and thus controlling the future rearmament and industrialization of China itself. On the other hand, Soviet Russia would like to exploit for her own profit Manchuria's natural resources and factories, using the country as a base for communist expansion in the Far East.

One must keep in mind the very real desire of Soviet Russia to defend her Far Eastern possessions, especially the Maritime province with its port city of Vladivostok. Russia is also determined not to allow either China or any other country to transform Manchuria into a base for an offensive against the Communist state as the Japanese did when they created the puppet state, Manchukuo.⁸

From a purely commercial point of view, the Soviets also are interested in gaining control over Manchuria's industries. As co-owners of the Chinese Changchun Railway they are eager to increase the profits resulting from its exploitation, and, certainly, they would like to place Manchurian industrial enterprises under Soviet management.

In particular, Soviet Russia might be said to fear the United States influence in China. Russia has been competing with this country in Asia for about fifty years, ever since Secretary of State John Hay proclaimed in 1899 the principle of the "open door" in China, and later State Secretary Philander C. Knox offered a project for the internationalization of the Manchurian railways.⁹

⁸S. Tulsky and Fedorov, *Manchuria kak platsdarm dlya napadeniya na S.S.S.R.* (Manchuria as a Base for an Attack on the U.S.S.R.) Moscow, 1934.

⁹E. D. Grimm, *Doktrina Otkrytykh dverei i Amerikanskaya Politika v Kitae*, (The Open Door Doctrine and the American Policy in China), *Mejdunarodnaiya Zhizn*, 1924, nos. 4-5, p. 114-115; B. A. Romanov, *Rossiya v Manchurii* (Russia in Manchuria), Leningrad, 1928, pp. 304-305; E. H. Zabriskie, *American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East*, Philadelphia, Univ. of Penn. Press, 1946, Chapter IV.

The Soviet leaders well understand that, compared to Russia, the United States has two great advantages; first, China does not fear American aggression and, second, the United States has the capital and the technical means which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics lacks.

Again, Soviet Russia has her advantages in that she is a close neighbor of Manchuria and that she controls the most important part of the Manchurian rail system. The Chinese-Changchun railway with all its branches is more than 2,000 miles long. While under Japanese management it was not only a railway, but a huge business concern, holding and controlling numerous important enterprises.

The railway owned coal mines in northern Manchuria at Chalainor and almost all the coal mines in southern Manchuria, including the very rich Fushun mines, an estimated total of 1,200 million tons of deposits. The railway also owned 712 square miles of forest concessions, situated mainly along the eastern railroad branch in northern Manchuria. On the river Sungari and in Dairen the railway had its own steamship lines. It owned several metallurgical enterprises, the largest of which in Anshan handled 160 million tons of iron ores, and several oil refineries producing oil from shales. In the communication center and capital of northern Manchuria, Harbin, and in Dairen, the railway had its own electric power and telephone exchanges.

The southern part of the railway, built by Russia but later ceded to Japan in 1905 under the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, and known as the South Manchurian Railway, is rich in resources of every kind. It cuts through the most thickly populated region in all Manchuria. The Japanese invested in this enterprise several billion yen and gained control of almost all important Manchurian business enterprises. For instance, Japan directed the affairs of the iron industry of Shova; the gas plant in Dairen; the cement plant in Fushun; the International Transport Company (Kokusai-Unio); the Japanese Paraffin Company; the Manchu-Korean Lumber Company; the Labor Exchange in Dairen; the Japanese-Manchurian Wares Storage Company; and the Company for Land Purchasing.

The aforementioned Shova Company, a gigantic concern, in turn controlled almost completely the production of steel and cast iron in Manchuria.

Oil refining and selling of the refined oil became almost a monopoly of the railway. Besides its machine shops, the South Manchurian

railway had its own machine tool factory and chemical plants producing fertilizers, ammonium-sulphate, and soda.

The direct or indirect control exercised by the railway over these enterprises does not begin to give a complete picture of the great economic power wielded by the South Manchurian Railway in Manchuria. At least sixty more companies were under this railway's control.

Both the Chinese Eastern and the South Manchurian railways, now merged into the Chinese-Changchun Railway, are important land and real estate proprietors. They own enormous areas in the cities of Dairen and Harbin, and tracts of valuable lands along the railroads.

Despite the fact that during the last fifteen to twenty years many new railroads were built in Manchuria, these new lines could not compete with the Chinese-Changchun Railway, which is the vital nerve of the rich region. Only one of the newly-built rail lines runs parallel to the Chinese Changchun Railway, connecting Nunkiang (Mergen) with the Peiping-Mukden line. Yet it is but a local railroad not fitted for transit transport and it has none of the accommodations possessed by the Chinese-Changchun Railway. The latter owns a large rolling-stock and excellent machine-shops located at Dairen and Harbin. Additional new machine shops were installed by the Japanese a few years before the Pacific war in a suburb of Harbin—Sumbey.

Throughout Manchuria, a great network of warehouses and commercial agencies served to increase the amount of goods available for transportation. In the city of Hailar were located a woolwashing factory, a wool press, and other military-owned enterprises.

The railway proper may bring about fifty million American dollars net profit a year, should the Chinese government be interested in an efficient exploitation of this railway and not hinder its operations by a tariff policy intended to attract goods to other competing lines.

There are reasons to suppose that the two partners will not always engage in harmonious cooperation. The Chinese-Changchun Railway is a great colonial enterprise of a unique kind. Actually, it dominates not only the commercial, but also the cultural life of all Manchuria.

The railway owns schools of different kinds, including technical colleges; many hospitals, among which the Dairen Hospital stands out by virtue of its spaciousness and modern equipment, as well as by the qualifications of its medical staff. The railway operates val-

able laboratories, experimental stations, model farms, and other scientific and semi-scientific projects. The railway caters to the public's need for cultural recreation and entertainment by providing club buildings and clubs, large modern libraries in Harbin and Dairen, with valuable collections of Russian and Chinese books. It operates printing presses and publishes railroad periodicals.

The railway has built and is managing luxury hotels along its entire system, the best in Dairen, the capital city Changchun (known under the puppet regime as Sinkiang), Mukden, and Harbin. Their importance will be understood when it is realized that they were the focal points, and sometimes in their localities the only spots, where local Europeans and Americans could hold their social gatherings. Having such establishments at their disposal, officials of the railway, at first the Russians, later the Japanese, could direct and control the social life of the wealthy region, as well as supervise the movements of tourists, transient passengers, and the local professional and business men, all of whom were the usual customers of the hotels. In several picturesque localities, the railway established up-to-date health and vacation resorts, which were used in the same manner.

The railroad, as the richest enterprise in the country, provided its general administration and its courts of law with all necessary office buildings. It gave comfortable living quarters to the government's officers and judges, and supplied them in addition with fuel and railway permits, and, thus, naturally influenced them.

It follows that the entire region, in one way or another, has been dependent on the railway administration. In all likelihood, this relationship is going to continue.

It is still too early to say just how the new co-owners of the Chinese-Changchun Railway are going to manage their huge business concern. Both the general manager of the railway and the chairman of its board of auditors are to be Soviet citizens. The chief of the port of Dairen also will be a Russian. And although, according to agreement, fifty per cent of the railway employees are to be Soviet citizens and fifty per cent Chinese, a proverb says truly that the music played by an orchestra depends on the conductor. Russia has power in the railway zone, China has sovereignty over it, meaning legislative, executive, and judiciary powers and duties. Once again, might and right meet each other. Russia can do, China can hinder.

Once before, China and Soviet Russia carried out an experiment

in partnership. This went on from 1924 to 1932, during their joint administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway in northern Manchuria. The experiment showed the dangers and pitfalls of such a co-ownership.¹⁰ It goes without saying that when a foreign power controls the most vital communications artery lying within the territory of another state, which claims sovereign rights over its territory, the resulting situation is bound to be packed with dynamite.

According to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945, the Board of Directors is the highest administrative organ of the Chang-chun-Chinese Railway, and the Chinese president of this body has the deciding vote. Nevertheless, the treaty stipulates that "serious differences are to be settled by the governments of the two controlling countries." This points to the possibility of future political complications. Should controversies arise between the two countries which jointly own the railway, such controversies either will assume a long-drawn-out character, or they will be decided in favor of the stronger partner under his pressure, or they even may lead to a serious conflict, as happened in 1929, when Soviet troops invaded Manchuria.

IV

The Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945, is an unsatisfactory compromise. Those who studied it will not be surprised if sometime in the future a conflict between the two co-owners becomes a matter of discussion on the agenda of the United Nations.

The Soviet government and the Kuomintang party, which controls China's central government, do not trust each other. According to the experience of 1924-1932, serious conflicts between them are likely. In 1925, the Soviet administration stopped all traffic on the Chinese Eastern Railway in order to prevent the Manchu war-lord,

¹⁰"In violation of the Sino-Soviet agreement of May 31, 1924, the C.E.R. had been used for years by the Soviet employees as the center of Bolshevik propaganda radiating to all parts of China, and the Soviet Consulate at Harbin was, in turn, the place where Soviet activities were focused. The Chinese government decided to take strong measures of retaliation. On May 27, 1929, the Soviet consulates at four places on the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway were raided by the Chinese local police. At the Harbin Consulate, over eighty Russian nationals were holding a meeting. When the search was completed, all those present in the consulate were detained with the exception of the three consular officers and forty-three members of the consulate staff." L. Tung, *China and some Phases of International Law*. Oxford Univ. Press, 1940. Pp. 176-177.

Chang Tso-lin, from moving his troops. The administration thus sought to secure success of an uprising against the marshal initiated by one of his generals. In 1929, China, in its turn, expelled the Soviet administration from the Chinese Eastern Railway's special zone. The result of this action was an armed conflict, in which Soviet Russia got the upper hand.

Returning victorious to the railway, the Soviet administration abused its controlling power and, evidently foreseeing an imminent retreat from Manchuria, removed to Soviet Russia the best locomotives, railway cars, and a quantity of less valuable equipment. The Chinese partners were helpless and could not stop the action.

Besides conflicts of a political character, other clashes may occur in Manchuria between the Soviet Russia and the Nationalist Chinese governments. The Treaty of August 14, 1945, fails to extend any guarantees to Soviet commercial interests. It does not mention the industrial enterprises owned or controlled by the former South Manchurian and Chinese Eastern railway systems. The Treaty is to be interpreted, according to the general rules of Law, as limiting Soviet rights in Manchuria strictly to the operation of the railroad. This situation would create openings for some other power or powers which might wish to exert their economic influence in Manchuria by investing in, and managing former railway enterprises. Thus, foreign capital might gain a foothold in Manchuria.

It is understandable that Soviet Russia, in order to evade undesirable complications and conflicts, prefers to do business in Manchuria with the Chinese Communists rather than with the Kuomintang administration. It would be much easier for Soviet Russia to assert her exclusive economic and political influence and to find a common language with the Communists than with the Nationalists. If a Chinese Communist government were established in Manchuria, it would become inevitably a puppet government, dependent for support upon the Soviets. Upholding her ambitions, Soviet Russia might insist that foreign enterprises in Manchuria be nationalized, and then in the process of liquidation of foreign properties, she might be able to acquire a lion's share of Manchurian businesses. Besides, a Chinese Communist administration would afford Soviet authorities an opportunity to wipe out all vestiges of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet opposition in the Chinese-Changchun Railway zone, long a refuge for émigrés from Russia. And a friendly Chinese administration would collaborate with the Soviets to secure freedom of propa-

ganda for Communist ideas and would help organize education in Manchuria in a Communist spirit.

Holding Port Arthur and Dairen in southern Manchuria, northern Korea with her ports, and Vladivostok in the East, Soviet Russia already has secured a commanding position in Manchuria, surrounded as the latter is by Soviet armed forces. Soviet Russia is in a position to prevent the movement into Manchuria of any troops which might want to support China's Central government against the Soviets. According to the maps and charts of the region around Port Arthur and Dairen, which Soviet Russia regards as her sphere of dominance, she controls there a large land and sea area, which includes several islands to the west, south, and east of Port Arthur and Dairen.¹¹ All this area now is as difficult of access to any non-Russian as is northern Korea, and, certainly, it is bound to be strongly fortified.

With the same purpose in view, the Red Army during its occupation of Manchuria has completely disorganized the strategic industry of formerly Japanese-controlled southern Manchuria by stripping that territory of all valuable machines. It is well known that lack of capital and of qualified personnel, in the Soviet phrase, the "deficiency of cadres,"¹² at present prevent the Soviets not only from furthering the development of the Manchurian industry, but even from maintaining it on the level on which they found it when they occupied the country. It would seem, therefore, that they chose to demobilize Manchuria's industry and stop its development until such time as Soviet Russia herself was ready to invest money in this industry and undertake its management.

If the foregoing is a correct interpretation of the present Soviet policy, then such a policy can only delay the economic progress of Manchuria and of China proper. Even the economy of the Chinese-Changchun Railway itself is faced by a possibility of decline. Soviet Russia totally lacks business experts and managers able to assure an efficient functioning of the various enterprises belonging to the railway. Within the special railway zone there are but a few old Russian residents, survivors of the latest events and purges in Manchuria, who are endowed with the needed qualifications and

¹¹*Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta* (Journal of the Supreme Soviet), Sept. 2, 1945. No. 59.

¹²See *Izvestiya*, no. 213, Sept. 9, 1945, and reports of the representatives of the R.S.F.S.R. in the Supreme Soviet. Annex to no. 35 of the *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta*, June 20, 1945.

experience. If Soviet Russia does not intend to curtail the activity of the railway and of its subsidiary enterprises, then the Soviets in Manchuria will have to enter into partnership with foreign capital.

The reestablishment in Manchuria of order, and a guarantee of security to foreign investments in that country, would work to the best advantages of both sides, Soviet Russia as well as China. As concerns the Chinese-Changchun Railway, its internationalization for a period of, say, 25 to 30 years, would be the best solution of the Far Eastern problem in the interests of world peace.

The present situation in Manchuria is such that it can only create mutual distrust between Communist Russia and the capitalist democracies. Unless, however, the problem of Manchuria is solved soon, it will hold back the progress of China and may give rise to all sorts of conflicts.

A Chapter in Russo-Polish Relations*

By GLEB STRUVE

IN the tragic history of Russo-Polish relations there are a few bright and redeeming episodes. One of them is connected with Mickiewicz's stay in Russia and the warm welcome which he received, both as a man and as a poet, from the Russian writers, and in particular his friendship with Pushkin. Another, less important and also less known, is associated with the name of Count Semyón (Simon) Románovich Woronzów (1744–1832). He was the Russian Ambassador in London from 1785 to 1806, that is during the period covering the two last partitions of Poland. Some time ago a Polish friend of mine, an ardent Polish patriot, spoke to me of Woronzów as a man of evil memory for the Poles, as one of the architects of Catherine II's anti-Polish policy. It is true that inasmuch as Woronzów was instrumental in averting the war with England and dispelling the storm clouds in the East in 1791, he helped to create an international situation which ultimately told against Poland. But the present study should show how erroneous it is to regard Woronzów personally as anti-Polish: from it will be seen that on two occasions Woronzów acted in a way which ought to earn him a grateful memory in the hearts of all Poles.

WORONZÓW AND THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND

Count Semyón Románovich Woronzów belonged to an old and distinguished Russian family. His uncle, Mikhail Illarionovich Woronzów, by whom he was really brought up, had been Chancellor of the Empire under Elizabeth, Peter the Great's daughter, and played an important part in shaping Russia's foreign policy. Semyón Woronzów's elder brother, Alexander, held for a short time the post

*The present article forms one of the preliminary studies to a Life of Count Semyon Woronzow which I am preparing. I retain the traditional spelling of the name in preference to the more correct modern transliteration (Vorontsov), because it is under this form that Woronzow is known in England. It is in this form, too, that his name is perpetuated in Woronzow Road in St. John's Wood in London. Most of the material used in this article has been drawn from the well-known *Woronzow Papers* (*Arkhiv kn. M. L. Vorontsova*), a valuable though extremely ill-arranged and badly-indexed publication in 40 volumes edited by Peter Bartenev and referred to hereafter as *W.P.*

of Russian Ambassador in England and was later Minister of Commerce under Catherine II and Chancellor under Alexander I. Their sister, Princess Dashkova, author of the famous Memoirs, played a prominent part in the coup d'état which placed Catherine II on the throne. She was later President of the Russian Academy.

Semyón Woronzów began his career as a soldier during the Russo-Turkish war. He used to say later that the military profession was his real calling, and to the end of his days he showed a great interest in, and a keen understanding of, the art of war, as witnessed by his comments on Napoleon's campaign in 1812. But fate willed otherwise and he became a diplomat. His first important diplomatic achievement was the negotiation of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji with Turkey in 1774. In 1782 he was appointed Russian Envoy to Venice and after a short spell there was given the choice of Paris or London as his next post. He chose London, for he was following in the footsteps of his elder brother who had already inspired him with great respect and admiration for England and her institutions. He came to London in 1785 when he was forty and remained there till his death in 1832, paying only one short visit (in 1802) to his native country. Some of his enemies accused him of having almost completely identified himself with the country of his residence and being more of an Englishman than a Russian. In 1806, in a letter to Prince Adam Czartoryski, he jokingly said that in Russia he was thought of as "an old dotard, more English than Russian, and fanatically attached to Mr. Pitt."¹ It is even said that towards the end of his life he joined the Church of England. An entry in the parish acts of St. Mary's New Church, Marylebone, where he was buried, shows that the burial service was conducted not by his old friend and adviser, Father Yakov Smirnov, Chaplain of the Russian Embassy, but by an English clergyman, Rev. John Moore, M.A.² His daughter Catherine married his friend Lord Pembroke, the eleventh Earl, and his grandson, Sydney Herbert, was War Secretary in the British Cabinet during the Crimean War. But his whole ambassadorial career shows that he remained throughout an ardent Russian patriot who always had the interests of his country at heart. He was at the same time a good European, and, being a man of great courage and independence, he more than once found himself in conflict with the official policy of his government.

When Woronzów took up his post at the Court of St. James's,

¹W.P., XV, 377.

²Alexandrenko, *Russkie diplomaticeskie agenty v Londone v XVIII v.*, Vol. I, p. 88.

relations between Russia and England were strained, largely as the result of the so-called "Armed Neutrality" which was Panin's policy and of which Woronzów openly disapproved. Regarding friendship and even alliance between the two countries as one of the essentials of Russian foreign policy and of European peace, Woronzów was faced from the outset with an arduous task. "I was quite unfamiliar with the complex political structure of England, without a profound knowledge of which one has to grope about in the dark here," he wrote in his unfinished autobiography.³ He therefore applied himself at once to "a close study of this apparent chaos beneath which, however, is hidden an amazing order."⁴ He made it his duty "to become familiar with this singular country in order to be of use to my own country should the occasion arise."⁵ Such an occasion arose, indeed, six years later, in 1791, when Woronzów, by his bold and skilful conduct of affairs, helped to avert a war between England and Russia over Ochakov, thus justifying the description which a modern German historian of Anglo-Russian relations has given of him as "the shrewdest and the best-informed foreign observer" in London of his time.⁶ This is not the place to retell the instructive and dramatic story⁷ of Pitt's "Russian Armament" and of Woronzów's successful efforts, in which he was helped by several able collaborators, both Russian and English,⁸ to avert the disaster. By 1793, Anglo-Russian relations had so much improved—partly thanks to Woronzów and partly owing to a great change in the international configuration—that Woronzów was able to conclude a new trade agreement, followed in 1795 by a defensive alliance. Soon after the episode with Pitt's abortive declaration of war on Russia, Woronzów, reproached by Lord Grenville, the new Foreign Secretary, with being "a friend of the Opposition," proudly retorted that he was "of no party but that of my country," that he was "Russian and nothing but Russian," and that he did not care who governed England so long as it was someone desirous of maintaining "good har-

³W.P., VIII, 18.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Gerhard, *England und der Aufstieg Russlands*, München and Berlin, 1933, p. 212.

⁷See E. Steinberg's article "The Making of an Anglo-Russian Alliance" in *Russian Review* (London), No. 1, September 1945.

⁸Among them the following deserve a special mention: Joly, Woronzow's private secretary (and later his son's tutor), a young Swiss; Father Yakov Smirnov, Chaplain of the Russian Embassy; and John Paradise, an erstwhile friend of Dr. Johnson and a remarkable linguist.

mony" between England and Russia.⁹ He remained till his dying day a staunch champion of Anglo-Russian friendship and an admirer of English political institutions. He called England "a blessed island"¹⁰ and "an excellent country" whose government was "the least imperfect of those ever devised by men,"¹¹ "the bulwark of all the others where life, religion and property of the inhabitants are menaced with total destruction."¹²

Having begun his diplomatic career in London by a political duel with Pitt (of whom in those days he said many a harsh word), he became afterwards, in the days of Anglo-Russian alliance against revolutionary France (he abhorred the Revolution and thought Napoleon a monster), one of Pitt's greatest and most loyal admirers and friends. When Pitt died, he wrote Canning a long letter describing the late Prime Minister as "the greatest Minister" England ever had and as "the most perfect of men," and urging him to write a life of Pitt: "You owe it to your country, to the world, to the memory of this great man who was your friend; you owe it to all his friends, you owe it to yourself." He added that if he had been in Canning's place, if he knew English and had Canning's talent and style, he would have devoted what was left to him of life to the writing of a book about Pitt.¹³ Curiously enough, despite his long stay in England, Woronzow had apparently not learned even to speak English fluently; at least a lady, a distant relation of the Pembroke family, who visited them in 1824 at Wilton House, recorded in her diary that she "dreaded" Woronzow "on account of his French" and regretted her "inability to converse with him," especially as she found him "the most engaging and delightful old man I ever saw."¹⁴ All Woronzow's letters to his English friends and acquaintances were written in French and so is his only extant letter (written in 1825) to his little grandson, Sydney Herbert, which is preserved among the Pembroke papers at Wilton House.¹⁵ This shows, incidentally, how widespread must have been the knowledge of the French language in English society in those days, for his ignorance of English did not

⁹W.P., VIII, 25.

¹⁰W.P., X, 23.

¹¹W.P., IX, 99.

¹²W.P., X, 29.

¹³W.P., XVI, 372-375.

¹⁴This extract is from the Diary of Mrs. Frank Lear, kindly communicated to me by Lady Ponsonby, herself a descendant of Woronzow.

¹⁵Those papers which relate to Woronzow and his family have been kindly placed at my disposal by Lord Herbert.

prove a disability in Woronzów's diplomatic career or in his intercourse with his many English friends. Woronzów knew Italian well, but it was also in French that he corresponded with Prince Castelcicala, the Neapolitan Minister, his closest personal friend among the foreign diplomats in London.

Woronzów was a man of great integrity, blunt and fearless in the expression of his opinions. Towards the end of Paul I's reign he fell into disfavor with the Emperor and had to retire temporarily from his post, refusing at the same time to return to Russia. Though a great admirer of Paul's son, Alexander I, he did not mince his words when the latter, in an attempt to appease Napoleon, sprang a surprise on the world at Tilsit. Woronzów was not only surprised, but grieved and ashamed—for a time he felt shy of appearing among his English friends. Much earlier he dared oppose courageously the Polish policy of Catherine II and protested against the Second Partition of Poland. He did so not only out of rightly understood Russian and European interests, but also on grounds of ordinary decency and honesty in international relations, voicing his opinion in terms which would do honour to a modern statesman.

Throughout the spring of 1792, the Empress of Russia had been setting the stage for her new Polish action: coming to terms with the Polish "Quislings," the "Confederates" of Targowica; encouraging Austria and Prussia to a war against revolutionary France so as to divert their attention; and making her own military preparations.¹⁶ On May 18, the Russian Envoy in Warsaw, Bulgakov, presented the Russian government's declaration, setting forth the reasons which compelled the Empress to intervene in Poland in defence of Polish liberties against the Constitution of the Third of May (1791) and to uphold the violated treaties. The same night the Russian troops crossed the Polish frontier. "Thus," in the words of a modern historian, "at almost the same moment there burst forth in East and West the two storms which the prudent diplomacy of Leopold II had foreseen and vainly striven to avert."¹⁷

In those days of slow communications it was with considerable delay that Woronzów learned that the events which he had dreaded had come about. On June 6 (Old Style?: many of Woronzów's

¹⁶Cf. H. R. Lord's excellent comprehensive study of the Second Partition: *The Second Partition of Poland. A Study in Diplomatic History*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1915. Lord is one of the few Western historians who have made use of the *Woronzow Papers*.

¹⁷Lord, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-281.

letters and dispatches bear a double date, but this has only one) we find Woronzów writing a long letter to his brother Alexander, with whom he maintained a lively correspondence, parallel to his official dispatches to Bezborodko,¹⁸ Morkov¹⁹ and others responsible for Russia's foreign policy. He began by saying that he felt sure that the Russian declaration to Poland could not have been written by Morkov (which was wrong, as he was afterwards to find out), for it was "very badly written, badly reasoned, and of unjustifiable prolixity," and then went on:

There was no need to speak of our grievances in the last war, because this looks like vindictiveness, which is mean and odious. Nor was it necessary to pay ridiculous lip-service to the old form of government under which the Republic is said to have flourished and prospered for so many centuries. This sounds stupid if said in good faith, or as an insulting mockery if one is convinced, as everybody is, that it was the most absurd and detestable form of government.²⁰

Woronzów said he refused to understand how such a ridiculous statement could have been made and how "in the midst of all the grand reasons" the Russian government could speak of such matters as corn and flour, or customs duties on those commodities. He continued by denouncing the war against Poland as an undertaking contrary to Russian interests, destined to be fought *pour le roi de Prusse*, and bound to lead to a new dismemberment of Poland:

Here we are again at war. It is obvious that it is we who shall bear the brunt of it. May at least the others derive no profit from it, which will be ultimately to our great detriment. I mean a new partition of this wretched Poland, a partition which will give Danzig and Torun, and Poznania to Prussia. I can see in it nothing but our eternal disgrace as well as future belated and irreparable regrets. I am quite ready to believe that at present such a partition is not contemplated; but Prussia, the intriguer, will know how to bring it about and how to lead us into it blindfold, which in fact has already happened.²¹

He sounded a warning note to official optimism:

I believe also that if it is thought that we do not need large forces for this expedition and that it will be easy, a gross error is being made. We are no longer living at the time of the Confederates who had neither money nor troops, who

¹⁸Count (later Prince) Alexander Andreevich Bezborodko (1747-1799), Catherine II's secretary, member and virtual head of the Collegium for Foreign Affairs; from 1797 to 1799, Chancellor of the Empire.

¹⁹Count Arkady Ivanovich Morkov (or Markov) (1747-1827), member of the Collegium for Foreign Affairs, Bezborodko's right-hand man, later Ambassador in Paris.

²⁰W.P., IX, 240.

²¹Ibid., p. 240.

were scattered in small bands and lacked unity, discipline and plan. Now it is a whole country, save for a small number of malcontents, united and supported by enthusiasm, by the hope of shaking off a highly odious foreign yoke, with an army certainly exceeding 50,000 men and disposing of the funds of the nation, which from year to year will grow more formidable as it becomes inured to battle, and unless we bring our undertaking to an end in one campaign we shall never finish it.²²

Woronzów was afraid that the war in Poland might unleash a general war with Turkey and Sweden striking in their turn at Russia. His pessimistic expectations on this score, as well as with regard to the duration of the Polish campaign, did not come true, but he was a good prophet when he said that an alternative to a general war would be the necessity for Russia "to carry out an infamous partition from which Prussia will gain most and which will not cost her a farthing (*sans que cela lui coûte un liard*)."²³ Woronzów was writing to his brother, but he knew that one way or another his views would be brought to the knowledge of the Empress and Bezborodko.

It is possible, of course, that Woronzów's attitude was to some extent influenced by the reaction which the Russian act of aggression provoked in Britain. On June 10(21), he wrote to his brother that there was "a general outcry against what is described as the Empress's acts of violence," and proceeded to explain the moral foundations of this reaction—this passage from his letter has a truly modern ring:

It is due to the principle of justice inherent in this nation: everything that smacks of oppression is hateful to them, and since they imagined that the Poles were going to be happy when they came out of their old anarchy, they regard the wish to force Poland to give up her new form of government, which she had set up to the satisfaction of the great majority of her people, as a terrible cruelty. This has gone so far that had Poland been nearer to this country the nation might have compelled the Government to come to the aid of the Poles.²⁴

And, remembering the battle he had fought against Pitt the year before, in which he was helped by the public opinion of Britain, Woronzów added "They are just as furious with us as they were with Mr. Pitt last year when he wanted to coerce us."

Woronzów did not take the step which in modern times an ambassador in his position might have taken—he did not resign or disavow his government. He even tried, by all the arguments he could think of, to defend the Russian action before the British gov-

²²*Ibid.*, pp. 240-41.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 241.

²⁴*Ibid.*

ernment, but he did so reluctantly, without, as he himself put it, "inwardly approving" of it. He even succeeded in persuading his friend Fox, the leader of the opposition, that after what had happened in Sweden, Russia "could not view with indifference the increase of power of a King of Poland." But he made his own views clear to St. Petersburg. And, after all, as he said, once the business had been embarked upon the shorter it lasted the better.

The next day he wrote again to St. Petersburg to say that when he had asked Lord Grenville to let him have the Russian declaration, the Foreign Secretary sent it to him through the Under-Secretary Burges and the latter supplied a copy in which several sentences were ironically underlined. Burges, added Woronzów, knew personally the King of Poland from whom he had received two years earlier a ring with a miniature portrait, "so he is furious with us and talks of nothing but our acts of violence and the coming partition of Poland." Woronzów himself still "wished ardently" that things would stop short of that:

If with every change or disturbance in Poland Prussia were to aggrandize herself and we to bear the costs of that aggrandizement, she will not fail to provoke them as often as she can, and with the Poles being such hotheads she will not find it difficult.

Russia ought to have learned her lesson, said Woronzów:

The last partition of Poland, apart from being odious in itself, had so strengthened Prussia that she thought she was entitled to dictate to us, nor can it be concealed that she has succeeded in this, for in the face of all Europe she imperiously forbade us to make an alliance with Poland and we at once obeyed with truly Christian humility. Whereupon Prussia herself concluded treaties with Poland and Turkey. . . .

And prophetically enough Woronzów added: "If she increases her territory again at the expense of our blood and our resources, then we or our children will feel the disastrous consequences of it."²⁴

Woronzów's "ardent wishes" were not to be fulfilled and his worst fears came true: the Polish campaign ended with another partition. On May 7 (New Style), 1793, in another letter to his brother Woronzów branded it as "unjustifiable perfidy" and showed a nobility of mind which some modern statesmen might do well to note:

Nothing of what you, and Messrs. Bezborodko and Morkov, have written to me to justify the new partition of Poland can either convince me or make me change my opinion that it is a deal of unjustifiable perfidy. I am not writing

²⁴W.P., IX, 243-244.

anything on this subject to those two gentlemen, but to you I can speak my mind. No doubt nations are not governed like individuals, but this maxim must not be ill-used. The whole thing is too blatantly iniquitous; but the perfidious manner in which it has been carried out makes it even more shocking. Since we were resolved to perpetrate this injustice, we ought to have said frankly that Poland was being despoiled in retaliation for her wish to make an offensive alliance with the Turks against us; instead of which there is talk of friendship, and manifestoes are published declaring that we seek nothing but Poland's happiness, that we want to ensure for her the integrity of her possessions and the enjoyment of her old form of government under which *she had flourished so brilliantly for so many centuries!* After this, can we believe that any Court will have any confidence in us? The greed for expansion has made us completely oblivious of the future and of the real interests of our State, for, while increasing the number of our enemies, we have irrevocably lost the only natural ally we had, I mean the House of Austria. . . .²⁶

Woronzów's opposition to Catherine's policy with regard to Poland was dictated equally by his "Liberalism," his innate sense of justice and decency, and his conception of Russia's interests and of true European balance: he saw in Prussia Russia's chief enemy, he believed in the necessity of Anglo-Russian alliance, and, like his uncle before him (who had been his mentor in diplomacy), he was firmly convinced of the desirability of retaining Austria's friendship.

For the sake of fairness it must be put on record that, obeying his government's instructions, Woronzów organised later a watch on Polish agents in London whom he believed to be sponsored by French Jacobins. In this task he was helped by his faithful friend and collaborator, Father Yakov Smirnov, and by John Paradise.²⁷

Woronzów never changed his adverse opinion of the partitions of Poland. Much later, in 1806, in a memorandum on Pitt and his policy, which he is supposed to have forwarded to Prince Czartoryski, then in charge of Russia's foreign policy; he wrote:

If the late Empress had better realised the interests of her Empire and what was needed to maintain the peace of Europe she ought to have, instead of forcing the Poles to elect her friend as the King of the country which she tormented throughout her life, concluded a permanent alliance with Great Britain the moment the family pact between France and Spain became known. She did not realise this necessity and believing her own person to be the only source

²⁶W.P., IX, 302.

²⁷The fact that this friend of Dr. Johnson and President Jefferson was a Russian agent has escaped the notice of all those who wrote about him, including his latest American biographer, Mr. A. B. Shepperson, whose book *John Paradise and Lucy Ludwell*, Richmond, Va., 1942, thorough and interesting though it is, shows a lamentable ignorance of things Russian. Paradise's Russian contacts are the subject of a separate study of mine.

of the interests and the well-being of the vast empire which she had so criminally appropriated she thought of nothing but flattering her vanity at the expense of all decency.²⁸

The animosity of this blunt posthumous criticism of Catherine and her policy reminds us that, like all his family with the exception of Princess Dashkova, Semyón Woronzów opposed Catherine's coup d'état in 1762. We can be almost certain also that Woronzów regarded even the First Partition of Poland as "iniquitous," and that as early as March 1791 he realized that Prussia was aiming at robbing Poland of Danzig.²⁹

WORONZÓW AND KOŚCIUSZKO

Events went much as Woronzów had foreseen them. The Second Partition of Poland was followed by the Third, with the unsuccessful rising led by Thadeusz Kościuszko as an interlude in the summer of 1794. Fate was to bring the great Polish patriot and the most outspoken Russian opponent of the partitions of Poland together when, in 1797, Kościuszko, after his release by Paul I, passed through London on his way to the United States. The Ambassador of the Russian Empire was to render Russia's enemy services which the latter acknowledged in a letter that, with all its polite formulas, was obviously inspired by a genuine feeling of gratitude. Here is this letter in its original French (it was dated "Bristol, June 16, 1797"):

Monsieur le comte,

Je ne puis, monsieur le comte, quitter ce pays sans me rappeler encore une fois au souvenir de votre excellence et sans la remercier pour toutes les amitiés et bontés dont elle m'a comblé pendant mon séjour à Londres. Je suis arrivé à Bristol sans me ressentir beaucoup des fatigues du voyage. Nous devons Samedi prochain nous embarquer pour Philadelphie. Une fois arrivé à bon port, je me promets bien de suivre fidèlement les avis du chevalier Farkwart [Sir Walter Farquhar] et de ses illustres collègues. Si jamais je recouvre une partie de ma santé, il me sera doux de me rappeler que c'est à vos soins, à l'intérêt que vous

²⁸W.P., IX, 302.

²⁹See the pamphlet called *Serious Enquiries into the Motives and Consequences of our Present Armament against Russia*. London: printed for J. Debrett, 1791. This pamphlet was compiled on Woronzow's instructions by his secretary Joly and translated into English by none other than John Paradise! It was published as part of the campaign launched by Woronzow against Pitt's "Russian Armament." It was, of course, supposed to emanate from an Englishman, but it is unlikely that the words "that iniquitous division, called the partition of Poland" (p. 54) would have been used if that had not been Woronzow's attitude. Although Woronzow himself says that the pamphlet was written by Joly, we may presume that Woronzow's own share in it was very large.

avez pris à moi que je la devrai. Veuillez agréer, monsieur le comte, les sentiments de reconnaissance et de la considération la plus distinguée avec lesquelles j'ai l'honneur d'être, monsieur le comte, de votre excellence votre très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur.

Kosciuszko³⁰

Kosciuszko had been recommended to Woronzów by Emperor Paul himself who is known to have shown a great interest in the Polish leader immediately upon his accession.³¹ But the man who was probably mainly responsible for the genuine interest which Woronzów took in Kosciuszko was the Scotsman John Samuel Rogerson (1741-1823), Catherine II's Court physician who came to Russia in 1766 and stayed there till 1816. For many years he had been Woronzów's regular correspondent and, since he enjoyed Catherine's favour (not so much as a doctor, for she made at least a show of not believing in medicine), he was very much in the know and his letters are a valuable source of information for Russian domestic and political history of that period. The first mention by Rogerson of Kosciuszko in the letters published in *Woronzów Papers* is in a letter dated October 20 (Old Style), 1794, where he says that "the prisoner is lodged at Mr. de Fersen's and is well treated."³²

Three weeks later, it was Bezborodko who wrote to Woronzów about Kosciuszko saying that Kosciuszko would never be released: "he is proud and hopes, they say, for a good reception and an opportunity of opening the eyes of the Empress on everything: those are his very words; but he is mistaken."³³ In February 1795, Bezborodko again mentioned Kosciuszko and described him as "an enthusiast, an honest man, but of very limited intelligence. . . . They have all been infected by the Constitution of May 3 and the idea of hereditary monarchy. When the affair is settled it has been decided to set them free and grant them complete amnesty."³⁴

Kosciuszko was not released, however, until after the death of Catherine II. On November 25, 1796, Rogerson wrote to Woronzów:

All the prisoners have been released. Kosciuszko, who is the best among them, is going to America. The Emperor gave him 60,000 roubles. I have given him a letter to you. He is a very honourable man. I have had a chance of rendering

³⁰W.P., XXIX, 357.

³¹Cf. T. Korzon, *Kosciuszko. Biografia z dokumentów wysnuta*. Krakow-Warszawa, n.d.

³²W.P., XXX, 53.

³³Ibid., p. 317.

³⁴Ibid., p. 332.

him some services. The late Empress had respect for him and wanted to release him and treat him with honour. She consulted me twice about this just before her death.³⁵

In his next letter (Dec. 8, 1796) Rogerson gave some more details about Kosciuszko:

I have already told you in my last letter, my dear Count, about General Kosciuszko's journey and although I know that he has been recommended to you by our Sovereign, I cannot let him go without asking you to look after him also on behalf of your friend Rogerson who takes a great interest in the fate of this man who is worthy of respect and interest by his character, his destiny and his sufferings. . . . I know that it will please you to show him every attention. I would have given him a letter to Lord St. Helens but I do not know whether he is in London. But it is enough for me to put him in your hands.

I want him to try to use Bath waters with a view to restoring the use of his leg, but will you ask Sir [Walter] Farquhar to help him with his advice. An idea has occurred to me, but I cannot speak of it with certainty. I thought that perhaps he would do well if on his way to America he stopped for a while in the Azores (St. Michael) where the climate and the sulphurous waters might contribute to the recovery of his leg.³⁶

Six days later Rogerson wrote that Kosciuszko had left and added: "The moral and physical strength of this honourable man has been almost exhausted by his long sufferings. He is the most honourable Pole I ever met."³⁷

It is certain that this solicitude for Kosciuszko shown by his friend weighed more with Woronzów than the "recommendation" of Paul I. We do not know what Woronzów did for Kosciuszko beyond introducing him to his own doctor, Sir Walter Farquhar, but we know that Kosciuszko thanked him for "all the acts of friendship and kindness" which Woronzów had showered on him. So did Rogerson in a letter written after Kosciuszko had sailed from Bristol, where he spoke of Woronzów's "tender and human care" for Poland's hero, adding: "I despair of his recovery: he has suffered so much in body and mind that his organism has been completely shaken and his nervous energy, I am afraid, irreparably ruined."³⁸

Nor do we know what Woronzów thought of Kosciuszko. Later, when Kosciuszko foreswore the oath of allegiance to the Russian Emperor which had been extorted from him, and went to Paris, Woronzów described him as an ambitious man, devoid of talents,

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 79.

³⁶*W.P.*, XXX, 81.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 85.

³⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

and dominated by Niemcewicz, "the fierce Jacobin." There is, nevertheless, something gratifying for a Russian who believes in the necessity of doing away with the tragic legacy of Russo-Polish relations in the thought that Woronzów, who had raised his voice in protest against the "unjustifiable perfidy" of the Second Partition of Poland, was able to offer what was probably sincere and disinterested help and comfort to the great Polish patriot and leader on his release from Russian captivity. The whole of this episode adds an attractive trait to the noble figure of Woronzów.

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Russian *Emigré* Literature in World War II

By HELEN ISWOLSKY

SUMMING up, over four years ago, the trends of Russian writing abroad,¹ we stated that Russian *émigré* literature, both in Europe and in America, had produced a series of interesting works, and had proved its vitality in spite of extremely difficult conditions.

We shall recall that the works written abroad by Russian exiles who had fled the Revolution reflected the experience of two generations: that of the older novelists, poets, and essayists who had established a reputation before the Revolution, such as I. Bunin, D. Merezhkovsky, A. Kuprin, V. Khodassevich, M. Aldanov, A. Remizov, K. Zaitsev, etc., and that of the younger men who had either left Russia in their childhood or were born in exile. In other words, the junior writers had been uprooted from the very start of their conscious life; they knew very little of their native land and had acquired literary culture and craftsmanship either in foreign schools or through individual effort and struggle.

However great the appeal of this literature, which had almost miraculously survived, Russian *émigré* writers lacked something essential, and this lack has often been stressed by literary critics. They no longer had a living link with the Russian soil and the Russian people; they did not participate in Russia's evolution and growth.

The senior writers, as we tried to show in our previous survey, preserved and cherished memories of long ago. They had the advantage over the younger generation of having developed their literary gifts on native soil. They had written for and spoken to large audiences in their own land. They were, so to say, the direct heirs of the great Russian literary masters, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Chekhov. They wrote in a pure and classical tongue, untouched by foreign influences, but they clung to the images and forms of the past with a conformism which halted the very development of their creative talent. Although they faithfully guarded the Russian cul-

¹*The Russian Review*, Vol. 1, no. 2 (April 1942).

tural heritage, they had perhaps lost one of its essential elements: the great aspirations of Russian humanism; the love of man, the dramatic search for God. They knew but little of the religious tension and vibration expressed in the writings of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky.

Neither did the younger generation present these fundamental spiritual traits of pre-revolutionary Russian literature. They had grown up in a world which knew no exalted drama, no great psychological conflicts tearing human conscience apart; their world was humble, poor, often sordid. They had mostly experienced want and solitude of a kind which does not stimulate the life of the spirit. They had, on the other hand, absorbed, in part, the scepticism of certain Western writers—Gide's amorality, the frozen introspection of Proust, and the world of J. Joyce, D. H. Lawrence, and Aldous Huxley. They had more reason than others to consider themselves as a "lost generation," and took a bitter pride in this fact. Yet, almost unconsciously, they belonged to Russia; knowing little of their land, yet preserving their mother tongue and culture. They did not yield to the temptation of denationalization; on the contrary, with the passing years, these young writers, (among them a number of women authors), began asserting themselves with a new vigor. Their works appeared in Russian émigré reviews, such as *Sovremennye Zapiski*, *Russkie Zapiski*, *Chisla*, etc., published in Paris, where most of these young authors lived or came on occasional visits. They had, moreover their own publications, started on a cooperative basis by a man of the older generation, Iliya Bunakov-Fondaminsky, who did so much to stimulate these young talents. Thus appeared *Krug*, an occasional magazine, containing prose and poetry, and several small volumes of selected poems.

Among these young novelists and poets belonging to the so-called Paris group, there were to be, as seen from the list below, many casualties, some of them due to the war, others to hardships, solitude, and poverty, from which these writers often suffered acutely. Here are the names of the best writers of the Paris group in alphabetical order: Vadim Andreev, Lydiya Chervinskaya, the late Boris Dikoy, Yury Felsen, Gaito Gazdanov, Alla Golovina, Georgii Ivanov, Lazar Kelberin, the late Irina Knorring, David Knut, Galina Kuznetsova, Anatoly Ladinsky, the late Yury Mandelstam, Constantin Mochulsky, Irina Odoevtseva, the late Boris Poplavsky, Sophia Pregel, Anna Prismanova, Vladimir Smolensky, Bronislav Sossinsky, P. Stavrov, the late Anatoly Steiger, Y. Terapiano, V.

Varshavsky, Vasily Yanovsky, Leonid Zurov, Marina Tsvetaeva, whose death in Russia during the war has been announced several times without confirmation.

There were, moreover, several minor authors whose works had not yet been published, although circulated in manuscript form, who seemed in many ways promising.

During the period immediately preceding World War II, these young writers of the Paris group underwent a psychological transformation. They gradually gave up, at least in part, their sceptical approach to life. True, Georgii Ivanov still retained his moral and spiritual nihilism. But there started among other young writers a sort of ethical revival. Bunakov-Fondaminsky, one of the editors of *Sovremennye Zapiski*, organized meetings and round table-discussions with the aim of stimulating constructive thought. The very fact that Bunakov-Fondaminsky made these young Russian intellectuals welcome at his home, that he helped them to publish their works, that he listened to their talks, and often to their confessions, encouraged the junior writers. It eased their pessimism and made them eager to study and discuss problems which they had long ignored because of their material difficulties and moral isolation. In that respect, as in many others, Bunakov-Fondaminsky deserves exceptional credit, a fact admitted today by the entire Russian émigré intelligentsia. We shall further see the truly heroic path this man was to follow during the war and the occupation of France. But before turning to that chapter of the life of Russian intelligentsia abroad, it is necessary to make clear in what way this pre-war literary revival was linked to religious experience.

This does not imply that these young Russian émigrés, the so-called "lost generation," were converted to a religious faith or that they adopted the teachings of a definite church, thereby losing the intricate combination of doubt, pessimism, psychological conflicts, and spiritual revolt which had for so long inspired their writings. It does mean, however, that they had come to a new realization of life's fundamental problems and were ready to discuss them with men whom they respected; although they did not accept the theology of these men. Bunakov-Fondaminsky himself was a deeply religious man, a sincere humanist, devoted to Russian culture and to the ideal of social justice it expressed. He was on the other hand well acquainted with the new Western religious and humanist trends: contemporary Protestant and Catholic religious thinkers were as familiar to him as Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. He was, moreover, a

friend of Nicholas Berdyaev and of Father Serge Bulgakov, the two most famous religious thinkers of the Paris Orthodox group. He was also a friend of Mother Mary Skobtsov, the Russian Orthodox nun, who had devoted her life to the care of the poorest Russian émigrés, and who was at the same time a talented writer, poet, and lecturer. Thus the "lost generation" encountered at Bunakov-Fondaminsky's home a true spiritual élite. This pre-war period and the remarkable fruit it bore in so far as the young Russian intelligentsia of Paris is concerned, deserves a special study. We have only briefly recalled these years preceding the war, because the war itself and its tragic experience, revealed and reassured the constructive trends we have described above.

During the years of occupation, after the defeat of France, we in America knew very little of what was going on in the various groups representing Russian émigré culture in Europe. It was only after the liberation that the picture became clear and that we were able to learn from personal letters and recent literary works how the Paris group of writers reacted to the great catastrophe.

Two essential facts must first of all be stated. With only a very few exceptions consisting mostly of obscure and second rate writers who had always been known as opportunists, the majority of Russian émigré writers in Paris rejected collaboration from the very beginning. Most of them joined either in ideological or active Resistance. Many of them became victims of the Gestapo; Yury Mandelstam and Yury Felsen perished in concentration camps. Boris Dikoy was shot with the heroic staff of the Paris *Musée de l'Homme* where he worked. Yury Sofiev was deported to a forced labor camp in Germany and returned only after the liberation. There are others who have not returned: Mother Mary Skobtsov, according to trustworthy evidence, died in the Ravensbrück gas chambers. She had been arrested and deported because of the protection she offered to persecuted Jews in Paris and because she wrote a poem in their behalf. Bunakov-Fondaminsky, too, was arrested and deported to Germany; no news has come from him since the liberation. We may still hope that he is among the living, but even so he can be considered as one of the martyrs of the Russian émigré intelligentsia. Those who saw him last at the concentration camp of Compiègne were deeply impressed by his calm heroism, his profoundly religious and resigned attitude, and by his joyful willingness to bear his cross. Bronislav Sossinsky joined the Resistance. Vadim Andreev and a group of his friends also took part in the French Resistance move-

ment on the small Island of Oleron, where he was finally captured by the Germans, regaining his freedom after imprisonment on the island. Vladimir Varshavsky volunteered as an infantry private in the first days of the war; he requested and obtained a specially dangerous mission, was taken prisoner, and spent four years in a prison camp in Germany, from which he was finally freed by the Russians. Many other Russian intellectuals in France, without directly suffering from war and occupation, have paid a high price for loyalty and abnegation. There is, for instance, the case of Professor Constantin Mochulsky, who taught at the Sorbonne. He wrote two books during the occupation, one on Dostoevsky and the other on Alexander Blok, living in most precarious conditions, suffering cold and hunger, not only during the occupation, but also after liberation, as was, and still is, the common lot of the Russian intelligentsia in Paris. Professor Constantin Mochulsky's health was seriously impaired during this ordeal and he has entered a sanatorium founded before the war by Mother Mary, who was his friend and to whom he devoted one of his recent articles.

The second trend manifested by the Russian intelligentsia in Paris during the war was a revival of a deep national feeling, awakened by Hitler's attack on Russia. This trend did not necessarily coincide with an allegiance to Communist ideology; it was not a political, but an emotional impulse; it was a return to national sources, a new interest in things Russian long forgotten or neglected. Proust, Gide, and James Joyce were laid aside, and the Tolstoyan faith in the Russian people became once more inspiring and attractive. Russian victories were hailed in Resistance groups and in prison camps; young Russian émigré intellectuals for the first time encountered Soviet resisters and Soviet prisoners of war. No fundamental antagonism marked these meetings. Soviet soldiers were surprised to discover that émigrés spoke such fluent Russian; the émigrés felt once more that they had roots, and that these were common roots with the Russian people.

The two-fold trends inspired by Resistance and by a national feeling are clearly reflected in post-war Russian émigré literature. Just as before the war most of the young writers still live and write in Paris. They have published some material in France, contained in two anthologies, *Vstrechi* and *Russkii Sbornik*, and in a few separate booklets of collected poems. A number of short stories, fragments of novels, and a series of poems written by Russian émigrés in Europe, and especially in Paris during recent years, have been pub-

lished in two Russian reviews in New York, *Novyi Zhournal* and *Novoselie*. The stories are by Leonid Zurov, Vadim Andreev, Vladimir Varshavsky; the poems by P. Stavrov, I. Knorring, A. Ladinsky, Y. Terapiano, Anna Prismanova, Vadim Andreev, Irina Odoevtseva, Victor Mamchenko, Y. Sofiev, and many others. Most young writers and poets who have survived the ordeals of war and occupation have resumed their work and are showing both craftsmanship and a profounder spiritual maturity.

These writers convey the feeling of having solid ground under their feet, because they met and defied reality as an ordeal and as an initiation. They no longer suffer from that vague and embittered discontent which used to be called *mal du siècle* and which is now known as "inferiority complex." This is not only due to the fact that during the war they made a definite choice and entered into definite action, but also because they have freed themselves from a selfish and narrow individualism in order to participate in a struggle where millions of other men, belonging to many creeds and nations, fought side by side for the same cause. In other words, their isolation is over, they have discovered brotherhood.

Most of the short stories recently published by these young émigré writers naturally relate their war experience. Thus, *Junior Lieutenant Danilov*, a very fine piece by Vladimir Varshavsky,² and other writings by that young author, recall Varshavsky's life as a soldier in the French army and as a prisoner of war in Germany. Danilov is a Soviet officer whom the author encountered after his liberation. This portrait is traced with remarkable truth. *The Walk to Town*, another short story by Varshavsky, is also excellent. This young writer, who had published very little before the war, has now revealed himself as a true craftsman, inspired by the powerful and accurate method used by Tolstoy to describe human beings, their physical aspect, their moral reactions, and the natural landscape which forms their background.

Other young émigré writers, instead of reviving their personal war reminiscences, have turned to the Russian theme, like Leonid Zurov in his novel *The Winter Palace*, a fragment of which has recently appeared, under the title *A Night in Petrograd*. This fragment does not suffice to give us an idea of Zurov's entire novel, but it does show, as in Varshavsky's case, that Zurov has become a far more mature writer, both in literary skill and in spiritual content.

The same can be said about most poems written by this group.

²*Novoselie*, no. 24-25.

They, too, reflect either war experience or the Russian theme. Some, like the poems of Yury Terapiano, transpose the tragic events of the war into mystical language. The cosmic interpretation of events, an attempt to grasp their eschatological meaning, can be often noted in Russian émigré war and post-war poetry.

We have not yet mentioned in this summary of war and post-war Russian literature abroad, the names of authors belonging to the older generation. Though most of them are still alive, and continued writing during war and occupation, their works scarcely reflect the crisis. Ivan Bunin has published a series of elaborate vignettes devoted to erotic themes, and reviving far away memories. The stories are written in that author's usual crystal-pure and strictly classical style. Many other older Russian émigré writers have, like Bunin, remained absorbed in memories instead of picturing contemporary events. Alexis Remizov is, perhaps, the only one who has made a description of his life in occupied Paris, a humorous and phantasmagorical account.

There are some Russian émigré writers in the United States and, in so far as the older generation is concerned, they, too, do not reflect the crisis of war and the problems of the post-war world; they are absorbed in writing historical novels or in literary criticism and *belles lettres*. As previously, Vladimir Nabokov is one of the leading Russian literary talents abroad, both in prose and poetry. Let us also mention some authors of the younger Russian generation in America who have specially stressed, directly or indirectly, the tragedy of war, its aftermath, or the cosmic aspect of our present days. Among the poets, Sophia Pregel has treated the Russian theme very much after the fashion of the Paris poets; she has moreover introduced "Americana," which is curiously blended with the Russian pattern. Another Russian poetess in America, Tatiana Ostromova, who has written some excellent poems, often recalls in style and inspiration Marina Tsvetaeva, the most distinguished poet of the Paris group; Tsvetaeva was linked to this group until her return to Russia on the eve of the war. Christina Krotkova, who publishes her poems in America, is in many ways typical of the younger generation of Russian émigré writers. One of the most representative novelists of that group, Vasily Yanovsky, also lives and writes in the United States. Though he has not directly participated in Europe's tragedy, at least not since he left France in the first years of the war, his work is created in the image and semblance of world-tragedy even more than it has ever been before. During

recent years, he has published several fragments of his new novels and a few short stories. His latest novel, *The American Experience*, is appearing in separate installments in *Novyi Zhurnal*. Yanovsky's writings deserve a more detailed analysis than we can give them in the present article, but he is mentioned in this article precisely as a man whose entire being responds to our present day world, whose mind and soul are rent apart by the human and social enigmas, by the new ethical, religious, and philosophical problems we are facing. Yanovsky, who is a realist fearing neither crudeness nor bitter irony in his writings, conveys, however, that sense of vibration, of religious tension, which we described as typical of the great Russian humanist writers.

If, before the war, young Russian émigré writers had lost that humanist strain which so deeply marked Russian culture before their time, they have finally discovered it and been inspired by it. It may now have a different name, it has been put through the ordeal of scepticism, revolution, war, and infinite suffering, both physical and spiritual. Yet we can still recognize it, and we behold a new Russian intelligentsia abroad, turning more and more to national cultural sources, and at the same time participating in universal culture.

Some Achievements of Soviet Medical Research

BY EDWARD PODOLSKY

MEDICAL research in the Soviet Union has been and is being carried out along a score of different fronts. Special hospitals, clinics, and laboratories have been built and equipped for specific types of research and staffed with specially trained medical personnel to direct and carry out this research. The State encourages the search for new medical facts and techniques, and the men who achieve results and discover new methods of combating disease are honored as national heroes.

In the U.S.S.R. the potentialities of skin grafting are taken so seriously that a special supply service has been inaugurated. The required materials are taken from those who have been condemned to death or are supplied by those generous persons who have willed their bodies for this purpose.

Reparative surgery has now reached magnificent heights in the Soviet Union. The work of Dr. Filatov in grafting new corneas from corpses on the blind corneas of the living has attracted world-wide attention. Similarly, the use of skin from the dead for healing the wounds of the living has now become widespread.

A collective farm woman arrived from the country with a face monstrously eaten away by ulcers and devoid of all emotion and expression. The face was like a hideous mask. Cutting away one of the ulcers, the surgeon replaced it with a piece of skin from a healthy area. Within a few days the patient's largest ulcer had closed up. The resistance of the tissue to the action of the bacteria had strengthened. A struggle had begun in every cell; the ulcers cleared up, the inflamed condition was improving, and life-giving forces vitalized the skin.

Another worker burned his arm with molten lead. The arm was paralyzed and covered with scars. New skin was grafted on this arm, the scars began to fade away, the tissues became elastic, and the arm regained its flexibility and strength.

Skin grafting is now one of the most highly developed branches of reparative surgery. It is used to fill in voids and help extensive

wounds to heal. Usefulness is restored to limbs contracted by extensive scar tissues, and ugliness caused by disease and accident is corrected.

Severe curvature of the spine is not only a disfiguring disease but a disabling one as well. Bone surgeons have been attracted to this problem in bone dynamics for a great many years, and various methods of overcoming spine curvature have been devised.

The first method of overcoming spinal distortion used various bone jackets and supports. At most, they gave but temporary relief; the curvature, if at all severe, was little affected. Later various operations were devised in which added strength was given to the weakened spine by inserting strips of bone in artificially made grooves. Some degree of lessening of the curvature was attained; most gratifying was the relief obtained from pain.

Within the past few years a very remarkable operation for the treatment of hump back has been devised. Professor Kouslick, head of the Orthopedic Clinic of the Central Institute of Traumatology at Leningrad, has discovered a new method for operating on hump back, by which the chest cavity is not mutilated although the ribs which cause the hump are straightened and re-aligned.

Twenty-five patients with maladjustment of the spinal column were treated by Professor Kouslick. In no case was there a fatal result. At the end of the fourth or fifth day the patients could sit up, from the tenth to the fourteenth day they could walk, and at the end of one month or six weeks they could return to work. The speed of recovery is due to the fact that the chest cavity is left intact. Another advantage of Professor Kouslick's method is the straightening of the trunk. Even very considerable distortions become practically imperceptible under the clothes, and in less serious cases the hump disappears completely.

Into a Moscow hospital a few months ago walked a thirty-year-old woman who complained to the examining physicians that her throat was causing her intense pain. When her throat was examined it was found that there was a band of contraction about her larynx. Questioning her, the doctors learned that she had suffered from diphtheria and was about to choke to death from the false membrane that this disease produced in the throat when her doctor made an external opening in her throat to enable her to breathe. After the operation had been performed, suppuration had set in, and the cartilage around the larynx had begun to disintegrate.

The patient was sent to the Prosthetic Institute in Moscow where

Dr. Rauer, the famous throat specialist, with the assistance of Dr. Joseph Bokstein, decided to give her a new throat. This was accomplished by transplanting the cartilage taken from the body of a person who had just died, the operation being carried out in four stages at monthly intervals. Eventually the larynx was completely restored and, at a recent meeting of the Moscow Surgical Society, Dr. Rauer revealed that the woman, now equipped with borrowed cartilage, had a new throat which proved very satisfactory in every respect.

Blood transfusions and other uses of blood have received widespread attention in the U.S.S.R. Many interesting studies have come from Soviet hospitals, laboratories, and clinics concerning the miracles that may be performed with blood. The late Dr. Bogomolets has done remarkable work with blood transfusions in delaying the onset of old age.

Dr. Bogomolets' theory as to how blood transfusions help in rejuvenating the system is most interesting. Since the aging of the organism is accompanied by accumulation within the cells of biologically inert protoplasmic molecules, their removal from the cellular elements by means of blood transfusion must have, to a certain degree, a rejuvenating effect on the organism. It is possible, therefore, according to Dr. Bogomolets, for small, frequent transfusions to delay premature aging of the body.

The resorptive effect of transfused blood suggests the possibility of favorable action of blood transfusion in functional disturbances of the blood vessels, according to Dr. Bogomolets. It is, therefore, possible that repeated blood transfusions may prove an effective measure against the development of arteriosclerosis.

Two other Soviet scientists who have done much with blood in the treatment of various conditions are Drs. A. A. Bagdasarov and M. C. Dultsin. They have found that blood transfusion in large doses produces a healing effect in hemophilia (bleeder's disease). Blood transfusions are of value in treating infectious diseases because they lead not only to a higher degree of non-specific immunity, but also to non-specific desensitization and detoxication. Blood transfusions are also of value in vitamin deficiencies. Small doses of blood create a favorable "soil" for more rapid and effective use of vitamins and minerals.

Blood products, particularly thrombin, have been found by Soviet neurosurgeons to be of great value in operative work upon the nerves and brain. Dr. N. I. Propper-Grashchenkov stated: "In the nerve

clinic of the All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine at Moscow, which serves the seriously wounded in skull, brain, spinal column and spinal cord, since the end of April 1942, thrombin prepared by V. A. Kudryashov has been used as a hemostatic agent in operations on the brain and spinal cord. In all cases there was a definite effect on the duration of bleeding from the small vessels of the brain and the tissue of the scalp and spinal column."

Soviet medical men have done much with blood. They have developed blood thrombin, a chemical powder very effective in stopping bleeding from the most serious wounds. Extracted from blood, it can be sprinkled on the brain to control diffuse bleeding. Because it is a natural substance there is no danger in leaving it in the body after an operation since it is absorbed.

Fibrinogen is another product derived from blood. A little like nylon, it can be made in the form of sheets, powder, sponges and strings. It has the power of clotting blood and absorbing it, and later being absorbed itself. Fibrinogen sponges are left inside the body without harm. They stop bleeding from serious wounds in no time.

Red blood cells, an important by-product of plasma production, are made into a paste which speeds healing of old, infected burns, varicose and other ulcers, and extensive granulating wounds.

Some interesting discoveries about human radiant energy have also been made by Soviet scientists. Dr. Gurvich, of Leningrad, states that he discovered that blood, as well as the brain, nerves, and other parts of the body, actually emanates specific types of rays generally known to scientists as mitogenic rays, life rays, or M-rays, which lie in the ultra-violet portion of the spectrum. They are given off from plants, yeast, and similar living organic structures. All organs of the body, he says, have their own specific biological spectrums.

Dr. Gurvich has found that as soon as cancer begins to develop, the normal spectrum of the blood, as mentioned above, undergoes a change. This change is definitely a warning signal that should be taken seriously.

Another Soviet scientist, Dr. D. N. Borodin, maintains that so far twenty-five biological spectrums have been mapped out by Dr. Gurvich and himself. These include two specific spectrums for cancer.

"It is interesting," states Dr. Borodin, "that spectra of cancer tissues are not identical during the different stages of the disease." Cancer is different at different stages of its development so far as

ascertaining it by these waves is concerned. This is a most interesting discovery and later may prove of great value in early diagnosis.

Painless childbirth through hypnotism has been another achievement of Soviet medical men. Professor V. Zdravomyslov of the Moscow University Medical School has been the pioneer in the development of this new method of making childbirth easier and less painful. Obstetrical anesthesia by hypnosis has now been developed to a high stage of perfection. This is how hypnosis is used today in childbirth. A few weeks before birth is expected, the mother is prepared by a course of hypnotic training. In some cases, however, the specialist inducing hypnosis starts the treatment during the actual labor when the pains first begin.

Complete success is obtained only when freedom from pain is produced during the whole of the period from the commencement of pain till delivery. Success is considered to be only partial when the pains, though considerably reduced, are not completely eliminated; failure, when hypnosis has had but little effect. Positive results have been obtained in 88 per cent of all cases, of which one-half responded—during the entire duration of labor.

The length of preparatory training varies according to the suggestibility of the patient and the depth of the subsequent hypnotic sleep. Pregnant women who respond favorably to suggestion attend hypnotic treatments at intervals of one to two weeks, sometimes even dispensing with the training period altogether. Others have preparatory treatment every two or three days, and sometimes even daily in certain cases.

During this hypnotic training period two aims are kept in mind: to dispel the conviction that pains are unavoidable and put the patient in a peaceful frame of mind; to endeavor by oral suggestion to diminish sensitivity to painful sensations which may, in spite of everything, occur by reason of the abnormal distention of the tissues. The first objective is easily obtained in almost every case. After a few treatments those who are dreading what lies before them are calmed and no longer afraid.

The use of psychotherapeutic analgesia is spreading among hospitals and maternity clinics in the Soviet Union. The only difficulty with hypnotism is the great amount of time that the specialist must be prepared to spend, and the enormous expenditure of energy that he must make. But it is always found that the results fully compensate for the initial effort.

From Moscow has come news that Professor Sinitzin of the Gorky

Medical Institute succeeded in transplanting the hearts of frogs. Professor Sinitzin had to develop a method for rapidly sewing up blood vessels, and his first series of experiments enabled him to place a second heart inside the animal's own heart. Later, he cut out the hearts of certain frogs and placed transplanted hearts in their blood vessel systems. Transplanted hearts functioned normally, some of the animals living for one hundred days. They did not show any difference in behavior from normal frogs, and they mated and spawned in the spring.

Continuing his experiments, Dr. Sinitzin then transplanted hearts through frogs' mouths, the animals' own hearts being removed at the same time, and the "new" heart immediately included in the blood-vessel system. There was a minimum loss of blood by this method, and at the time of Dr. Sinitzin's reports, some of the frogs had lived for 130 days. Cardiographs of the transplanted hearts coincide with those of the unoperated ones.

Valentin Cherepanov was dead. The surgeon made entry in the case history: "Death following shock and acute hemorrhage on March 3, 1944, at 14:41."

Valentin Cherepanov would have remained dead had not Soviet medical science formulated methods of combating premature death from wounds. Formed many months ago by the Red Army Medical Board and the People's Commissariat of Health, the special groups of medical men were headed by Vladimir Negovsky, Director of the Laboratory of Experimental Physiology of the All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine.

Three and a half minutes after death had been recorded, the group went to work on the body of Valentin Cherepanov. One minute later, Cherepanov's heart began to beat and after three minutes, respiration appeared. Within half an hour he had recovered consciousness. Then he fell into a doze. His name was called and he opened his eyes and answered questions. He asked for a drink. His breathing was even and his pulse regular.

Today Cherepanov feels perfectly well, but he is under observation at the All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine. Dr. Negovsky and his co-workers, Drs. Smenskaya, Litvinov, and Kozlov, have already tested their methods on 51 officers and men with severe injuries to the internal organs or limbs. In all these cases the usual means of saving life had failed. In 12 wounded the vital functions were restored and the patients later treated for their wounds. In the other cases the return to life was brief, lasting only a few hours or days.

Briefly, Dr. Negovsky's method of revival is as follows: Oxygen is supplied to the lungs directly by a pulmотор; blood is introduced not only into the brachial vein, but also into the artery, in the direction of the heart. This method restores nourishment to the heart muscle. Dr. Negovsky's method is simple and readily available.

Dr. S. V. Kravkov has been doing original research on the stimulation of vision for the past several years. He found that the problem of sharpening visual functions may be reduced to the application of external stimuli and the use of medicinal agents. Moderate light stimulation of the eye was tested as a means of increasing the light sensitivity of the vision. The following facts were disclosed. If in the course of dark adaptation the visual field is illuminated with a light of moderate brightness for one to five minutes, at further stages of adaptation the eye will exhibit a higher degree of sensitivity than it could reach without such stimulation. An appropriate dosage of additional light stimulation produces a significant and durable positive effect with rather rare exceptions.

During the last five years the achievements of Soviet medical men and the great advances of Soviet medical science have received widespread attention in the United States. The work done by Dr. Bogomolets in using the ACS serum to prolong human life is now of current interest, having received favorable attention in the press and on the radio. There can be no doubt that Soviet medical men are in the foreground in the constant fight to eliminate disease, repair the mischief of accident and disease, and to prolong human life.

Twenty-Five Years of Teaching Russian at Columbia

By MARION MOORE COLEMAN

THE silver anniversary of any achievement whatsoever deserves a celebration, and when such an anniversary is allowed to slip by unremarked, when the pressures and emergencies accompanying a great war make it necessary to let the anniversary go by uncelebrated, then it is only proper that the neglect should be atoned for as quickly as possible and amends be made as soon as it becomes practical to do so. Last summer—1945—while we were still at war, marked the 25th anniversary of Russian language teaching in the summer at Columbia University, and the session of 1946 just completed saw Russian classes in the summer school on Morningside Heights going into their second quarter century.

Normally it would seem of slight importance: the fact that a language has been taught in a university for 25, and now 26, consecutive summers, but with Russian the case is different. In the first place, Russian is still a relative rarity so far as the summer curricula of our colleges and universities in general are concerned; and in the second, it was only with the coming to Columbia of the one who taught that first summer class in Russian in 1921 that Russian language classes became firmly established in this university and that the study of Russian in general passed beyond the possibility of being looked upon as whimsy or dilettantism.

We asked Elena Mogilat, the teacher referred to above, what those early classes were like back in 1921. In some respects, she said, they were just like those she is teaching today: composed of people with the most widely divergent purposes in their study of Russian, and, naturally, of many who had no purpose at all.

There was one woman, Mrs. Mogilat recalls, who had fallen in love with the Russian language from hearing a café singer give her all in *Ochi Chornye*. In the same category of the purposeless were those hysterical adorers of the Soviet régime found in every Russian class both then and now, who never study hard enough either to enjoy the language or to be a credit to the teacher and whose zeal quickly peters out when battle has to be joined with the perfective aspect.

From the beginning, however, Mrs. Mogilat informs us, there was always a solid core of serious and purposeful students enrolled in her Russian language classes. One of these early students, who finds his Russian helpful now in his "hobby-business" of dealing in rare books, as well as occasionally in his legal transactions, recalls with pleasure those pioneer classes in Russian back in the twenties. Russian was an "honest" language, he says, "one you could get your teeth into," and he is sorry he has not been able really to get down to business and master it.

As in Italian language classes there are always a number of students to be found studying the language because they need it in their musical studies, so with Russian. Moussorgsky and Tchaikovsky have been responsible for more students taking Russian than they could ever have imagined, especially in the early days when there were not so many other reasons for taking the language as there are now.

One class of student has been constant from the beginning, we learn, and he is the scientist. Naturally the scientific student cares little about learning to speak the language, except in so far as speaking will advance his reading facility. Yet the scientist's knowledge of the language must be precise, as well as highly specialized, and a course designed especially to meet his needs had from the beginning to be devised. As there was no provision at first for an extra course of this nature, Mrs. Mogilat was obliged to devise one that could be integrated with the regular elementary language course and be kept going simultaneously with this. The problem thus posed called for great ingenuity on the teacher's part, and especially for much work outside of class, but Mrs. Mogilat says she has enjoyed this unique part of her teaching as much as any, as it has taken her into a variety of fields and given her a view of many scientific branches.

During the first three months of her teaching the scientific student, Mrs. Mogilat requires a thorough grounding in basic Russian. For this she uses the well-known text of Semeonova. No time is spent on conversation—the scientists are excused from participation in the usual conversation periods, though they are encouraged to listen to it and absorb what they can—but reading aloud and dictation play a large part, so that ear may help eye in the learning process. After Christmas, each scientific student is assigned, or assigns himself if he is advanced in his field, a piece of contemporary reading that concerns his particular branch. Often no two members are working on the same article or even in the same field—metallurgy,

medicine, chemical engineering, botany, and anatomy are favorite fields—but all bring their material to class for reading, translation, and later discussion, so that all may have a chance to build a general as well as a specific scientific vocabulary. Soviet scientific literature is exceedingly rich and there is never any lack of articles for the student to work on, or any dearth of stimulating new concepts to discuss.

Librarians have always made up a fair proportion of those studying Russian, according to Mrs. Mogilat. One librarian tells us she loved her Russian classes and that she learned so much more than the mere language from her teacher, "so much about Russia," as she says. It was this librarian, we recall, whose testimonial to her teacher may still be seen on the wall of 505 Philosophy Hall at Columbia. It is a water color of a black Scotty dog (the librarian is of Scotch origin) gazing up in uncertain wonder at an enormous white Russian wolfhound, while the latter looks with pity down at his own aspiring self.

Students of history and economics have been a powerful element in the Russian language classes at Columbia from the outset. These, like the scientists, have no particular desire to speak Russian but they are anxious to get a fluent reading knowledge in their specialized field with all possible speed. To meet the needs of this rapidly mounting group, a class in Historical Readings was introduced in 1932. Since that time this class has been elected by an ever increasing number of students each year, most of them from Professor Robinson's large classes in Russian History. By 1941, there was so much demand from the scientific students for a similar course tailored to their needs that the name was changed to Rapid Readings, and provision was made for the scientists as well as for the historians and economists.

The problems connected with Russian language teaching have remained the same from the beginning to the present and to meet them the teacher has to be versatile as well as hardy. Constant improvisation is required and constant re-fashioning of the program of reading and conversation. Mrs. Mogilat believes firmly in group conversation in all classes, from beginning to advanced. This summer, in her intermediate class, we saw one student after another take the chair,—the teacher retiring to the rear of the room—and deliver in easy, conversational manner a lecture on some subject he had chosen himself, then submit to question and at times attack from the class, defend himself, parry or thrust, all in Russian in the most

lively and natural manner. In the class were, according to their own testimony, students having the most divergent aims in their study of Russian. One wanted to know the language in order to travel in the Soviet Union. Another expects to do social work there. One young man, an English literature major, was studying Russian in order to "balance" his knowledge of literature. There were a couple who intend to take advanced degrees in the language and literature: our future American Slavists. One was studying merely "for fun," another, a professor from one of our state universities on sabbatical leave, "because he had some free time" and found Russian interesting. A good number of the class was desirous of knowing Russian for scientific purposes and a large number, similarly, for historical research. There was one who expects to use Russian in doing business with the Soviet Union. And, of course, there was the inevitable young woman who, when she began studying Russian, had no purpose at all in mind but now is working hard at it in order "to be able to speak with my prospective mother-in-law."

Wherever the other Slavic languages—Polish and Czech, Serbian and Slovak—are taught, they are elected almost exclusively by students of one or another Slavic origin: Polish by those whose parents came from Poland, Czech and Slovak and Serbian similarly. This has never been the case with Russian. In fact the precise opposite has generally been the case. Most of those studying Russian have not been themselves of Russian origin, either recent or remote, but of general, old-American stock. In the classes this summer there was a young man of Hungarian origin and one of Ukrainian, but in the main, with the exception of a few young people of Jewish origin, the students were mostly old-stock American. This makes the problem of teaching Russian, especially the elementary language, quite different from that of teaching the other Slavic languages in this country, as the students come to Russian with virgin minds, uncluttered by odds and ends of language, most of which eventually has to be unlearned.

Although Mrs. Mogilat began her teaching of Russian in the summer session, she was at once invited, following that first summer of 1921, to offer Russian in Extension. This was not the first time Russian had found a place in the Extension Department of Columbia, as a Mr. Andreevsky had been teaching it intermittently from the beginning of the war (1914), but Mrs. Mogilat's coming marked, as we have said, the beginning of steady and uninterrupted continuity in the teaching of the language. She had arrived in our country but

a year previously, on Memorial Day, 1920, and was full of enthusiasm for the task assigned her by the late Professor Coss, at that time director of the Summer Session.

There were just beginning to be texts available of modern vintage—for generations, Carl Reiff's ancient English-Russian Grammar, produced way back in the middle of the nineteenth century, had been the standard text—but now there were Forbes and Hugo and Bondar, and the one Mrs. Mogilat chose at first to use in her classes: *Russian Grammar for Class and Reference Use* (New York, 1919) by the founder of the Department of Slavonic Languages at Columbia, the late John Dyneley Prince. Readers suitable for class use were few in those days, and Mrs. Mogilat found a text edition of Tolstoy's *Prisoner of the Caucasus* the most practical at first. Today almost every month sees a new Russian grammar on the market, and at least two new classroom editions of a Russian classic.

With the second World War, Mrs. Mogilat found her Russian language classes doubled and trebled, and in order to meet the challenge of this revitalized interest, she organized a Russian circle which she called "Russky Kruzhok" (1943). With its headquarters in an informal "Russian" room in one of the houses on 117th street, this organization has as its prime objective to provide an opportunity for more language practice and conversation drill than it was possible to give in the class period. Every afternoon students may go to the Kruzhok and talk to their hearts' content with a native Russian known for her pure and beautiful Russian. Russian papers and magazines, both émigré and Soviet, are provided, and the student may browse at will among these, as well as converse. In addition, the Kruzhok has a social side, sponsoring parties at Christmas and Easter and also dramatic evenings and lectures. Last spring it put on a full three-act Ostrovsky play in McMillan Theatre—of course in Russian.

Mrs. Mogilat has always insisted on having part of the reading material required of her classes consist of current writing, again both émigré and Soviet. The classics, yes, but Russian is, after all, a living language, and what is written today is important too. The one test current writing must pass is that its Russian shall be beyond reproach.

As may be imagined, in teaching Russian all this time in a great university, as Mrs. Mogilat has done, there has existed at all times the danger of partisanship in the ideological struggle which since 1917 has torn the Russian world into two parts. Mrs. Mogilat has

never taken sides. She has never deviated from the belief that Russia is one, however many different ways there may be of looking at her historically as in the present, and so she has never had any difficulty in avoiding partisanship. One day, it seems, she came to class all in white but with a brilliant red kerchief draped about her head. After class, one of her students, thrilled by the sight, rushed up to Mrs. Mogilat and exclaimed: "A perfect symbol, white crowned with red, just like Russia herself!"

Long before the Army and Navy Language Programs began making propaganda for more of the spoken language in our schools, Mrs. Mogilat placed the central emphasis on speech. Everyone, however shy, is eventually lured into taking part in conversation, if not to the point of displaying his prowess before the entire class, than at least to conversing with a small group.

Also, while agreeing with those who are opposed in principle to translation and insisting rather on reading, so that the language may communicate itself directly, Mrs. Mogilat has encouraged certain especially gifted pupils to try their hand at literary translation. Some good poems in English have been produced in this way. Here is a verse to *Silence*, by the poet Tyutchev, translated by John P. Mihaly:

Be still, keep secret and conceal
Thy dreams, and all that thou dost feel!
Allow but in the Soul's confine
Their steady rise and slow decline,
As scintillating stars at night
Enjoy their secretive delight!
How can the heart itself unclasp?
Thyself how may another grasp?
By what thou liv'st, can he descry?
An uttered thought becomes a lie.
Exploring, thou wilt foul the source:
Just quaff from it in mute recourse!
To live but in thyself aspire:
Within thy Soul's a world entire
Of secret fascination wit;
External noise will deafen it,
The morning rays will blind thy view:
Their chanting heed in silence, too.

Since 1921, Russian language has not come and gone, and come

and gone as we have seen it do in other places, and if you ask Mrs. Mogilat the secret she will say: hard work on the teacher's part, and on hers (or his) also, adaptability to the very n-th degree. Each class has a new need, each must be given a new program. No two years are ever alike. What does the student want? The teacher must find this out and then, sparing no pains and at whatever cost to herself, give it to him, often making up her own textbook and reader as she goes along. There is no other rule. Teaching Russian is harder than teaching other languages where both need and procedure are standardized, but it is also, undoubtedly, much more interesting.

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SALISBURY, HARRISON. *Russia on the Way*. New York, Macmillan, 1946. 425 pp. \$3.50.

LAMONT, CORLISS. *The Peoples of the Soviet Union*. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1946. 229 pp. \$3.00.

Much the most stimulating of this group of books on Russia is Professor Timasheff's *The Great Retreat*. It is also much the most difficult reading. When a sociologist is also a former jurist, it is small wonder that his writing is not only involved but replete with abstruse and unfamiliar technical phrases. This is particularly true of the introductory discussion on the nature of revolutions in general, and of that of the Soviets in particular. Fortunately, the author has provided short summaries as a guide and possible alternative to his sociological disquisitions. And once under way, the book is smoother sailing.

The bulk of the book is devoted to the rewarding task of tracing the evolution of theory and practice in the various phases of Soviet life, with emphasis upon practice. Many of the descriptions, such as that of the actual machinery and functioning of government, are excellent. The title of the book reflects, of course, the author's belief that since 1934 there has been a progressive departure from Com-

unist Utopianism, a trend of which he highly approves. In the economic field, for instance, he welcomes a strong tide toward free enterprise. Soviet Russia, he contends, has won successes only in the degree to which it has reverted to traditional Russian programs. But meanwhile progress has been delayed by tremendous losses caused by fanatical dogmatism. And in the field of politics there has been no evolution at all, but an abrupt return to something worse than the despotism of the eighteenth century, with a complete disregard of the great advances made in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

A turn from Timasheff to Professor Schuman's *Soviet Politics* forces the reader to the conclusion that the social sciences, at least when applied to a topic of vital present concern, are certainly not yet scientific in the same sense as the natural sciences. Here are two books dealing with much the same materials, both written by sincere and able and informed authors, each of whom claims to be letting the facts speak for themselves, and to be drawing only the logical conclusions. But the books are worlds apart, not only in general conclusions but in their marshalling of specific facts. Timasheff is as bitter in his indictment of Soviet leadership as Schuman is glowing in its praise.

Professor Schuman, it is true, has a rather different approach. He has a most disarming method of showing both sides of every problem, but at the same time leaves little doubt that he believes that the Soviets have invented a valuable new way

of life, and that there has been—fortunately, to his way of thinking—no retreat in essentials. He regards Soviet policy as having been wise and correct in most instances, and tends to account for failures to meet Western standards of justice as due largely to the overriding need of self-preservation. Timasheff tends to disregard this factor in the hard modern world. But Schuman, on the other hand, passes too lightly over the damage done to Soviet Russia through the political errors of its rulers.

In making comparisons, Schuman is severely critical of the policies of the Western democracies. Whether one agrees with him or not, his presentation of the advantages of collectivism cannot but induce much salutary searching of soul on the part of readers who believe that Russia is always wrong, and America is always right. However, his case is weakened when he relies upon such assumptions as the one that the Russian government is a "popular" government because the authorities take every care to secure popular acceptance of their policies.

Written in a fluent and at times sparkling journalese, the story flows on smoothly. But the more than six hundred pages of names, dates, events, and comment, while providing a convenient record, have a sheer weight which makes the book scarcely less baffling than Professor Timasheff's slighter but more complicated study.

Harrison Salisbury's *Russia on the Way* is much less pretentious than either of the two books already described. It merely recounts the impressions of a trained journalist who spent eight months in Russia in the happy year of 1944 when Russian-American collaboration was at

its height and travel was freer than for many years before or at any time since. Much of the story is devoted to pointing out some of the apparently trivial but nevertheless significant differences in manners and point of view between Russians and Americans. Distinguished by high common sense and clear and readable English, this is a book which should prove both diverting and informative to the general public and to the expert alike.

Corliss Lamont's vivid description of *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* contains much interesting information on the variegated life of the country, but it seems to have been written chiefly to impress the reader with the joys of existence there. It might be suggested that in his portrayal of the advances which the Soviets have brought to the non-Russian minorities Mr. Lamont is so effusive that the picture lacks reality. It is self-evident that there must be some difficulties involved in providing self-determination within a pattern of political and economic centralism in this age of exaggerated nationalisms; and as the shake-up in the Ukraine in August of this year has shown, the system is not operating to the entire satisfaction of all concerned. A more balanced report would have been more convincing.

OLIVER J. FREDERIKSEN
Miami University

PROKOPOWICZ, S. N. *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*. Zürich-New York, Europa Verlag, 1944. 459 pp.

BAYKOV, ALEXANDER. *The Development of the Soviet Economic System*. Cambridge University Press and Macmillan, 1946. 514 pp. \$6.50.

Among the Russian scholars residing outside of Russia, none has contributed more than Professor S. N. Prokopolowicz to the understanding of Russia's economics under the Soviets. For many years he was the head of the Institute of Russian Economics in Prague where he published, in Russian, a valuable *Bulletin*. When Prague was conquered by Hitler, he moved to Geneva and published there, in English, a *Quarterly Bulletin of Soviet Russian Economics*.

The work under review, published in German, is a condensation and integration of the contributions made by Prokopolowicz to the two bulletins. It is arranged not chronologically, but by topics, and successively treats population, agriculture, industry (with an important section on wages), retail trade, foreign trade, and national income. An additional chapter contains a brief analysis of the Soviet Constitution and of the rights of the citizens.

All these topics are discussed on a high scientific level. Prokopolowicz shows to the reader the confusion prevailing in Soviet statistics, but also the way to get the best from poorly integrated figures. Depending on Soviet statistics, the treatment practically does not go beyond the year 1941, when Hitler's attack on Russia entirely changed the economic situation. Out of the particular chapters and sections, those on wages and national income are masterpieces; but the section devoted to the system of economic planning does not convey a real understanding of the complicated procedure. In a short conclusion, Prokopolowicz expresses his admiration for the great economic achievements of the Soviet government

which he contrasts with the alleged economic stagnation in pre-revolutionary Russia, and ventures an opinion that real improvement was possible only through dictatorial methods. These statements do not derive logically from the specific studies made in the preceding chapters. The book would have gained were this conclusion omitted.

Mr. Baykov was Professor Prokopolowicz's junior partner at the Russian Economic Institute in Prague. His book happily supplements the Prokopolowicz volume, being organized not by topics, but by periods. It is the merit of the author to have recognized the existence not of three (as commonly held), but of four periods in the development he studied. These are War Communism, the New Economic Policy, "The Period of Extensive Industrialization and Collectivization," and "The Period of Intensive Endeavor to Improve the System," with December 1, 1934 (the date of the abolition of bread rationing) as the line of demarcation between the third and the fourth periods. Within each chapter, approximately the same topics as those studied by Prokopolowicz are dealt with; however, population is omitted, and a detailed study of public finance, credit, and money is added. Unfortunately, the organization of the individual sections is rather mechanical: each begins with an exposition of the particular ends of the Soviet government (derived from official statements), and measures taken to achieve the goals, then enumerates the departures of reality from expectation, and finishes by one more enumeration of the remedial measures. Occasionally, the author adds his conclusions; more often than not, they explain the change in the

author's own attitude towards the Soviet achievements—from a critical to a rather enthusiastic one. Mr. Baykov admires especially the system of planning, the description of which is careful and illuminating. But the complexity of the procedure, as it appears in the author's description, should rather deter eventual imitators.

Despite its defects, Mr. Baykov's book is a very welcome contribution to our knowledge of Soviet economics, since it is based on the study of numerous Soviet publications, not easily available. Taken together, the two books form a solid foundation for any further study of the Great Experiment in practical Marxism.

N. S. TIMASHEFF

Fordham University

ZABRISKIE, EDWARD H. *American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East: A Study in Diplomacy and Power Politics, 1895-1914*. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946. 226 pp. \$3.50.

This excellent volume discusses in a detailed and well-documented manner the problems of the American-Russian conflict in the Far East during the period of 1895-1914. It offers a useful corrective, not only to the hasty generalizations of Professor Pitirim Sorokin's *Russia and the United States*, but also to the valuable work by Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Road to Teheran*. The conflict Professor Zabriskie analyzes was a real one. It was, in the main, as the author says, a result "of economic competition in Manchuria which began as early as 1895."

One might refuse to accept at full

value the hot and angry words written by President Theodore Roosevelt to Secretary Hay in July 1903 about "going to an extreme," but there is a great deal to what Tyler Dennett said that no one "can go through the records of 1898-1904 and not feel that Japan was fighting the battle of the United States in Manchuria." This was the way the American government felt about that war at the time. Dr. Zabriskie's statement that the United States played an important rôle in the precipitation of hostilities between Russia and Japan is unquestionably founded on ample evidence supporting this view.

The volume is based on a great deal of careful research, including manuscript sources of the Department of State archives and papers at the Library of Congress, as well as Mr. W. W. Rockhill's collection. It is refreshing to see such a scholarly, objective, and skilful use of sources in a book concerned with American-Russian relations.

In the two introductory chapters, Professor Zabriskie examines the "peculiar relation of cordiality" which existed between the United States and Russia in the nineteenth century, despite the deep fundamental differences in their cultural background, traditions, and political philosophy. The author states that this relationship was based on the existence of a common enemy and "an absence of competing interests." When the United States "left the frontier behind and entered upon an era of overseas expansion," the earlier friendship was replaced by hostility.

Another chapter is given to the examination of the circumstances which made a breach in the long-standing tradition of friendship.

The growing cordiality between America and England, which had emerged out of the Spanish-American war, was paralleled by an increased tension between Russia and Great Britain. The annexation of the Philippines brought the United States into the area of the Western Pacific and created a new problem for Russia with her far-flung interests in the Far East. Another important link in the chain of events leading to rivalry between the two countries remained to be forged—"that of Russia's reaction to Secretary Hay's still unformulated Open Door notes."

The core of the book is in Chapters IV to VII. As the author states, "the rivalry between the United States and Russia represented a conflict between two contrasting paths of expansion." Russia was attempting to exploit China's crisis of 1900 by assuming control "over at least Manchuria and north China." The United States had developed its policy of the Open Door. The author is aware of the divergent views in Russia as to the expansion in China and especially of the conflicting opinions of Witte and Kropotkin. He is also conscious of the lack of consistency on the part of Secretary Hay (the Samsah Bay concession matter), also that Mr. Hay's interest was primarily in the development of American trade rather than in helping China.

Professor Zabriskie is convinced that the United States "had played an important part in the precipitation of hostilities" between Russia and Japan. The rôle of Germany is also examined, in addition to the better-known part England had played in giving the impetus to Japan to declare war against Russia. "From surface appearances, it was

apparently to American interests that Japan . . . should disturb the Russian over-balance in Manchuria. The United States considered that Japan, even if victor, would be more pliable than Russia backed by France." This explains why the American public was pro-Japanese at the beginning of the war. President Theodore Roosevelt, writing to one of his sons, summed up: "I thought Japan would probably whip her [Russia] on the sea. . . . I was thoroughly well pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game." The President was interested in prolonging the war "to exhaust both Russia and Japan," so that their appetites for territory would be temporarily appeased. The severe defeats suffered by Russia on land and sea prompted President Roosevelt to take steps to end the war. He feared that Russia would be too weakened to be able to serve as a counter-balance to Japan. His opinion of Russia remained unchanged: "They have been unable to make war and now they cannot make peace. They strike me as corrupt, tricky, and inefficient."

With the opening of the peace negotiations, the American public opinion began to veer from favoring Japan. Witte's personality and behavior had a great deal to do with this. The exorbitant demands made by Japan had, no doubt, an important share in this change, too.

The results of the peace turned out quite differently from those anticipated by President Roosevelt. By 1907, the rift between the United States and Japan became wide, and the convention of June 13, 1907, made clear the tendency of the former foes to make a common front. Despite the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908, Russia's fear of

further Japanese aggression and plans to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway, the July 4, 1910 treaty, later rounded out by that of July 8, 1912, brought Russia and Japan still closer together and spelled the failure of the Open Door policy.

The author ends his book on a pessimistic note: "Ambitions, schemes, greeds, hatreds, new in form, old in content, again arise. And the age-old cycle of history, apparently in an ever-widening circle, repeats itself."

As a historian, this reviewer has grave doubts about the "age-old cycle." Nevertheless it is clear that the conflict of interests in the Far East between the United States and Russia is in another stage. Some of the diatribes at the Allied Council of Japan are as strident as Mr. Theodore Roosevelt's at his best. If there is a lesson to be drawn from Dr. Zabriskie's fine book, it is that of the fallibility of the human mind in predicting results of foreign policy. Russian statesmen failed to estimate correctly Japan's power, while President Roosevelt and his advisers helped to promote a war with its huge "butcher's bill" and far-reaching effect on the history of the world, without obtaining any advantages for the United States.

In reading this book, one would do well to bear in mind Lord Halifax's wise words at the Pilgrims' dinner in April 1946: "I think the perspective of any ambassador in Washington is liable to become partial and distorted. Sooner or later every dispute, national or international, finds its way on to his desk . . . he will hear more about the points about which people differ than the points in regard to which

they may agree." This is also true of diplomatic correspondence. It does not give an adequate picture as to how one nation feels about the other. During the conflict analyzed by Dr. Zabriskie, I never heard anyone in Russia utter in my presence any adverse remarks about the United States. On the contrary, I heard a great deal of admiration expressed by people in various walks of life. The visit of the U. S. naval squadron to Kronstadt in 1911 brought out such a spontaneous outpouring of admiration, friendship, and hospitality, that it made a lasting impression on the American naval personnel who were the object of it. It stood out in striking contrast to the attitude of the German authorities and public at Kiel, whither the squadron went from Kronstadt.

The volume is almost entirely free from factual mistakes such as usually clutter books on Russia. There is, however, an error as to the date of the Polish rebellion, which vitiates some of the subsequent reasoning. A footnote (p. 155) does not seem well founded. The main body of the book is a remarkable example of well-balanced scholarly handling of a mass of complicated historical data. The editing is skilfully and carefully done and the proof-reading correspondingly excellent. These are a fine rebuttal to the oft-repeated criticism of the university presses on these counts.

The book is indispensable to anyone interested in American-Russian relations and Russian history in general. Let us hope for other first-rate books from the same pen.

D. FEDOTOFF WHITE
Philadelphia, Pa.

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LIEB, FRITZ. *Russland Unterwegs: Der Russische Mensch Zwischen Christentum und Kommunismus*. Bern, Switzerland, A. Francke Ag., 1945. 474 pp.

Few issues are as grave and meaningful for the future of mankind as the relationship of Christianity and Communism; for as Fritz Lieb, Professor of Theology at Basel, Switzerland, justly points out, both make demands on man in his totality. Yet both have to be viewed, according to Lieb, within the framework of their historically evolved institutions, which are subject to change, and neither, as it is, constitutes anything "final." This was also clearly perceived by Oswald Spengler, whose penetrating mind did not ask in his *Decline of the West* whether or not Russia would exercise a Christian influence, but "what sort of a Christianity" Russia would bring forth one day.

In the face of the great issues, the Catholic Church has taken a firm stand; not long ago the Pope stated again that "the choice lies between champions and wreckers" of Christianity, and that Communism "turns man into a soulless wheel." Many Protestant churches do not disagree; Harry Emerson Fosdick has pointed out that "this generation is up against sheer paganism" and that a "head-on collision" is unavoidable.

Professor Lieb does not think so. Only because of the shortcomings of the Orthodox Church did the call for renewal in Russia come from quarters outside the Church. The Orthodox Church, he says, had failed to make its propagation of the Gospels a determining force in daily life; it had been misused by the tsars as an instrument of state; it

had turned minds to other-worldliness, imbued them with a negative spirit, kindled a desire for chaos and an apocalyptic view, and only too late had it recognized its responsibility towards the weak and encumbered. But Russian man, as shown through numerous quotations from Dostoevsky, possesses "directness in the approach to other men," "all-including humanity" (*Allmenschlichkeit*) and a feeling of brotherhood which fit him better than individualistic western man for truly Christian tasks. He also possesses, according to Dostoevsky, a realization of his sinfulness and of his inability to grasp the truth because of sin; but at the same time he is aware of the "concrete relationship of Protestant (?) faith and life and socialistic realization." This leads him to God's highest command, love, which must find its expression not in platonic thoughts, but in their practical adaptation.

According to Professor Lieb, the Dostoevskyan, essentially negative and chaotic, outlook of Russian man is now replaced by three positive trends: towards achievement of socialism, technology, and nationalism. Socialism, to which Lieb devotes one-half page, is interpreted as the creation of a society in which men are brothers. Technology, to which eight pages are given, is presented as the cult of machines, adoration of technique, and, consequently, as a dreadful, materialistic danger which, belonging to the Soviet Union's adolescence, has been overcome. The feeling of nationality, significantly discussed in one hundred and twenty-eight pages, is characterized as the present trend and extolled as recovery of Russia's great traditions and spiritual heritage. Lieb asserts that, as

in the post-revolutionary period in French history, the correlation of future tasks and past thought and trends is achieved without sacrificing the accomplishments of the Revolution. Nationalism is traced through repudiation of M. N. Pokrovsky's "historical nihilism" with its anti-Christian, one-sided, materialistic tendency. It is shown in the revival of patriotism, the rebuilding of the army, the appreciation of national literature, music, and classical thinking. It is emphasized by rejection of sexual license and of freedom of abortion and a resurgence of Christian concepts of family life, procreation, and home education of children. Schools no longer serve unilateral political enlightenment and propaganda but, despite strictest discipline, the development of a child's "free personality." "Socialistic humanism" with the ideal of human dignity as opposed to the "murderous self-alienation" of man is described as today's ideal.

All this, Professor Lieb asserts, is possible only now that class differences have been abolished. The change is paralleled by the Soviet Union's progress from atheism to present day Christianity. Spiritual nihilism has been overcome, Communism as a religious creed discarded, and Christian religion is on the way back within a truly humanistic state. Revival of nationalism and respect for the past, combined with just punishment and thereby purification of the Church, have introduced a new era. In a long chapter it is shown how materialistic atheism declined and even Christians were discovered to be good Soviet citizens. The road of the Orthodox Church is described from the first loyalty declaration of the Patriarch in 1923, through the Con-

stitution of 1936, to the rôle of the Orthodox during the war. Although opportunistic reasons of Church as well as government are hinted at, Lieb comes to the verdict that "it would be blindness not to recognize in this whole development of the relationship between Church and State a joyful progress—mainly also in the direction of greater freedom of spiritual life in the Soviet Union."

A synthesis of Christianity and Marxism is possible, concludes Professor Lieb, and, despite atheistic principles, Karl Marx fits well into the picture. For Karl Marx was right, his aim was "the liberation of each individual from the chains of society which suppressed him," and the Church should have paid more attention to the material needs of the people. The task of man is "humanity," and the fallen man, expelled from paradise and meriting death, whom Marx describes, must be saved by God, as the Church preaches.

With the considerable amount of information at his disposal and with his theological training and Soviet leanings, Professor Lieb could have made his book an outstanding contribution. Unfortunately, his opportunism, sophistry, and indiscriminate use of convenient quotations, his contradictions, and his acceptance of words for deeds, coupled with all manner of prejudices, deprive his book of dignity and solidity. But perhaps he has performed a useful task by provoking thought and stimulating some true scholar to take up the urgent task of describing, without fear of existing differences, the true aspects of the relationship between Christian and Communistic thought and the possible fruits of their synthesis.

WALTHER KIRCHNER
University of Delaware

SEVEN SOVIET PLAYS. Introductions by H. W. L. Dana. New York, Macmillan, 1946. 520 pp. \$4.00.

Since the 1917 Revolution, the Soviet theatre has been one of the most effective instruments in the communication of ideas and objectives to the nation. This, the first collection of war plays to appear in the United States, shows first, in terms of contemporary ideology, the nature of the Russian resistance to Napoleon, then, in the six succeeding plays, it presents a panoramic analysis of how they mobilized their resources against the gigantic Nazi attack, covering approximately four years, from 1938 to 1942. From the eve of the great conflict when one sees the Soviet people still forging ahead in their industrial and agricultural development, at the same time as they become aware of the ominous rumblings on the international horizon, the account passes to the actual fury and sacrifice with which they met the enemy. From the beginning, that enemy is distinct: German and the subversive elements within the nation who seek to reclaim pre-war wealth and to revenge old grudges.

The temper of each play, for all its tragic actualities in terms of individual lives, is tonic. It affirms the ultimate victory, it gives purpose to extreme sacrifice, and philosophy to creative struggle, however exacting. The mentality, the motivations of the characters are those of ordinary human beings differentiated from those of other lands only by the politico-social pattern, which, as in all Soviet literature, demonstrates, via the technique of socialist realism, that a man succeeds or fails in life accordingly as he identifies his per-

sonal destiny with the environment in which he functions. This concept, notwithstanding its mandatory nature, adds a dimension beyond personal fulfillment and conveys the sense that these are not just individuals who suffer and die, but to some degree, are an expression of the nation and its mass purpose.

Vladimir Solovyov's *Field Marshal Kutuzov* opens the series as a kind of prophetic prologue in its delineation of the hero of 1812 who expelled the Grand Army from the Russian land. Performed first in 1939, it played in the Vakhtangov Theatre in Moscow until July 1941. The novelty of this recounting, as compared with *War and Peace*, for example, is the repeated emphasis on the class conflict. Napoleon's arrogant contempt for the expendability of his men is contrasted with the old marshal's modesty, his supreme concern for the preservation of the Russian manpower at any cost, even Moscow itself. We see the venality of many of the landowning class who spoke only French and who refused human rights to their serfs, as compared with the heroic patriotism of the peasant guerillas. Alexander is shown as the autocrat who forced Kutuzov to cross the Niemen and make of the Russian victors imperialist conquerors as well as defenders of their soil.

Leonid Leonov's *The Orchards of Polovchansk* (1938), like Chekhov's *The Cherry Orchard*, shows a complex of personal and rural problems set against a still sunlit, but nonetheless sinister horizon. In Chekhov, the present, however frustrating, carries a vague hope of the future. In Leonov, the vigorous, creative present, though threatened by future tragedy derived in part from the evil influence of the old régime

represented by Pylyaev, the unconverted, ends on a note of affirmation.

Afinogenov's *On the Eve* (1941) asserts that the meaning of life is found not in strife but in creative work, and that there are no isolated phenomena in the world, but that everything is related. The invasion strikes like "a clean wind" that scatters "the husks of petty personal affairs." The agronomist's life work is destroyed, his wife is killed, the wheat fields and factories are burned, but the will to survive and recreate dominates the whole, as it does in *Smoke of the Fatherland* by the Tur Brothers and Leo Sheinin. Somewhat more stereotyped than the other plays, it nevertheless presents a powerful picture of the scorched earth strategy as it affects a collective farm, reclaimed by its former owner, a tool of the Nazis.

Engineer Sergeev by Vsevolod Rokk, shows the capture of the famous Dnieprostroi Dam by the Germans and the heroic self-sacrifice of the director of the power plant who outwits the enemy by blowing it up at the cost of his own life. Konstantin Simonov's *The Russian People* (performed by the New York Theatre Guild) movingly states the revived sense of nationhood, of fatherland, in the defenders of a surrounded town on the southern front. Alexander Korneichuk's *The Front*, perhaps the most politically instructive play, shows two generations of Bolshevik army officers; the older heroes of the Civil War, who have come to rest on their laurels, must be replaced by younger, better-trained men in order to win battles, thus explaining what actually took place in the early phase of the war.

The translations are for the most part fluent and effective. H. W. L. Dana provides an illuminating and informed introduction conveying the great rôle of the theatre in sustaining the war effort of the Soviet people.

KATHARINE STRELSKY
Poughkeepsie, N. Y.

FAYER, MISCHA H. *Gide, Freedom and Dostoevsky*, Burlington, Vt., Lane Press, 1946. 159 pp. \$2.50.

KOHN, HANS. *Prophets and Peoples*. New York, Macmillan, 1946. 213 pp. \$2.50.

Dostoevsky appears in this book only as a factor in Gide's development, for Mr. Fayer's purpose, as he states it at the outset, is to "disengage the essential facts concerning Gide from a mass of prejudices and misconceptions, and show him for what he really is: namely, a constructive thinker belonging to the family of *grands esprits* who, since the dawn of civilization, have formed the leaven of human progress." This he does by analysing Gide's life into three main periods: "I. *The Satanic*, corresponding roughly to the prewar years of his literary career; II. *The Transitional*, coinciding more or less with the War of 1914-18; and III. *The Seraphic*, comprising the years since." The first of these is the period of "auto-emancipation," when Gide, attempting to break away from the conventionality of his environment, examines the nature of freedom and arrives at a position of "misguided individualism"; the second, is that, when in the unhappy isolation imposed by a war to which he could not subscribe, he makes a searching investigation of Evil and comes to the Christian ideal of

humility and submissiveness; and, finally, the third, the result of the first two periods of search, when he achieves serenity through an elaborate philosophic synthesis. In each of these stages, Dostoevsky plays an important part. In the first, Gide is himself much like the Russian's "self-willed types"; in the second, the "turning point of his life," he tries "to identify himself with Dostoevsky," finding in him corroboration of his own ideas, adopting his views of Christianity and his concept of Evil; and, in the third, he is influenced by Dostoevsky in every part of the synthesis which he effects: he is helped to a final "personal liberation" by his awareness that Dostoevsky was concerned not only with moral problems but also with social conditions; he imitates Dostoevsky's psychological concepts and methods, and through them, attempts to change conventional French notions about the psyche; he attempts to apply Dostoevsky's free esthetics, and thereby inaugurates a revisionist movement in French literature; he is confirmed in his "pluralism" and in his opposition to transcendental "dictates in human conduct" by Dostoevsky's freedom from dogma; he is liberated from "traditional ethics" through a union of "individualism and altruism," to which he is assisted by Dostoevsky's theory of self-abnegation as the only road to happiness; and, lastly, he is aided to "liberation from the existing social order" by Dostoevsky's indictment of bourgeois civilization and his "reconciliation of nationalism and internationalism." All of this is interesting, even though a bit too schematic, as an examination of a mind's development. But there is one element which Mr. Fayer does not consider:

the fact that in point of artistic stature, Gide and Dostoevsky cannot be compared, for though he does admit that "on the whole" Gide's characters "lack the convincing reality and gripping humanity of Dostoevsky's creations," he seems to think that Dostoevsky's greatness is enhanced by Gide's appreciation of it. What his essay amply demonstrates is that Gide might have served Dostoevsky as model for one of his tormented thinkers, but hardly as a friend with whom he could have talked on terms of intellectual equality. But that was not, I am afraid, Mr. Fayer's intention.

In his *Prophets and Peoples*, Professor Hans Kohn devotes a chapter (V) to Dostoevsky as spokesman of the Russians. With a bow to his magnificence as creative artist, Professor Kohn gives his attention to another aspect of his genius, his notoriously reactionary and chauvinistic journalism. And it is Dostoevsky's journalistic views,—without explanation of what precisely such terms as "the Russian God" and "the Russian people" had meant in them,—that he exhibits as a symbolic statement of Russian nationalism. Apart from the fact that Dostoevsky's journalism is not quite so simple as it is here made out to be, one may be permitted to wonder at the propriety of discussing an author's position largely on the basis of his worst productions. Dostoevsky, says Professor Kohn, "took a great secret with him, the complexity and irreconcilability of so many of his views"; and his essay does so little by way of providing a key to the mystery, that I am not sure whether it is not prejudice, rather than scholarship, that it has best served.

HELEN MUCHNIC

Smith College

GORKY, MAXIM. *Reminiscences of Tolstoy, Chekhov, Andreyev.* New York, Dover Publications, 1946. 215 pp. \$2.75.

Recently I have been rereading Tolstoy's philosophical and religious writings. My emotional response was, if not a sophisticated, a common one: distrust. Everyone familiar with Tolstoy's place in Russian culture cannot escape the almost painful fascination with the lucid, cold, logically illogical mind which (may I be forgiven the heresy) arrogantly preaches such impossibly simple solutions to the ailments of society and man in general.

Out of the ocean of books on Tolstoy as a man—and particularly on the enigma of old Tolstoy—Gorky's mere sixty-eight pages, informal ones at that, devoted to Tolstoy in his *Reminiscences* (brilliantly translated by people like S. S. Koteliansky, Leonard Woolf, and Katherine Mansfield, collected and recently edited by Mark Van Doren)—are to me the most satisfying. This is partly so because Gorky evokes an almost uncannily plastic image of Tolstoy, an image of a shrewd and yet tormented magician. "He is like a god, not a Sabaoth or Olympian, but the kind of Russian god who 'sits on a maple throne under a golden lime tree,' not very majestic, but perhaps more cunning than all the other gods." Through Gorky's creative memory, Tolstoy's hands come to life: "He has wonderful hands—not beautiful, but knotted with swollen veins, and yet full of a singular expressiveness and the power of creativeness. Probably Leonardo da Vinci had hands like that. With such hands one can do anything." And then his voice and his eyes: "One must have

heard him speak in order to understand the extraordinary, indefinable beauty of his speech; it was in a sense incorrect, abounding in repetitions of the same word, saturated with village simplicity. The effects of his words did not come only from the intonation and the expression of his face, but from the play and light in his eyes, the most eloquent eyes I have ever seen. In his two eyes Leo Nikolaevich possessed a thousand eyes." Above all, Gorky conveys in a few restrained words Tolstoy's movements, the outward-inward dynamism of Tolstoy's gigantic vitality: "He walked the roads and paths with the business-like, quick step of the skilled explorer of the earth; and with sharp eyes, from which neither a single pebble nor a single thought could hide itself, he looked, measured, compared. And he scattered around him the living seeds of indomitable thoughts."

But there is something more than all this which makes the *Reminiscences* an important book.

Gorky does not "interpret" Tolstoy. He takes Tolstoy in and, like a prism, reflects to us the impact of a genius on a young, sensitive writer. Yet—he is anything but servile. In fact, he refuses even in his memory to succumb to Tolstoy. The *Reminiscences* are impregnated with Gorky's ambivalence toward Tolstoy. "In Leo Nikolaevich there is much which at times roused in me a feeling very much like hatred, and this hatred fell upon my soul with crushing weight. His disproportionately overgrown individuality is a monstrous phenomenon, almost ugly. . . ." Therefore, there is as much of young Gorky in the book as there is of old Tolstoy. Refusing to succumb to the "saint" that the

masses as well as the philistines and sectarians made out of Tolstoy, he brings a great man—but primarily the man—to life.

In spite of Tolstoy's attraction for Gorky, there was little warmth in their rather casual relationship. Perhaps the old man did not really care for Gorky, who was so obviously preoccupied with defending his identity within the enchanted orbit of the irresistible magician.

But Anton Chekhov, Chekhov the gentle, who had explained much of Tolstoy to Gorky,—had warmth, respect, and understanding for Gorky. We find in the *Reminiscences* an unpretentious record of one of the most beautiful Russian "literary" friendships. Gorky's relationship to Tolstoy was anything but simple, whereas there is nothing complex in the comradeship between him and Chekhov. In return for Gorky's unreserved admiration, "a great, wise, and observant man . . . with a sad smile, with a tone of gentle but deep reproach [for his countrymen and contemporaries], with anguish in his face and in his heart, in a beautiful and sincere voice . . ." offered the younger man encouragement and advise.

It is difficult not to get nostalgic over the correspondence between Gorky and Chekhov (1898-1902), which makes a goodly portion of the *Reminiscences*. The two men became friends before they met. With deep respect, enthusiasm, constructive criticism, they watched over each other's work in progress. The basis of the union was work. They became comrades in arms. Perhaps the function of artistic literature as "civic service" is indispensable as an incentive for artists to join in a meaningful fraternity, strange and

outmoded as such literary friendships may seem to us today.

The triangle of Tolstoy, Chekhov, and Gorky holds the most significant place in the *Reminiscences*. I had the feeling that the editor should have left it at that. What follows—reminiscences of Andreyev, a letter to Stanislavsky, and a brief sketch of Blok—brilliant as these are—are by comparison something of a let-down.

VERA SANDOMIRSKY

Detroit, Mich.

SARGENT, DANIEL. *Mitri, or the Story of Prince Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin, 1770-1840*. New York, Longmans, Green, 1945. 327 pp. \$3.50.

This book is an important addition to the literature on the Russian nobleman who never set foot on Russian soil; who was born in Holland, reared in Germany, and buried in America, a fearless, even if a somewhat eccentric pioneer of the New World.

Mr. Sargent's volume sheds new, strong light on Father Gallitzin's personality and life, and his relationship to his father and his father's fatherland, by making use of the various Catholic archives in Pennsylvania and Maryland, also by utilizing thoroughly the existing printed data on the subject in both English and German. Citing a memoir by an old Presbyterian lawyer, published in an obscure Pennsylvania newspaper, Mr. Sargent establishes that Dmitri, notwithstanding his lifelong career outside of Russia and his conflict with his Russian sire, did consider himself a Russian (p. 231). Moreover, the Tsar's representatives in Wash-

ington felt that he was a Russian, some with reservations, others with none.

Using profusely and ably original letters of the era, Mr. Sargent shows clearly the complicated web of the attitudes of Gallitzin's parents to each other and to their son. He is cool and impartial as he describes and analyzes these interesting relationships. Dmitri's mother was a pious Catholic, but this does not prevent the author from reaching the correct conclusion that she was capricious, that she "pestered" and "harassed her son" (pp. 20, 37, 46, and 53). On the other hand, the rôle of Father Brosius in making Dmitri a missionary in America is unduly soft-pedalled. Mr. Sargent becomes less a biographer and more of a preacher when he ascribes Dmitri's self-sacrificing determination to a source "much farther distant than Brosius" (p. 72). And there is a positively unpleasant note of bigotry in Mr. Sargent's writing as we find him repeatedly fuming against the secular teachings and the spirit of enlightenment of the eighteenth century.

Withal, there is no prettying up of Father Dmitri merely because he was a Catholic missionary. Actually, and rather justly, Mr. Sargent minimizes the influence of Gallitzin as a writer. The remarkable priest is pictured with his good points and bad, his strong qualities and his weaknesses, not only his abnegation and his service to humanity in that rugged frontierland of early Pennsylvania, but also his quarrelsome disposition so often marring his fine works and his lofty faith. Father

Dmitri is shown not alone as a noble shepherd but also as the spoiled nobleman that he never ceased to be—the meddler, the politician, even the snob that he often was, interfering with his other self, the stout-hearted and near-holy pioneer.

In conclusion, and by no means to negate all the applause that Mr. Sargent's book deserves, I want to remark on one technical feebleness of the volume: the fact that neither the author nor the publisher saw fit to show the manuscript, while it was in preparation, to someone familiar with the Russian language. Errors are inevitable in any work, pertaining to Russia even indirectly, especially when written by persons unfamiliar with either Russian history or the Russian tongue. Mr. Sargent's book abounds in annoying mistakes. Naryshkin appears as Narashkine (p. 3); Rumiantsev as Romanzoff (pp. 17 and 186); Dashkov as Daschkoff (p. 175); the province of Vladimir as Waladmir, and that of Kostroma as Kostram (p. 172). Empress Anna is presented, not as the niece of Peter the Great that she was, but as his daughter (p. 41). And surely the author should have known that when Catherine married Peter, he was not as yet Tsar Peter III (as presumed on p. 40), but Empress Elizabeth's heir apparent. Nowhere in the book does Mr. Sargent even mention the priest's correct name—he writes of him always as Gallitzin, never as Golitsyn, as this name should have been, but never was spelled in the priest's own lifetime.

ALBERT PARRY
Chicago, Ill.

Bibliography

Dartmouth Collection of Historical Material on the Russian Revolution

By DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILD

IN the years following World War I, Dartmouth acquired a small, but adequate for the purposes of an undergraduate college, collection of books on Russian history and literature (Russian classics were acquired both in the original and in translations). With the general increase of interest in Russia during World War II, it was decided in 1943 to start a special collection of historical material—books, pamphlets, periodicals, and manuscripts—on the Russian Revolution, emphasizing at first the period 1917–1921. At the same time, it was agreed to continue the acquisition of books on Russia in other fields. By 1946 the special collection on the Russian Revolution had grown to a point where it seemed worth while to describe it for those interested.

The choice of the subject and of the period hardly needs an explanation. The Russian Revolution is the greatest upheaval of modern times and will attract debate and investigation for many years to come. An enormous amount of material, often contradictory, is extant, but no really objective and comprehensive history of the Revolution has yet appeared. (The best history to date is that of William Henry Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917–1921*, 2 vols., New York, Macmillan, 1935; since its publication a considerable amount of new material has come to light.)

Outside of Soviet Russia, the most extensive collection of historical material pertaining to the Russian Revolution was collected by the Russian Historical Archives in Prague. (A comprehensive bibliography of this material has been compiled by S. P. Postnikov, *Bibliografiya russkoi revoljutsii i grazhdanskoi voiny, 1917–1921*, Prague, 1938.) In 1945 the Prague Archives were handed over by the Czech government to Soviet Russia. In the United States the best collections on this period are those of the Hoover War Library at Stanford University, California; the Library of Congress; the Slavonic Division of the New York Public Library; and the Widener Library at Harvard. At the present writing, the Dartmouth collection could not compete with any of the above repositories. It is merely a nucleus of a collection which some day may become important.

The strength of the collection (much of the recently acquired material is not yet catalogued) lies mainly in an extensive autobiographical literature; i.e., diaries, memoirs, reminiscences, of Soviet and anti-Soviet leaders, largely in Russian.

The description that follows is not a formal bibliography but an attempt to characterize the collection in general terms. It is hoped that, modest as the collection now is, it may present some interest to historians specializing in this field and that the knowledge of its existence may attract bequests and gifts, especially of manuscript material which is likely to be still in the possession of former Russian statesmen and political leaders now residing in the United States.

I. DOWNFALL OF THE MONARCHY

A. GENERAL BACKGROUND. Besides the better known historical works and memoirs referring to the social, political, and economic development of twentieth century Russia, available in English and other languages, the Dartmouth Library possesses a number of interesting items in Russian, notably:

1. *Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX-go veka*, ed. by L. Martov, P. Maslov, A. Potresov, 3 vols., St. Petersburg, 1907; Ministerstvo Zemledeliya, *Komitet po zemleustroistvu* (a survey from 1906-1916), Petrograd, 1916.
2. Reminiscences, in Russian, of public figures and political leaders, such as: Vladimir Burtsev, N. A. Morozov, V. V. Shulgin, and others.

B. WORLD WAR I AND THE LAST YEARS OF THE IMPERIAL REGIME. A creditable collection of material, mostly in Russian, has been assembled.

1. Diaries and letters of Tsar Nicholas II; especially *Perepiska Nikolaya i Alexandry Romanovykh, 1914-1917*, 3 vols., Moscow-Leningrad, 1923.
2. Diaries, memoirs, and reminiscences of Russian statesmen, military and political leaders, and courtiers: A. I. Denikin (on the Russian Imperial Army), G. Graf (on the Baltic Fleet and the Revolution), Mary Kleinmichel, V. N. Kokovtsev, S. E. Kryzhanovsky, P. G. Kurlov, V. A. Maklakov, S. P. Melgunov, Tatiana Melnik, V. I. Nazansky, V. M. Purishkevich, M. V. Rodzianko, S. D. Sazonov, V. A. Sukhomlinov, A. Taneeva (Vyrubova), and Felix Yusupov; in this

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connection, of special interest are the eye-witness accounts of the last days of Nicholas II at the military headquarters by M. K. Lemke, V. M. Pronin, and N. M. Tikhomenov; also monographs and studies of Nicholas II, notably by S. S. Oldenburg.

3. Memoirs of leading foreign diplomats (all in English); Sir George Buchanan, David Francis, and Maurice Paleologue.
4. Shorthand Records of the Extraordinary Investigating Commission of the Provisional Government, *Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhima*, 7 vols., Moscow-Leningrad, 1924-1927. (An important source, refers also to the pre-World War I period.)
5. Documents and studies brought out by the Soviet government, notably: V. P. Semennikov, *Politika Romanovykh nakanune revolyutsii*, and *Monarkhiya pered krusheniem*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1926-1927; Moscow Bureau of the Communist Party, *Nakanune revolyutsii* (a collection of articles), Moscow, 1922; Ya. Krastyn, *Revolyutsionnaya borba krestyan v Rossii v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny*, Moscow, 1933; P. M. Bykov, *Poslednie dni Romanovykh*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1930; M. I. Akhun, *Bolsheviki i armiya, 1905-1917*, Leningrad, 1929; and others.

II. THE MARCH REVOLUTION, THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE BOLSHEVIKS (MARCH-NOVEMBER 1917).

Material on this period is still sketchy and is of a two-fold nature:

1. Memoirs, reminiscences and speeches of socialist and liberal leaders: N. S. Chkhheidze, A. Kerensky, L. Martov, P. Miliukov, and G. Plekhanov; also notably the following: N. N. Sukhanov, *Zapiski o revolyutsii*, 7 vols., Petrograd and Berlin, 1919-1922. (An important source, the author was a prominent member of the S. R. Party); V. B. Stankevich, *Vospominaniya 1914-1919*, Berlin, 1920; Yu. V. Lomonosov, *Vospominaniya o Martovskoi revolyutsii 1917 g.*, Stockholm-Berlin, 1921; A. Bublikov, *Russkaya revolyutsiya*, New York, 1918.
2. Official Soviet studies and reminiscences of the Bolshevik leaders, notably: Leningrad Institute of the History of the Communist Party, *Bolshevistsiya Petrogradskogo garnizona v 1917 g.* (articles and documents), Leningrad, 1932; A.

Shlyapnikov, *Semnadtsatyi god*, 4 vols., Moscow, 1925-1931 (an important source on the February and the November Revolutions); N. Avdeev, *Revolyutsiya 1917 goda* (Vols. 1 and 2, January-May and April-May 1917), Moscow, 1923; V. Vladimirova, *Revolyutsiya 1917 goda*, Moscow, 1923.

III. WORKS OF BOLSHEVIK LEADERS.

Over a period of years, the Dartmouth Library has acquired a fairly extensive collection of works by the two leading figures of the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin and Trotsky. The Lenin collection is especially noteworthy. It comprises two English editions brought out by the International Publishers: *Collected Works*, 9 vols., New York, 1927-1942; *Selected Works*, 12 vols., New York, 1935-1938; and a Russian edition, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 30 vols., Gosizdat, Moscow-Leningrad, 1923-1935; the Library also possesses a variety of separate items consisting of Lenin's essays, speeches, and letters in Russian, English, and German, some of which are of considerable rarity; some biographical studies and monographs on Lenin containing excerpts from his works and brought out by the Soviet government, among which of special interest is the luxurious illustrated edition: *Lenin (V. I. Ulyanov)*, Moscow, Olgiz, 1939.

The Trotsky collection consists of all of his important works on the Revolution and the Stalin régime, published in English, after his banishment from the U.S.S.R. in 1927, also some of his Russian works, notably: *Kak vooruzhalas revolyutsiya*, 2 vols., Moscow, 1923-1925; finally, scattered, today very rare, pamphlets by Trotsky in various languages published outside of Russia.

Increasingly scarce today are the works of the other early leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution. Many of them, after the death of Lenin, formed the opposition to the prevailing party line and later were purged. Within the U.S.S.R., many of their works have been withdrawn from circulation and outside of Russia are rapidly disappearing from the market. In this category, the Dartmouth Library possesses a few representative works on the Bolshevik theory and also speeches on the prevailing policies of the day by the following old Bolsheviks:

N. Bukharin, F. Dzerzhinsky, L. Kamenev, S. Kirov, A. Kollontai, N. Krupskaya, N. Krylenko, M. N. Pokrovsky, K. Radek, P. Stuchka, E. Yaroslavsky, and G. Zinoviev.

IV. THE BOLSHEVIK COUP D'ETAT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER (NOVEMBER 1917-MARCH 1921).

The bulk of the Dartmouth collection refers to this period. By its very nature the material is highly controversial and, in general, could be classified into the following categories:

A. OFFICIAL SOVIET SOURCES, DECREES, REMINISCENCES, ETC.

1. Collection of decrees, notably:

Sbornik dekretov, 1917-1918 g., Moscow, 1920; *Sistematischekii sbornik vazhneishikh dekretov, 1917-1920*, Moscow, 1921; *Krasnaya Armiya: polozheniya i dekrety Sovetskogo pravitstva*, Moscow, 1919.

2. Works of Lenin, Trotsky, and other Bolshevik leaders concerned with the policies of the Soviet government during the first three years of the Soviet régime.

3. Official monographs, reminiscences of the Bolshevik coup d'état and civil war by Soviet civilian and military participants. The following material is to be especially noted:

Istpart (Commission for the History of the October Revolution and the Russian Communist Party); some 20 vols. have been issued in this series of which the Dartmouth Library to date has only a few; S. Piontkovsky, *Oktyabrskaya revolyutsiya v Rossii*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1923; N. Popov, *Kormchii Oktyabrya*, Moscow, 1925; I. Mintz (ed.), *Dokumenty velikoi proletarskoi revolyutsii*, Moscow, 1928; S. Rabinovich, *Istoriya grazhdanskoi voiny*, Moscow, 1933; L. Kritsman, *Geroicheskii period velikoi russkoi revolyutsii*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1926; V. Bonch-Bruevich, *Na boevykh postakh*, Moscow, 1930.

4. Studies and reminiscences dealing with the November uprising and Civil War in various parts of Russia, notably: G. Kostomarov (ed.), *Oktyabr v Moskve, materialy i dokumenty*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1932; V. Marushevsky, *Belye v Arkhangelske*, Leningrad, 1930; M. Kolvari, *Interventsiya v Krymu*, Crimean G.I.Z., 1930; K. F. Ogorodnikov, *Udar po Kolchaku*, Moscow, 1938.

5. The Communist International—a good collection, including resolutions adopted at the early congresses of the Comintern: *Protokoll des 1-6 Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale*, 6 vols., Hamburg, 1921-1929; also pamphlets

on the Comintern by Lenin, Zinoviev, Yaroslavsky, and other Bolshevik leaders.

6. History of the Communist Party: N. Popov, *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, 2 vols., New York, International Publishers, 1936; *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Short Course*, ed. by a Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.), New York, International Publishers, 1939; works of the Bolshevik leaders; at present the Dartmouth collection lacks the shorthand reports of the early congresses of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.
7. White Russian emigration—a few items, notably: V. Belov, *Belyaia pechat*, Petrograd, 1922, and *Beloe pokhmelie*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1923.

B. ANTI-SOVIET SOURCES, consisting of material published in Russia by the leaders of the White Movement during the Civil War, which is largely propaganda for the cause, and of works published outside of Russia after the termination of the Civil War. Much of the latter is indispensable source material for an impartial study of the Russian Revolution. Published in small editions by obscure publishers in various European and Asiatic capitals, this material by opponents of the Soviet régime is getting increasingly scarce, and there is an obvious need for collecting and preserving it. The Dartmouth Library has made extensive purchases within this field during the last several years.

1. Propaganda pamphlets and decrees of the governments formed on the territories occupied by the White armies in 1918-1920.
2. General studies and memoirs pertaining to the Civil War, Intervention, War Communism, and White Russian Emigration by various opponents of the Soviet régime. Of special value are the following:
 - I. V. Hessen (ed.), *Arkhiv Russkoi revolyutsii*, 21 vols., Berlin, 192(?)-1934 (an important source containing memoirs and other material on the Revolution); N. N. Golovin, *Rossiiskaya Kontr-revolyutsiya v 1917-1918 g.*, Paris, 1937; S. P. Melgunov, *Krasnyi terror v Rossii, 1918-1923 g.*, Paris, 1924, and his *Rossiiskaya Kontr-revolyutsiya*, Paris, 1938; Paul Miliukov, *Istoriya vtoroi russkoi revolyutsii*, 3 vols.,

Sofia, 1921-1924, and several other works of the same author; A. A. von Lampe (ed.), *Beloë Delo* (important documents, monographs and letters), 7 vols., Berlin, 1926-1933; A. Denikin, *Ocherki russkoi smuty*, 5 vols. in 3, Paris and Berlin, 1921-1926 (refers also to the earlier period); M. S. Margulies, *God interventsii*, 3 vols., Berlin, 1923; A. S. Lukomsky, *Vospominaniya*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1922 (also deals with the earlier period); in this category also belong many memoirs in Russian of the socialist and liberal leaders published in emigration; namely, those of N. D. Avxentiev, F. Dan, A. Kerensky, L. Martov, K. D. Nabokov, V. V. Shulgin, V. Zenzinov, and others.

3. Memoirs and reminiscences of the civilian and military leaders of the White Movement pertaining to separate centers of opposition to the Bolshevik régime, in Siberia and the Far East (a very excellent collection assembled to date, which includes a variety of important material on the Kolchak Movement in Siberia); also material pertaining to the Civil War in the South, the Ukraine, the West, and the North.
- C. ACCOUNTS OF CIVIL WAR AND WAR COMMUNISM BY FOREIGN OBSERVERS, CHIEFLY BRITISH AND AMERICAN JOURNALISTS. A very complete collection assembled, including the published works of the following: C. W. Ackerman, Louise Bryant, A. Bullard, W. C. Bullitt, A. Dosch-Fleurot, G. Eddy, Lincoln Eyre, Stephen Graham, R. E. Long, John Pollock, M. P. Price, A. Ransom, John Reed, C. Sorolea, W. E. Walling, H. G. Wells, and others.
- D. FORMAL STUDIES OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IN ENGLISH, by: N. Bazili, W. H. Chamberlin, V. Chernov, P. Kirby, Sir Bernard Pares, G. Vernadsky, and others; also documentary studies by F. A. Golder, *Documents of Russian History 1914-1917*, New York, Century, 1927; James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher (eds.), *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918*, Hoover War Library Publications, Stanford University Press, 1934; and by James Bunyan (ed.), *Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia, April-December 1918*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1936.

E. PERIODICALS. Besides those serials already mentioned, the Dartmouth Library possesses complete sets of the following:

Sovremennye Zapiski, 70 vols., Paris, 1920-1940; *The Slavonic Review*, London, 1928-1939; *The Slavonic Yearbook*, American Series, I, 1941, and *Slavonic and East European Review*, American Series, II, 1942- ; *The Russian Review*, New York, 1941- ; *Le Monde Slave*, 1924-1938; *American Quarterly on the Soviet Union*, New York, 1938- ; also individual issues of various magazines containing articles pertaining to the years 1917-1921, notably:

Russian Review, London, 1917; *Russkaya Svoboda*, Petrograd-Moscow, 1917; *Russkaya letopis*, Paris, 1921; *Letopis revolyutsii*, Berlin-Petrograd-Moscow, 1923; *Dela i dni*, Petrograd, 1920-1921.

Nikander Strelsky

September 7, 1893—June 20, 1946

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW has met with a great loss in the death of Nikander Strelsky, Associate Professor of Russian and of Comparative Slavonic Literature at Vassar College. He had been from the first a member of the Review's Advisory Editorial Board where his scholarship and wide acquaintance in the Russian field were always at its disposition. He died on June 20th, after a month's illness, of a heart attack at Saranac Lake, whither he had gone for a much needed rest after a strenuous year of teaching and research.

Born in Kharkov, educated in that city's School of Agriculture and in the Polytechnical Institute of Kiev, he turned for military training to the Alexis Imperial Academy and, after six months there, was commissioned as second lieutenant and entered active service in the Kegholmsky Regiment of Imperial Life Guards. He fought on many fronts in World War I and later in the Civil War. He was promoted to staff captain, was twice wounded, gassed, six times decorated. When the Red army took Sebastopol, he withdrew with Baron Wrangel's one hundred thousand to Constantinople in 1920. Like all the rest of that welter of destitute humanity, he lived as best he could until in 1922 he became manager of a group of talented Russian émigrés organized as the Russian Imperial Ballet. Their success in the theatre field prompted them to tour Europe and to cross the ocean to the United States. Scarcely had Mr. Strelsky arrived in this country when he fell so gravely ill that he was obliged to spend six years at Saranac. When he left Saranac, handicapped in health though he was and had always to be, he decided to begin a new life in a college town and took up his residence in Poughkeepsie. He came with no resources except an incomparable courage and an equally incomparable wife, able collaborator in everything he undertook. Both stood him in good stead as he laboriously climbed the steep path he had chosen for himself. While earning his bread, first by giving private lessons and then as Vassar's official tutor in the Russian language, he drove to classes in Columbia, often at night and in the worst of weather. He spent three full summers, 1933-35, one as a fellow of the Kosciuszko Foundation, at the Universities of Cracow, Warsaw, Lvov, Prague, Ljubljana, and Belgrade, working with the most distinguished

scholars in the Slavonic field. During this time, he was made scholar member of the Kondakov Institute of Prague. In 1935, he took his Master's degree at Columbia and was appointed instructor at Vassar. In the course of the next five years, he achieved the almost incredible. Despite a temporary relapse in health, he taught with such vigor that in 1940 he was made assistant professor. That same year he took his Doctor's degree at Columbia University. His thesis, *Saltykov and the Russian Squire*, published in book form, won him wide recognition as a scholar, a reputation that had been in the making through the numerous articles previously published and which subsequent contributions to various periodicals steadily enhanced.

At the time of his death, Professor Strelsky was editor-in-chief of the *Anthology of Russian National Character* to be published under the auspices of the American Council of Learned Societies, he was a contributor to the Russian section and editor of the Yugoslav section of the *Columbia Dictionary of Modern European Literature* now in press, he was editor of the Yugoslav section of the forthcoming *Guide to Comparative Literature*. He was preparing a series of critical studies designed to interpret Dostoevsky from a new point of view and he was assembling material dealing with Walt Whitman's influence in Russia. But research was only one of his many interests. Eager to promote Slavic studies, he was one of the founders of the American Association of Teachers of Slavonic and East European Languages, he was a member of the Board of Directors of the Pushkin Society and of that of the Tolstoy Foundation, he was on the Advisory Committee of the Kosciuszko Foundation. Except for two terms, he carried a full teaching schedule and entered heartily into the life of the community. He was an active member of the film committee, he arranged exhibitions, he held Friday afternoon *colloquia* which brought faculty and students together in stimulating discussion, he used his fine histrionic talent to add zest to many campus plays. And all the while he was compiling a *Russian Reader*, published a year ago, and searching bookshops for rare editions to add to his own library or to that of the college he loved so well. To build up the Russian section of Vassar's library was a passion with him. It was his ambition to make it one of the best in America. So winning was his enthusiasm that on one occasion a friend presented the college with one of the best private collections of Russian literature in this country.

But nothing that he did could outshine the personality of Nikander

Strelsky. There was a radiance about him that kindled warmth wherever he went. His buoyant spirit recognized no obstacles. His sense of humor never left him. It was his joy to give his strength, his time, his experience, his vision to whatever they might serve.

LUCY TEXTOR

Poughkeepsie, N. Y.

Stanford University

HOOVER INSTITUTE

Fellowships in Slavic Studies

1. A grant from the Rockefeller Foundation makes it possible for the Hoover Institute to award fellowships for research in the Slavic materials in the Hoover Library. These materials are mainly in the fields of the humanities and the social sciences.

2. The purpose of these fellowships is to furnish opportunities for the completion of significant research and for the completion or extension of training for an academic career or public service.

3. The fellowships are of three kinds: Senior, Junior and Graduate. The awards will be made on the recommendation of the Fellowship Committee which will determine the type of fellowship awarded on the basis of the maturity in scholarship or professional experience of the recipient. The basic stipends are \$4,000., \$2,500., and \$1,300. for an academic year or nine months. The exact amount of the stipend, however, will be determined in each case by the Fellowship Committee on the basis of the length of time the fellowship is held, the distance the fellow is obliged to travel and such other factors as the Committee considers relevant.

4. Awards will ordinarily be made for the period of one academic year or nine months but the Fellowship Committee will consider applications for shorter or longer periods. The term of the fellowship need not begin with the commencement of the academic year in the autumn.

5. Fellowships will be awarded only to applicants for whose investigations the materials in the Hoover Library offer special advantages. The materials in the Library are briefly described in *Special Collections in the Hoover Library* (1940), and *A Tower to Peace* (1945). Some notable additions, particularly in Polish, have been acquired since the publication of these brochures.

6. Fellows will be members of a Hoover Institute Seminar in which reports on current research will be made and discussed.

Fellows may also be asked to lecture on topics in the field of their specialization to students in the Pacific-Asiatic-Russian program in the School of Humanities or the International Relations program of

the School of Social Sciences. Such lectures will not be permitted to interfere with research and will not exceed two hours per month.

7. An applicant for a fellowship is asked to furnish the following information to the Hoover Institute Fellowship Committee:

- (a) A statement of the general field of his interest
- (b) A brief outline or description of the research project on which he is presently engaged with an indication of the status of this work at the time of application
- (c) A more detailed statement of the investigation he desires to carry on in the Hoover Library
- (d) A brief biography, a photograph, and the names of persons from whom further information may be obtained
- (e) A bibliography of published works. In case of a younger applicant who has not yet published, the Committee will be glad to see the manuscript of a dissertation or other writing based on the applicant's research.

8. Applications should be addressed to the Chairman of the Fellowship Committee, Hoover Library, Stanford University, California.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

New York, N. Y.

October 9, 1946

Dear Professor Mohrenschildt:

Since you invited me to write an article in *The Russian Review*, Mr. Chamberlin, one of the editors of The Review, on September 24th published in *The Journal-American* an article on "Twelve Soviet Threats to World Peace"; the same number carried Stalin's bid for world peace in reply to the questions submitted to him by my friend Alexander Werth of *The Sunday Times* of London.

Mr. Chamberlin's article is printed on the Editorial Page, marked in capitals PUBLIC SERVICE. It is stated that it is written expressly for the Hearst Newspapers. The article is loaded with the most virulent presentation of charges of every imaginable kind against Russia. It is entirely without discrimination or perspective. The most "exciting" parts are, so to speak, shrieked in capitals. So far as it has any effect on the public, it can only bring a Third World War nearer, and prejudice the careful work which Mr. Byrnes and his bi-partisan colleagues of the American delegation at the Peace Conference at Paris are doing ably and with such infinite patience to produce the opposite result.

I cannot understand how a man of Mr. Chamberlin's intellect can fail to see that propaganda of this kind is quite incompatible with any claim to leadership in the study of Russia in America. For myself, I must entirely refuse to associate myself with any such leadership.

You asked me at an earlier time to associate myself with the Advisory Editorial Board of *The Russian Review*. I must ask you to publish my withdrawal and its reasons in your Review, leaving myself free, if necessary, to make my position clear in the ordinary Press.

Yours sincerely,

/S/ Bernard Pares

MR. CHAMBERLIN'S REPLY TO SIR BERNARD PARES

I find myself in disagreement with several of the propositions advanced by Sir Bernard Pares in his letter. If space permitted, I would be glad to defend the factual accuracy of every one of the twelve Soviet threats to peace which I describe in the article to which Sir Bernard takes exception.

Several of these threats (the hostile pressure on Turkey, the maintenance of huge armies outside of Soviet frontiers, the violation of the Yalta Agreement by the suppression of political and civil liberties in Poland and Bulgaria) have received new confirmation since I published the article,—and since Stalin made what Sir Bernard optimistically calls "a bid for world peace."

I cannot accept Sir Bernard's suggestion that Americans should be deaf, dumb, and blind in relation to aggressive aspects of Soviet international policy, especially when Soviet official representatives, radio commentators, and journalists are continually aspersing American motives and actions. Nor do I believe that a forthright exposition of the critical situations which have arisen in many parts of the world as a result of dynamic Soviet expansion will weaken the hands of Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin. Any danger of such weakening seems to me to proceed from another source, from those minority voices in this country and in Great Britain which advocate a policy of appeasement. Such a policy did not work with Hitler. It will not work with Stalin.

Finally, I cannot see why a critical analysis of Soviet foreign policy should discredit one as a student of Russian affairs. Many experts on German history and politics certainly offered critical analyses of Hitler's foreign policy between 1933 and 1939.

Sir Bernard himself, when I first knew him in the early thirties, was distinctly critical of many Soviet policies, foreign and domestic. I never felt that this disqualified him as a diligent student of Russian history and modern Russian politics and economics.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ William Henry Chamberlin

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

CHEKHOV, A. P. *The Russian Text of Three Plays: Uncle Vanya, Three Sisters, The Cherry Orchard*, Cambridge University Press, 1946. 168 pp., \$1.50.

CONDOIDE, MICHAIL V. *Russian-American Trade*, Columbus, Ohio, Ohio State University. 160 pp.

FISHER, HAROLD H. *America and Russia in the World Community*, Claremont, California, 1946. 175 pp., \$2.50.

KRAVCHENKO, VICTOR. *I Chose Freedom*, New York, Scribner's 1946. 496 pp., \$3.50.

DOBZHINSKY, M. V. (Ed.). *Pamyati Rakhmaninova* (In memory of Rachmaninoff), New York, Satina, 1946. 184 pp.

Practical Russian. Ed. by E. A. Moore and Gleb Struve, London, Edward Arnold, 1946. 122 pp.

Russkii Sbornik (Bunin, Remizov, Teffi, etc.). Paris, Podorozhnik, 1946. 206 pp., \$1.75.

SNOW, VALENTINE. *Russian Writers; a Bio-Bibliographical Dictionary*, New York, International Book Service, 1946. 222 pp., \$3.75.

TROTSKY, LEON. *Stalin*, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1946. 516 pp., \$5.00.



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